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Abstract 
This dissertation demonstrates several theses in relation to key components of Marx’s 
philosophy that conventional interpretations either misrepresent or overlook. The chief thesis 
concerns his idea of revolutionary subjectivity which is demonstrably inconsistent and 
undertheorized. The main areas of Marx’s work that are explored to elucidate this idea are his 
ontology and method, philosophical anthropology, idea of “communist society,” and theory of 
history. Insight into these and other aspects of his work can be derived through analysis of a 
tradition of social philosophy which has its origins in ancient Hellenic thought. Marx’s strongest 
inspiration from this period came from the philosophy of Aristotle, whose work profoundly 
influenced his understanding of human development and his idea of “free” life-activity and 
relations. A key component of this tradition is the ontological idea that “reason governs the 
world.” Marx sublated the form that it took in Hegel’s philosophy. Inspired by Hegel’s idea that 
“reason” is ‘at work’ in human history through a process of “estrangement,” Marx claimed that 
the capitalist mode of production is instrumental in the development of the productive forces and 
the “integral development” of the revolutionary working class. According to Marx the creation 
of revolutionary subjectivity takes place through “estrangement” and “revolutionary 
practice.” On his premises, such developmentally self-transformative life-activity 
is indispensable for the development of the capacities required for the revolutionary overthrow of 
capitalism and reorganization of social life. And yet he also claimed that the life-activity of 
working people in capitalist society has a tendency to ruin them physically and mentally. An 
accurate representation of this problem at the heart of Marx’s idea of revolutionary 
subjectivity—and thus of this idea itself—requires an emphasis on his sensitivity to the 
subjective-mental dimension of human life (his incipient psychology and theory of “mind”) and 
the development of individual ‘ethical’ capacities in particular. This dissertation concludes by 
rearticulating elements of Marx’s thought about “estrangement” and human subjectivity with 
Husserlian phenomenology and Freudian psychoanalysis (including some of Melanie Klein’s 
revisions of it) so as to establish a fruitful starting point for sublating Marx’s social philosophy. 
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Introduction 
“All this nonsense. Digression.” 
- Marx1  
1. The Problem 
Marx’s idea of revolutionary subjectivity has not received the attention that it deserves 
from scholars and interpreters of his work.2 Joseph McCarney was one of the relatively few 
exceptions and he thought that the identification of the revolutionary subject is a “crisis” facing 
Marxism.3 There is indeed a problem with Marx’s idea of revolutionary subjectivity, although it 
is not simply “the absence of this subject as Marx conceived it,” as McCarney claimed.4 After 
all, we might be short sighted and “this subject” may still appear. The real problem arises from 
the inconsistency inherent in Marx’s idea itself. 
Marx thought that he had comprehended the immanent realization of freedom in the world. 
In his own words, he was interested in “comprehending theoretically the historical movement as 
a whole,” i.e., the “historical movement going on under our very eyes.”5 From his perspective an 
integral part of this process is the genesis of an emancipatory form of individuality capable of 
                                                          
1 Marx 1973, 273. 
2 As Guido Starosta claimed, “it could be argued that not many works have explicitly put the problematic of 
revolutionary subjectivity at the center of the critique of political economy” (Starosta 2005, 162). See Chapter Five 
for critical remarks on Starosta’s interpretation. 
3 “The fundamental thesis of Marx’s social theory,” he claimed, “is that capitalism contains within it the emergent 
structures of the rational form of society which is socialism. The emergence of socialism depends on the agency of 
a subject which must, within Marx’s theoretical framework, be a social class. He identifies the revolutionary class 
as the proletariat of the most advanced capitalist countries of his time. Against this background the immediate 
source of the present crisis has to be seen as the failure of that class to play its historical role” (McCarney 1990, 
163). 
4 McCarney 1990, 180. Elsewhere he claims that Marx failed to correctly identify the revolutionary subject because 
of “the undeveloped state of the object of analysis,” i.e., “it has yet to reach maturity” (McCarney 1991, 31). 
5 Marx 2010, 77, 80. 
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initiating the creation of a “free” society and he claimed to see its incipient development and 
gradual organization into a social movement of the revolutionary working class.6 According to 
him, Capital is a “critical analysis of the actual facts” of capitalist society—and yet his idea of 
the development of revolutionary subjectivity was left undertheorized and inconsistent.7 His idea 
is especially undermined by his own account of the conditions of life in capitalist society which 
he depicts as largely detrimental for human development.  
Marx maintained that working class life ruins the “body” and “mind” of the individual 
worker, but he also thought that these conditions are instrumental in the development of the 
capacities required for revolution. In his view, the fundamental life-activity of working people in 
capitalist society, including the struggles that inevitably arise from it, would compel us to engage 
in activity that shapes us into revolutionary subjects. He did not think that it was his task to bring 
guidance to the masses from above, as though he simply discovered who embodies revolutionary 
subjectivity and what the content of their revolutionary action must be. In other words, he did not 
seek to make the working class revolutionary. He claimed to recognize that the fundamental 
social life-activity of the proletariat takes the form of “estrangement” in capitalism and compels 
them to engage in “revolutionary activity,” i.e., activity in which “the changing of oneself 
coincides with the changing of circumstances.”8 The seeds for the overthrow of the capitalist 
                                                          
6 In 1845 Marx thought many of these subjects had already begun to blossom in relatively advanced capitalist 
countries. He claimed that “a large part of the English and French proletariat is already conscious of its historic task 
and is constantly working to develop that consciousness into complete clarity” (Marx 1975b, 37).  
7 Marx 1976, 99. A key reason why Capital remained unfinished was because the revolutionary social 
transformation that he thought was happening had not ripened. Engels commented on this matter in his 
description of Marx’s plan for the third volume of Capital and the state of the manuscripts: “For the final chapter 
there is only the beginning. The intention here was to present the three great classes of developed capitalist 
society (landowners, capitalists and wage-labourers)...as well as the class struggle that is necessarily given with 
their very existence, as the actually present result of the capitalist period. Marx liked to leave conclusions of this 
kind for the final editing, shortly before printing, when the latest historical events would supply him, with unfailing 
regularity, with illustrations of his theoretical arguments, as topical as anyone could desire” (Marx 1981, 97). 
8 Marx and Engels 1998, 230. 
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order are sown within its own soil because “it provides for an unprecedented expansion of the 
productive forces of social labour and to the universal development of every individual 
producer.”9  
The “communist proletarians who revolutionise society,” Marx claimed, “put the relations 
of production and the forms of intercourse on a new basis—i.e., on themselves as new people.”10 
For him, revolutionary subjectivity amounts to a set of developed “mental” and “practical” 
capacities, including more specifically productive powers and ethical capabilities required to 
appropriate the productive forces created by capitalism, recognize all human beings as inherently 
ends-in-themselves, and initiate the reorientation of our social life-activity with the aim of 
providing everyone with the requirements for a “free” life. However, comprehending Marx’s 
idea of revolutionary subjectivity and providing a concrete account of it beyond this relatively 
abstract definition requires close examination of other key elements of his thinking. For this 
reason it will be discussed after exploring his ontology and ‘dialectical method’, his 
philosophical anthropology, his vision of “communist society,” and his understanding of the 
historical process of human development. Other fundamental components of his social 
philosophy will be elucidated in the process. This dissertation concludes by exploring potential 
pathways for the sublation of Marx’s work into a social philosophy which, on his premises, more 
adequately addresses the intensifying social and political struggles of the present that resonate 
with his revolutionary theory. 
 
                                                          
9 Marx 1975c, 293. 
10 Marx and Engels 1998, 230 
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2. Chapter Summaries 
The focus of the first chapter is on Marx’s ontology and “dialectical method.” A key 
component of this is his critical appropriation of the ultimate ontological premise of a tradition 
beginning with ancient Hellenic thought11 and sublated by Hegel; namely, that “Reason directs 
the world.”12 In this view “reason” is the “substance” of the natural universe and as “rational” 
subjects (“self-conscious reason”) we can become conscious of it in the form of “universal” 
laws.13 For Marx “dialectic” signified a ‘scientific method’ (or mode of thought) and an 
ontological concept. His “dialectical method” can thus be conceived of in accordance with what 
Hegel described as the “business of science”: “to make conscious” the “work which is 
accomplished by the reason of the thing itself.”14 The work of this kind of ‘scientist’ is akin the 
“critic” who, according to Marx, can comprehend “true actuality” in “the forms inherent in an 
existing actuality,” which in the case of human society takes the form of a “critical analysis of 
the actual facts” of social life-activity.15 This is a vital aspect of his “dialectical” critique of 
political economy and the capitalist mode of production in Capital. He thought that essential 
features of our activity in capitalism display the work of “reason” in an ‘unreasonable form’ 
because it is instrumental in the development of “the productive forces of social labour” and “the 
integral development of every individual producer” which are preconditions for a “rational form” 
of society.16 An indispensable aspect of Marx’s “dialectical method” was thus the 
comprehension of the “positive in the negative,” which is a feature of what in Hegelian 
                                                          
11 In Marx’s view this ancient tradition began with Pre-Socratic thinkers and reached its highest point with 
Aristotle. 
12 Hegel 1956, 25. 
13 Marx, for example, mentioned “the constant tendency and law of development” (Marx 1976, 1025). 
14 Hegel 1991, 60.  
15 Marx 1967, 213; Marx 1976, 99. 
16 Marx 1976, 173. 
5 
 
terminology is a “speculative” (or “positively rational”) form of thought. The “speculative” is 
habitually treated as one of the key features of Hegel’s thought that Marx decisively discarded 
after his ‘materialist turn’—encouraged, perhaps, by Marx’s excessive criticism of Hegel’s 
“dialectical method”—and yet, within the context of Marx’s work as a whole, his re-emphasis of 
the ‘dialectical negativity’ inherent in “what exits” also involves the idea that there is a 
discernable tendency for “a higher socioeconomic formation” to emerge.17 
The second chapter is devoted to an exploration of Marx’s idea of our “nature”—
“universal human nature”—understood in the Aristotelian sense as what we are when fully 
developed, which according to Marx is “free.”18 By describing us as a “universal” being and 
identifying us with the activity of “mind,” he essentially defined humanity as “self-conscious 
reason.” We are “free” when we are able to know “how to apply everywhere the inherent 
standard to the object,” i.e., to actualize the “universal” (which is “reason”) in all aspects of our 
life-practice, whereby we achieve self-determination.19 The “human being” is the “universally 
developed individual” who pursues the comprehensive development of their “essential 
powers.”20 Attention will also be given to Marx’s idea that a fundamental impetus for the 
development of our “nature” arises through our struggle to satisfy “natural necessity” via the 
social labour process. The struggle to live (and live well) leads us to alter not only the world 
                                                          
17 Marx 1981, 911. 
18 Marx 1967, 118. 
19  Marx 1964, 114. According to Hegel, “if I am dependent, my being is referred to something else which I am 
not.... I am free on the contrary, when my existence depends upon myself” (Hegel 1956, 17). Likewise, Marx 
thought that a “being only regards himself as independent...when he owes his existence to himself” (Marx 1967, 
312). 
20 Marx 1964, 176. Marx did not elaborately and systematically define these “powers”—e.g., as Aristotle did with 
his categorization of virtues (i.e., “moral” and “intellectual”) and further specification (“courage,” “wisdom,” 
etc.)—but substantial claims about human “species powers” are made throughout his writing nevertheless; e.g., 
his relatively cursory notes about the “human nature of the senses” which are not just “the five senses” but also 
include “the so-called spiritual and moral senses” (Marx 1967, 309). 
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which we inhabit but ourselves as well. Even though our “essential” character, as expressed 
through our life-activity, is such that its expression changes throughout the transitions between 
varying forms of what Marx termed the “ensemble of social relationships,” each character is a 
determinate gradation in our “universal” development nonetheless.21 
The third chapter examines Marx’s philosophical understanding of the form of society 
required for the realization of “full human development.”22 His idea of the content of a “free” life 
in “communist society” is similar to Aristotle’s idea of “eudemonia,” i.e., a life of “living and 
faring well” arising from the practice of “complete virtue.”23 The “social rationality” he 
envisioned is dependent on a social mode of life produced and reproduced by “universally 
developed individuals.”24 Marx’s idea of “justice” also conveys the influence Aristotle’s 
philosophy. It involves the practice of “complete virtue” in our relations with others25 and is 
itself a virtue (a kind of “moral virtuosity”) because it requires acting in accordance with a 
“universal” ethical principle. The realization of “justice” in this sense is necessary, according to 
him, for the proper functioning of a “communist” organization of social life which is an end-in-
itself. In such a society we could all achieve “rational” self-determination because as “associated 
producers” we would consciously provide ourselves with what we need to develop “universally”; 
i.e., the material means for a life oriented toward the “absolute movement” of the development of 
our “species powers” would be provided by everyone for everyone: “From each according to 
                                                          
21 Marx 1967, 402. 
22 Marx 1976, 533. 
23 Aristotle 1998, 15. Aristotle’s idea of virtue is “activity of soul which follows or implies a rational principle,” i.e., 
“reason,” and evidence indicates that Marx was inspired by it (Ibid., 13). 
24 Marx 1992, 390. 
25 In a more intimate form the “just” relations within which all activity takes place in “communist society” becomes 
what Aristotle described as true “friendship”: the reciprocal and mutually recognized practice of “complete virtue.” 
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[their] ability, to each according to [their] needs.”26 The practice of “justice” is integral for both 
realms of life-activity that Marx conceptually divided “communist society” into: the “realm of 
natural necessity” (which involves instrumental activity) and the “true realm of freedom” (which 
is devoted to activities that are ends-in-themselves). Marx claimed that instrumental labour 
would be done “rationally” for the sake of fully “free” end-in-itself activity and one of the key 
results of this is that it is minimized in order for us to spend as much time and energy in the 
“realm of freedom.” This realm involves the conscious actualization and enjoyment of 
“universal” intellectual and aesthetic principles (“the laws of beauty”) within relations that are 
“just” and mutually recognized to the fullest extent possible. In this way our life is composed of 
activities in which we exercise and further develop our “species powers.” 
The fourth chapter explores vital philosophical components of Marx’s writing on history 
and the growth of “communist society” from within capitalism. Freedom is the telos27 of the life 
of our species and in Marx’s view “reason” allegedly also governs our species’ developmental 
history. Inspired by Hegel, Marx thought “estrangement” in the labour process in particular 
illustrates the “dialectic of negativity” through which the “Reason” that “has always existed” 
attains its “rational form,” i.e., consciousness in “an advanced phase of communist society” 
when “the practical relations of everyday life between [individuals], and [humanity] and nature, 
generally present themselves to [us] in a transparent and rational form.”28 There is substantial 
evidence which indicates that a key component of his perspective of our historical development 
                                                          
26 Marx 2010c, 347. Marx’s call for the abolition of private property is significant not only because the functioning 
of “communist society” would require radically democratic control by the “associated producers” over the social 
means of production but also because in his view we would not want to exclude each other from the experience of 
our own “universal” good. 
27 Philosophical debates about Marx’s ‘teleological’ idea of humanity’s genesis will be addressed in this chapter. 
28 Marx 2010c, 347; Marx 1964, 177; Marx 1957, 213; Marx 1976, 173. Elements of Kant’s philosophy regarding our 
ability to discern a ‘rational’ movement in history will also be explored in this chapter. 
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is a sublation of Hegel’s idea of the “cunning of reason.” He evoked this concept in Capital in 
the midst of a discussion of specifically human activity—one of many instances throughout 
Marx’s writings which indicate that in his view “reason” is always ‘at work’, whether it is in a 
conscious or ‘unconscious’ form. More specifically, in periods of “estrangement” (like the 
capitalist mode of production)—which is a necessary phase in our development from our initially 
animal condition, determined by instinct, to human beings, the pinnacle of nature and the 
sovereign being of the cosmos, determined by “self-conscious reason”—it is ‘at work’ in an 
irrational form. For Hegel, a key form of “estrangement” is the “passions” of “World-Historical 
Individuals” which are irrational motives that have world-historical consequences. In Marx’s 
thought the “avarice” of the capitalist class plays an analogous role to the Hegelian “passions.” 
This is evident in his more general idea of “the transitory necessity of the capitalist mode of 
production.”29 He claimed that the “historic destiny” of capitalism, its “great historic quality” 
achieved via its “unlimited mania for wealth” and “ceaseless striving towards” surplus value 
production, is that it 
“creates the material elements for the development of the rich individuality which is 
as all-sided in its production as in its consumption, and whose labour also therefore 
appears no longer as labour, but as the full development of activity itself, in which 
natural necessity in its direct form has disappeared; because a historically created 
need has taken the place of the natural one.”30 
                                                          
29 Marx 1976, 739. 
30 Marx 1973, 325. 
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The capitalist mode of production is a form of human “estrangement” and Marx was 
unambiguous about his belief that it drives “towards its own suspension.”31 It does so primarily 
through the development of the productive forces of social labour as required for “communist 
society” and the emancipatory subjectivity that will initiate the creation of this new world. 
Marx’s idea of the revolutionary subjectivity that will perform this “suspension” is the 
topic of the fifth chapter. He thought that our initial discontent and rebelliousness will lead to 
“revolutionary practice” which transforms us in such a way that we become able to establish the 
“first phase of communist society.” This requires that the “estranged” conditions of life in 
capitalism have also previously shaped the subjectivity of the working class for its leading role in 
this process. A key instance of this ‘education’ through “revolutionary practice” is the process of 
appropriating the knowledge objectified in the productive forces (which requires a certain degree 
of development of individual productive powers to begin with) because he thought the act of 
appropriation further develops the capacities required for it. In his view, a key aspect of the 
“integral development of every individual producer” is the development of a feeling of 
indifference toward the “particularity” of work insofar as we are receiving wages (although his 
writing does not suggest that every individual must be able to operate all of the forces of 
production in order to establish the “first phase of communist society”). This is a result of wage-
labour “estrangement” in capitalism. He thought that in these conditions we are driven by 
“greed” for money which works in tandem with the essential features of the capitalist 
organization of the production process (‘deskilling’, etc.) to open up “the real sources of wealth,” 
                                                          
31 Ibid., 410. “The life of a people,” Hegel claimed, “ripens a certain fruit; its activity aims at the complete 
manifestation of the principle which it embodies. But this fruit does not fall back into the bosom of the people that 
produced and matured it; on the contrary, it becomes a poison-draught to it. That poison-draught it cannot let 
alone, for it has an insatiable thirst for it: the taste of the draught is its annihilation, though at the same time the 
rise of a new principle” (Hegel 1956, 78). 
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i.e. “general industriousness,” as it encourages us to move from occupation to occupation.32 Even 
if Marx’s idea of “integral development” seems unrealistic33 it is nevertheless a fact that the 
working class already operates the social forces of production as a collectivity.  
Marx depicts the ability to consciously unite in a way that facilitates radical democratic 
control of the production process as a fundamental factor in the success of a revolutionary 
movement.34 Aside from the development of our productive capacities, the development of 
individual ethical capacities to the extent necessary for initiating the “first phase of communist 
society” is another key component of Marx’s idea of revolutionary subjectivity. In his view the 
form of society which emerges initially would be “still stamped” with the morality “of the old 
society from whose womb it emerges,” although insofar as the initiation of a revolution for 
“communist society” is carried out consciously it requires the development of an incipient form 
of the desire for “justice.”35 For instance, Marx evokes the idea of this development in his claim 
that working people experience a kind of “association” through “revolutionary practice” which 
leads to the development of a new, higher need of an ethical kind: “the need for society.”36 His 
work indicates that overcoming the power structure of capitalism requires that we desire and are 
able to relate to each other on a more “just” level than the “estranged” relations characteristic of 
                                                          
32 Marx 1973, 224. 
33 There are other similar tendencies that can be seen in capitalism, although it is not clear that they have anything 
positive to offer to the process of human development. For example, Bill Morneau, the Finance Minister of 
Canada, has claimed that Canadians “should get used to so-called ‘job churn’—short-term employment and a 
number of career changes in a person’s life” (Canadian Press 2016). 
34 Cf. Marx’s claim that “It is the working [classes]...who have...laid down the real basis of a new society—modern 
industry, which transformed the destructive agencies of nature into the productive power of [humanity].... By 
creating the inexhaustible productive powers of modern industry they have fulfilled the first condition of the 
emancipation of labour. They have now to realize its other condition. They have to free those wealth-producing 
powers from the infamous shackles of monopoly, and subject them to the joint control of the producers.... The 
labouring masses have conquered nature; they now have to conquer [humanity]” (Marx 2010b, 278). 
35 Marx 2010c, 346. 
36 Marx 1964, 155. 
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the capitalist mode production, alongside the development of intellectual awareness about our 
essentially collective struggle and the necessary character of the collective solution. 
Marx’s idea of “revolutionary practice” is inconsistent with vanguardism and in fact 
precludes it. On his premises, to suggest otherwise would be to forget that “the educator himself 
must be educated.”37 He claims that the “proletarian movement is the self-conscious, 
independent movement of the immense majority, in the interest of the immense majority,” and 
that “the emancipation of the working classes must be conquered by the working classes 
themselves.”38 Nevertheless, in his view—as is amply demonstrated by the record of his 
activity—this does not repudiate the importance of organizing ourselves through the creation of 
groups with revolutionary aims, participating in mass protest movements, engaging in 
‘educational’ activities, or participating in the construction of a party apparatus to unify and 
clarify our interests and aims, influence state policy, and eventually attain state power. A typical 
vanguard-fallacy is the belief that it is possible to instill ‘revolutionary consciousness’ in the 
disgruntled and disaffected masses of oppressed people and provide them with organizational 
structure and leadership.39 This belief is intimately related to another mistaken interpretation of 
Marx’s thought: namely, that revolutionary subjectivity can be understood essentially as class-
consciousness. This interpretation of Marx’s idea of “the class-consciousness of the workers” is 
limited because he did not think of revolutionary subjectivity as a kind of awareness in a purely 
mental or intellectual sense; for Marx it also involves the ‘embodiment’ of the degree of “self-
                                                          
37 Marx 1967, 401 
38 Marx 2010, 78; Marx 2010c, 82. 
39 See, for instance, a typical vanguardist view in the following claims by Robert Brenner in the first issue of 
Catalyst: “the fact remains that, up to now, in most of the world, right-wing nationalist-cum-populist forces have 
been able to capitalize on the profound distress and disaffection of working people far more effectively than has 
the radical left”; the “question is whether a still embryonic radical left can develop the capacity to exploit the 
implicit and explicit opportunities that are certain to present themselves in the coming period” (Brenner 2017). 
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conscious reason” required for “revolutionary activity,” which requires a corresponding 
development of our ‘emotional’ and ‘sensual’ powers in order to carry it out in practice.40 It is 
thus more accurate to think of revolutionary subjectivity in the context of the totality of an 
individual’s character, i.e., as a revolutionary orientation of the individual’s entire personality. In 
order for us to ‘consciously’ participate in the creation of “communist society” we must not only 
know but be able, through will and action, to do what is necessary for its existence. Ultimately, 
from Marx’s perspective, the experience of “estrangement” and “revolutionary practice” by 
working people in capitalist society is required to equip us with capacities which cannot be 
imparted by the guidance of a vanguard. 
At this point a distinction must be made between the developmental processes associated 
with “estrangement” and “revolutionary practice” because Marx’s claims about the detrimental 
side of “estrangement” undermine his theory. In short, his idea that the capacities required to 
initiate the revolution develop through “estrangement” is inconsistent in the form that he left it 
because, according to him, it also has a marked tendency to ruin us physically and mentally. He 
claimed that “estrangement” stunts our development as “human” beings because it “mortifies 
[our] body and ruins [our] mind,” resulting in “ignorance” and “mental degradation.”41 As things 
have come to pass it does indeed appear that the severe exhaustion of the physical and mental 
energies of the working class is a widespread result of capitalist exploitation. Marx’s writing 
points out that “estrangement” is particularly detrimental for the development of revolutionary 
                                                          
40 Marx 1967, 808. “The subject,” McCarney claimed, “has to be a centre not just of cognition but also of will and 
agency, a desirer and doer as well as a knower. Hence, its consciousness is both theoretical and practical and, 
moreover, is necessarily embodied in some determinate locus of activity in the world. A dialectical social theory 
must, after all, be specifically concerned with factors of social change and, for that and other reasons, with forms 
of human practice. It is in the light of these concerns that consciousness as such becomes significant…. Hence, if 
one may still speak of a dialectic of consciousness, it has to be understood as that of a practical, embodied 
consciousness” (McCarney 1990, 117-118). 
41 Marx 1964, 110. 
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subjectivity because in his view we are deluded about our own activity and habituated to become 
treacherous creatures of the “cash nexus” driven by aggressive greed. It appears that Marx 
underestimated the extent to which the hostile nature of social relations in capitalism acts as a 
hindrance to revolutionary development and activity, and his work does not sufficiently address 
the question as to how we will overcome it through positively developmental “revolutionary 
practice.” 
Capitalism is a society that increasingly leaves “no other nexus between [individuals] than 
naked self-interest, than callous ‘cash payment’”—and yet Marx thought that it “produces not 
only the alienation of the individual from himself and from others, but also the universality and 
the comprehensiveness of his relations and capacities.”42 Our development therefore presents us 
with a tricky problem: according to Marx, individuals who experience these “alienated” relations 
in capitalism are nevertheless positioned to associate with each other in ways that foster the 
revolutionary “need for society.” If this need is going to develop at present in a revolutionary 
way it must do so in a world that appears to be increasingly motivated by envious competition 
and possessive individualism, rife with violence and authoritarianism in a myriad of forms, and 
decaying social conditions that are giving rise to reactionary movements worldwide.43 The 
working class’ “need for society” requires a development of ethical capacities (or, in Aristotelian 
terms, “moral virtue”) but Marx did not elaborate, in a realistic and substantial way, how these 
capacities will develop amid the “alienated” relations that comprise a fundamental aspect of 
capitalist society.44 
                                                          
42 Marx 2010, 70; Marx 1973, 162. 
43 Consider, for example, the problem posed by the “need for society” of the ‘Proud Boys’. 
44 As Hal Draper claimed, “Most of the problems of proletarian revolution stem from the massive role of divisions, 
disproportions, and disparities within the working classes, among its different sectors, and among its individuals. 
The process of overcoming these diversities and discords is a key part of the road to proletarian revolution. One 
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The idea of “estrangement” is closely connected to the problem of revolutionary 
subjectivity. The final chapter will explore a fruitful starting point for rearticulating 
“estrangement” and human subjectivity in Marx’s work with elements of Freudian 
psychoanalysis and Husserlian phenomenology.45 From Marx’s perspective, “estrangement” is 
rooted not only in the world of our social life-activity but also in us, our “inner world.”46 Human 
subjectivity was an essential element in Marx’s understanding of socio-economic phenomena 
(especially “estrangement”) and his work indicates that he had a sophisticated understanding of it 
even though he did not develop a robust theory of his own. In his view, life in capitalism is 
experienced differently by the subject who perceives it with “sober senses” compared to the 
subject with a “mystical consciousness” who experiences life in an illusory way. Thus he 
proposed that a serious inquiry into our subjectivity is worthwhile. He described the possibility 
of a “reform of consciousness” through “analysis of the mystical consciousness that is unclear 
about itself,” but he was unable to achieve this in a substantial way because he did not develop 
(or have at hand) a rigorous psychological theory with which he could approach a ‘Historical 
Materialist’ analysis of the “perceptibly existing human psychology.”47 Nevertheless, his work 
contains an incipient psychology.48 
Marx described “estranged” social practices as being driven by our own powers which 
have become a power unto themselves, are hostile, and command us, whereby our own social 
mode of life-activity and history dominates us as individuals and collectively all at once. His 
                                                          
can view this process as one of maturation. Maturation has several sides (physical, intellectual, emotional, and so 
on) even in the simple case of an individual; so also in the case of a class, which is a more complex phenomenon” 
(Draper 1978, 52). 
45 Parallels between Marx’s thought and Husserl’s phenomenology are also explored in the first chapter. 
46 Marx 1964, 108. 
47 Marx 1967, 214; 1975, 302. 
48 To begin with we can consider, for example, his use of psychological terminology to describe the subjective basis 
of socio-economic life such as “mania,” “accursed hunger,” etc. (Marx 1973, 222). 
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writing indicates that from his perspective it is not enough to conceptualize this simply as a 
feature of the social nature of our essential life-activity—even though this is a key factor in his 
explanation for the phenomena of “estrangement”—because our “inner world” is involved in 
determining it. Consider, for example, Marx’s idea of “the fetishism which attaches itself to the 
products of labour as soon as they are produced as commodities.”49 In Capital Marx summarizes 
our “estrangement” in the capitalist mode of production by claiming that our “own movement 
within society” has for us “the form of a movement made by things, and these things, far from 
being under [our] control, in fact control [us].”50 His claim that the “social relation between men 
themselves” takes the “fantastic form of a relation between things” is a key instance of the 
“mystical consciousness” of “estrangement” in his writings.51 Of course, it is an ‘inverted 
consciousness’52 because it corresponds to actually ‘inverted’ social life-activity, but insofar as 
Marx thought that we live in conditions which “require illusions” he was implicating a decisive 
subjective component in the determination of this social life even though he did not extensively 
elaborate it.53 
Marx thought that when the “sensuous” product of labour becomes a commodity it 
“changes into a thing which transcends sensuousness.”54 In doing so he equated a feature of our 
“social” activity with the “suprasensible.”55 In his view we are ‘social animals’ but not simply 
gregarious beasts; on the contrary, we are an inherently “rational,” conscious being that 
                                                          
49 Marx 1976, 165. 
50 Ibid., 167-8. 
51 Ibid., 165. 
52 This inversion is summed up in his claim that the “mysterious character of the commodity-form consists...simply 
in the fact that the commodity reflects the social characteristics of men’s own labour as objective characteristics of 
the products of labour themselves, as the socio-natural properties of these things” (Ibid.). 
53 Marx 1967, 250. 
54 Marx 1976, 163. 
55 Ibid., 165. 
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experiences the world intersubjectively. Thus, in a word, on Marx’s premises the realm of the 
“suprasensible” is located in “the human mind,” even though ‘commodity fetishism’ is 
inextricably linked to a definite form of social life-activity.56 Indeed, he claimed that the 
“objective conditions essential to the realization of labour are alienated from the worker,” which 
is an ‘objective’ socio-historical process, but he also claimed that in this process they “become 
manifest as fetishes endowed with a will and a soul of their own.”57 His point, of course, was not 
that commodities actually have a “soul” of their own, and when he claimed that the capitalist’s 
“soul is the soul of capital” he did not counter the inversion by simply claiming that there is no 
“soul.”58 Instead, his writing indicates that he thought mental-psychological processes are a 
fundamental basis for this inversion. In the case of the capitalist, for instance, they are “capital 
personified” because their “soul” is such that this definite form of life-activity satisfies an “inner 
necessity” of theirs (e.g., greed).59 Insofar as it is our “soul” that is ‘alienated’ and projected onto 
capital in this way, “estrangement” in Marx’s ‘Historical Materialism’ is a kind of ‘psycho-
social’ phenomenon. 
Marx claimed that capitalists are generally more “estranged” as a class60 than working 
people, but the subjectivity of the working masses who habitually participate in the irrationality 
of everyday life-activity an integral part of the capitalist system. Even though he thought their 
“estrangement” is ‘self-transcending’, he also claimed that capitalism has the potential to break 
down all resistance to it. Indeed, substantial historical evidence indicates that in some 
                                                          
56 Ibid., 90. 
57 Ibid., 1003. 
58 Ibid., 342. 
59 Marx 1967, 312. “Each tries to establish over the other an alien power, so as thereby to find satisfaction of his 
own selfish need” (Marx 1964, 147). 
60 This is because, according to Marx, they find “absolute satisfaction” in the “process of alienation” associated 
with the capitalist mode of production (Marx 1976, 990). 
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circumstances working people can become reactionary instead of revolutionary (e.g., by turning 
against each other on the basis of various prejudiced attitudes, supporting fascism and other 
reactionary movements, etc.,) and Marx himself insinuated that there is a tendency to resist what 
he considered a “reform of consciousness.”61 The persistent tendency to become mired in 
“estrangement” and saturated in the various illusions that arise organically out of our conditions 
of life62—which is a tendency that Marx was familiar with—underscores the need for a 
‘Historical Materialist’ approach to comprehending social and political phenomena which 
adequately takes human subjectivity into consideration. 
Insofar as the genesis of our ability to overcome our bondage to each other and “natural 
necessity” is a crucial feature of Marx’s ‘Historical Materialism’, the development of the power 
of our “mind” is as well. There is a relatively common tendency for people writing about Marx’s 
thought to interpret ‘Historical Materialism’ as a social theory which essentially treats the 
“mind” (and by extension any idea of psychological subjectivity) as epiphenomena.63 At the 
basis of this is a ‘materialist’ ontology which is inconsistent with Marx’s thought. The 
significance of overcoming this ‘materialism’ is illustrated by the work of those who have 
recognized the role of “mind” (and psychological subjectivity) in Marx’s ‘Historical 
                                                          
61 Cf. Schiller’s claim that “it must be something in men’s psyche that obstructs the acceptance of truth, even when 
it is so vividly convincing” (Schiller 2016, 27). 
62 In such circumstances we tend to take our activity and relations (e.g., competition, exchange, exploitation, etc.) 
for granted, typically because our lives leave us too desperate, weakened and demoralized to do anything about it. 
Consider, for instance, the “incredible amount of pressure” that Amazon puts on its workers “to work faster and 
faster,” a practice which they go along with because of “the fear of being ‘written up’ and losing their jobs, which 
will thrust them into other low-paid jobs with fewer benefits” (Semuels 2018). As one worker put it: “The constant 
trying to chase your rate [of productivity], trying to stay ahead of being written up—it affects you psychologically.” 
Another worker claimed that “what makes people not want to quit” Amazon is “the pay”: “People say, ‘You can 
treat met any type of way, since this is the best money we can get out here in Moreno Valley’” (Ibid.). 
63 Psychological theories are key components of social theory in the philosophical tradition that Marx is rooted in 
(cf. Plato’s Republic). Consider, for instance, Marx’s idea of “universally developed individuals” who are virtuous 
individuals à la the philosophy of Aristotle who claimed that “by human virtue we mean not that of the body but 
that of the soul; and happiness also we call an activity of soul” (Aristotle 1998, 25). Aristotle claimed further that 
“if this is so, clearly the student of politics must know somehow the facts about the soul” (Ibid.). 
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Materialism’ and tried to bring it into conversation with Freud’s work. While it can be 
demonstrated that Freudian psychoanalysis has marked consistencies with the incipient 
psychology in Marx’s ‘Historical Materialism’, these attempts ultimately come up short if they 
remain uncritical of the ‘materialist’ premises of Freud’s theory which are insufficient for the 
concept of “mind” found in Marx’s work, and thus also inattentive to the philosophical premises 
upon which Marx’s idea of “mind” rests. 
In Freud’s early essay titled “Project for a Scientific Psychology” he claimed that his 
“intention” was “to represent psychical processes as quantitatively determinate states of 
specifiable material particles, thus making those processes perspicuous and free from 
contradiction.”64 Views like this are typical of the natural sciences founded on the materialism of 
Newtonian physics which, as Alfred North Whitehead put it, conceives of “nature as composed 
of permanent things, namely bits of matter, moving about in space which is otherwise empty,” in 
which the “connections between such bits of matter consists purely of spatial relations.”65 
Whitehead maintained that it is impossible to interweave the concepts of “Life” and “Mind” 
within this “general concept of nature” because the locomotion “of matter involves change in 
spatial relationship” and “nothing more than that.”66 Freud left his “Project” unfinished67 but he 
did not fully cast aside the ‘materialist’ foundations of natural science and his “metapsychology” 
                                                          
64 Freud 1966, 295. 
65 Modes of Thought, 128. “We assume,” Freud wrote, “that mental life is the function of an apparatus to which we 
ascribe the characteristics of being extended in space and of being made up of several portions” (Freud 1966, 13). 
66 Whitehead 1968, 129, 132. “Matter involves nothing more than spatiality, and the passive support of 
qualifications. It can be qualified, and it must be qualified. But qualification is a bare fact, which is just itself. This is 
the grand doctrine of nature as a self-sufficient, meaningless complex of facts. It is the doctrine of the autonomy of 
physical science” (Whitehead 1968, 132). 
67 As his work progressed he attempted to take account of “the subtleties which were being brought to light by 
‘psychological analysis’ and which could only be accounted for in the language of mental processes” (Freud 1991, 
163). At that point he thought that the “physical characteristics” of “latent states of mental life” are “totally 
inaccessible to us: no physiological concept or chemical process can give us any notion of their nature” (Ibid., 169). 
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ultimately remained beset with an antithesis. At the end of his life he described psychoanalytic 
psychology as “a natural science like any other,” and according to him the “processes with which 
it is concerned” are akin to “those dealt with by other sciences” such as “chemistry or physics.”68 
His work indicates that even until that point his “metapsychology” was still part of the same 
general ‘materialism’ in which nature is ultimately composed of “dead” matter in strictly 
determined motion; consider, for example, his view that our innate “instincts” (i.e., the “somatic 
demands upon the mind,” including the physical-chemical processes associated with such bodily 
impulses) “are the ultimate cause of all activity.”69 Freud was thus unable to consistently 
maintain that we can potentially direct ourselves intelligently and live freely because his 
philosophical anthropology rests on the ontological premises of a mechanistic ‘materialism’ 
which precludes a coherent conception of self-determination and the life of “mind.” 
Examples of work which failed to sufficiently distinguish Freud’s perspective from Marx’s 
in this way can be drawn from various well-established attempts at synthesising their thought 
(e.g., the work of Wilhelm Reich70 and members of the Frankfurt School). Erich Fromm’s 
                                                          
68 Freud 1969, 30. 
69 Ibid., 17. 
70 In Dialectical Materialism and Psychoanalysis, Reich maintained that he does “not accept a certain ‘materialist’ 
conception of psychology widespread in Marxist circles,” i.e., “the concept of mechanistic materialism” (Reich 
2012, 11). Ultimately, however, he never overcame this “materialism” in his own appropriation of Freud’s 
psychoanalytic theory. In the first (1929) edition of this work he claimed that if a psychology “is to deserve the 
right to be called a materialistic psychology,” it “has to be clear about whether psychological activity can be viewed 
as a metaphysical fact—i.e., a fact outside the organic world—or as a secondary function bound up with the 
organic world” (Ibid., 13). And in the second (1934) edition, he wrote: “Sexual economy, if it wants to become a 
proper scientific discipline, must study the sexual process in all its functions, psychical as well as physiological, 
biological as well as social, and must equally investigate all the functions of the basic law of sexuality; thus it is 
faced with the difficult task of deducing sexual-psychical functions from sexual-biological functions. In this task it is 
assisted by the dialectical method which it consciously employs. We may put forward the following principle: it is 
certainly true that the psychical is the product of the organic and must consequently follow the same laws as the 
organic; but at the same time, it is the opposite of the organic, and in that function, it develops a set of laws which 
are its own and peculiar to itself. Only the study of these latter laws has been the task of psychoanalysis; and in the 
main, this task has been completed. Sexual economy may be expected to solve the problem of this relationship 
between physical and psychological functions; whether it does so depends on conditions outside our control” 
(Ibid.). 
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“analytic social psychology” attempted to take account of (and to some extent develop) the idea 
of mind (and psyche) in Marx71 but he could not have achieved a suitable synthesis for “the use 
of psychoanalysis within historical materialism” from the outset because, according to him, the 
“method and function of a psychoanalytic social psychology” is “that of classical Freudian 
psychoanalysis as applied to social phenomena.”72 
The final chapter will draw on Husserl’s phenomenological philosophy and psychology 
because his writings contain ideas of human subjectivity and experience which are consistent 
with the philosophical premises of Marx’s incipient psychology.73 “Psychology failed,” Husserl 
claimed, because “it let its task and method be set according to the model of natural science or 
according to the guiding idea of modern philosophy as objective and thus concrete universal 
science.”74 Freudian psychoanalysis would fit in this general description. According to Husserl, 
“Phenomenology frees us from the old objectivistic ideal of the scientific system, the 
theoretical form of mathematical science, and frees us accordingly from the idea of 
                                                          
71 Fromm maintained that Marx had an incipient psychology—“a dynamic psychology”—although he missed the 
mark with his claim that “Marx never meant” for “the ‘economic’ factor” to be “understood to refer to a 
psychological, subjective motive” (Fromm 1970, 64). He also mistakenly claimed that “Historical materialism is not 
at all a psychological theory” because “Economy in this context refers not to a psychic drive, but to the mode of 
production; not to a subjective psychological but to an objective socio-economic factor” (Fromm 1962, 38). On the 
contrary, Marx was sensitive to the subjective (and even “psychological”) determinations of economic life; e.g., the 
indispensable role of greed in animating certain economic behaviour and the objectification of knowledge in the 
productive forces. Nevertheless, it is true that Marx lacked “a satisfactory psychology” (Fromm 1970, 155). Indeed, 
as Norman Brown maintained, where “a psychology of human needs should be, there is in Marxism a great gap” 
(Brown 1959, 250). 
72 Fromm 1970, 157, 162. Other aspects of Fromm’s work will be explored in the final chapter. 
73 An accurate interpretation of this relationship requires a grasp of major elements of Marx’s philosophical 
thought which are discussed in the first and second chapters of this work. Husserl’s idea of “intentionality” and its 
usefulness for articulating the idea of experience associated with Marx’s method of “science” is explored in the 
first chapter as well. It is worth noting that Husserl locates his phenomenology within essentially the same 
tradition as Marx’s thinking is rooted: “Phenomenological philosophy regards itself in its whole method as a pure 
outcome of methodical intentions which already animated Greek philosophy from its beginnings; above all, 
however, [it continues] the still vital intentions which reach, in the two lines of rationalism and empiricism, from 
Descartes through Kant and German idealism into our confused present day” (Husserl 1999, 335). 
74 Husserl 1970, 203. 
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an ontology of the soul which could be analogous to physics.75 Only blindness to the 
transcendental, as it is experiencable and knowable only through phenomenological 
reduction,76 makes the revival of physicalism in our time possible.”77 
While various theorists have attempted to bring Marx’s thought into conversation with 
Freud’s, not enough attention has been given to the Kleinian version of psychoanalysis in this 
regard. The final chapter will draw connections between the philosophy of ‘Historical 
Materialism’ and Melanie Klein’s interventions in the psychoanalytic tradition.78 Even though 
her psychoanalytic theory shares the same fundamental flaws as Freud’s initial version in 
relation to Marx’s thought, her revision of his theory is more compatible with the philosophical 
premises of Marx’s ‘Historical Materialism’, especially in relation to his idea of ethical life and 
experience. For Marx, “estrangement” is fundamentally “estrangement” from each other. The 
“mystical consciousness” of “estrangement” does not just involve the projection of subjective 
powers onto objects, but also the habitual objectification of other subjects.79 Klein put forth an 
“object relations” perspective of psychological life with a psycho-social basis for “universal” 
ethical experience and activity that is amenable to the conceptual framework of Marx’s 
‘Historical Materialism’. Ultimately, her work presents a psychology of social and political life 
                                                          
75 “In no way,” Husserl maintained, “can a science of soul be modeled on natural science or seek methodical 
counsel from it” (Ibid., 223). 
76 That is, the “epoché.” Chapter One contains further discussion of this concept. 
77 Ibid., 265. Cf. Husserl 1970, 212. 
78 Fromm, incidentally, claimed that Klein’s “evidence and constructions have not been convincing in the opinion of 
most psychoanalysts, including myself” (Fromm 1970, 32). 
79 “When man confronts himself, he confronts the other man.... In fact, the proposition that man’s species-nature 
is estranged from him means that one man is estranged from the other, as each of them is from man’s essential 
nature. The estrangement of man, and in fact every relationship in which man stands to himself, is first realized 
and expressed only in the relationship in which a man stands to other men. Hence within the relationship of 
estranged labor each man views the other in accordance with the standard and the relationship in which he finds 
himself as a worker” (Marx 1964, 114-115). 
22 
 
which compliments a ‘Historical Materialist’ analysis of progressive-revolutionary and 
conservative-reactionary political movements and their corresponding ideologies, attitudes, etc. 
3. A Confession 
In the middle of an intimate conversation at a time when this thesis project was just a hazy 
idea of an amorphous plan for engaging with Marx’s philosophy, I found myself in the odd 
position of identifying as a ‘Marxist’, supporting the central philosophical and political tenets of 
Marx’s social theory, but simultaneously maintaining that his theory of revolutionary 
subjectivity—which, in my view, is a central (if not the most integral) component of his 
revolutionary theory—is inconsistent and full of gaps. In a way, this thesis has inadvertently 
become a recounting of the shedding of my ‘theoretical’ skin—a kind of anámnēsis. It is not just 
an interpretation of Marx’s writings; it is intended to be a critical engagement with his thinking. I 
do not attempt to ‘solve’ the problem of revolutionary subjectivity. A “scientific” theory of this 
development can only be demonstrated through self-evidence which is both “theoretical and 
practical” (at which point the apparent opposition between theory and practice is sublated); in 
other words, the “soul” of the revolutionary subject cannot be known merely as an object in the 
world but fundamentally as the activity of a subject through our own collective participation in 
“revolutionary practice.” 
At a Historical Materialism conference in Toronto (May 2016) I was asked why I bothered 
to investigate Marx’s idea of revolutionary subjectivity “theoretically.” This question had never 
crossed my mind in any significant way until that moment. My interlocutor argued that the 
revolutionary subjects are created by “history” and that we do not need a theory because we/they 
just need to become revolutionary. Essentially, the question boiled down to why I even bothered 
to make it a ‘philosophical’ problem if Marx’s revolutionary social theory is ultimately about 
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‘changing the world’. I cannot recall how I responded but I remember wanting to say that we are 
driven to comprehend this ‘philosophically’ because of our “material and spiritual” struggles. 
The lives of working people around the globe are becoming more difficult and our suffering is 
increasing. We are ‘losing the class war’ and extreme right-wing reaction is on the rise 
worldwide—and as the average temperature of the Earth rises at an intensified rate, it appears 
that the “icy water of egotistical calculation” is only getting colder.80 
Marx claimed that humanity “inevitably sets itself on such tasks as it is able to solve.”81 
Whether or not this is determined to be true, we cannot comprehend the solutions to the social 
problems and political conflicts that we face without comprehending ourselves, and if we 
seriously intend to achieve these aims we cannot avoid becoming involved in ‘philosophy’. As 
Whitehead claimed, 
“Every epoch has its character determined by the way its populations re-act to the 
material events which they encounter. This reaction is determined by their basic 
beliefs—by their hopes, their fears, their judgments of what is worth while. They 
may rise to the greatness of an opportunity.... On the other hand, they may collapse 
before the perplexities confronting them. How they act depends partly on their 
courage, partly on their intellectual grasp. Philosophy is an attempt to clarify those 
fundamental beliefs which finally determine the emphasis of attention that lies at the 
base of character.”82 
                                                          
80 Marx 2010, 70. 
81 Marx 1977, 21. 
82 Whitehead 1967, 99. 
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This kind of ‘philosophical’ approach shares a similar spirit with what Marx called the “self-
understanding”—or “confession”—“of the age concerning its struggles and wishes.”83 In his 
opinion it is a “task of history” to “establish the truth of this world” and the immediate task of 
“philosophy” insofar as it “is in the service of history” is “to unmask human self-alienation.”84 
However, this dissertation indicates that Marx’s ‘philosophical’ approach is not—and indeed 
cannot be—oriented toward discovering ‘the truth’ for the world to merely “accept, pass on, and 
put into practice.”85 Instead, its ethos is akin to the sentiment expressed in what Socrates said, 
while he stood on the threshold of the Cave, about those who are not aware of their chains:  
“They’re like us.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
83 Marx 1967, 215. 
84 Ibid., 251. 
85 Marx 2010c, 298. 
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Chapter One - Ontology and Method 
“I am so far advanced that in five weeks I will be through with the whole economic shit. And that 
done, I will work over my Economics at home and throw myself into another science in the 
museum. I am beginning to tire of it.” 
 - Marx, 185186 
“There is no royal road to science, and only those who do not dread the fatiguing climb of its 
steep paths have a chance of gaining its luminous summits. 
Believe me...” 
 - Marx, 187287 
1. “At the entrance to science, as at the entrance to hell...” 
Marx never described his idea of the “dialectical method” in a substantial way. 
Nevertheless, through a close study of his work we are able to discern that he sublated Hegel’s 
idea of “dialectic” as the “higher movement of reason.”88 Understood in this way, “dialectic” 
refers to a mode of thought and an ontology which is premised on the originally ancient 
Hellenic89 idea that “Reason directs the world.”90 Hegel was also situated in this philosophical 
tradition and Marx’s writings demonstrate that Hegel’s sublation of it into his own philosophy 
had a profound and enduring influence on Marx’s thought. For this reason Hegel’s writings are 
an invaluable source of further clarification for all key components of Marx’s method. His idea 
of “Reason” as both ‘substance and subject’ is foundational for what became known as Marx’s 
                                                          
86 Quoted in McLellan 1973, 283. 
87 Marx 1976, 104. 
88 Hegel 1969, 105. 
89 When interpreting Marx’s criticism of Hegel’s “dialectical method” we must remember that they are both 
situated within this philosophical tradition, more of which will be discussed below. 
90 Hegel 1956, 12. 
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‘Historical Materialism’.91 Even though there is substantial evidence found throughout the span 
of Marx’s writing which indicates that he critically retheorized this idea, it nevertheless remains 
largely overlooked.92 
The fact that Marx sublated Hegel’s “dialectical method” is widely recognized by 
commentators on Marx’s thought but there remains great diversity among interpretations of his 
method. A commonly held view among commentators is that Marx abandoned the “speculative” 
aspect of Hegel’s method93 along with his rejection of Absolute Idealism, and yet it is possible to 
discover substantial evidence in Marx’s writing which indicates that he retained the element of 
“speculative” thought. In comparison, the phenomenological character of Marx’s method is 
recognized more readily.  
The key components of Marx’s “dialectical method” form a triad: this ontological idea that 
“Reason directs the world,” its phenomenological character, and his “speculative” thinking. The 
relationship between these main components will be explored alongside other related aspects of 
Marx’s thought and in the process it will be demonstrated, contrary to a prevalent interpretive 
tendency, that Marx’s method is not a kind of crude ‘materialist empiricism’. Evidence from 
Marx’s ‘mature’ writings which indicates that he did not abandon or profoundly alter the 
                                                          
91 While it may seem counterintuitive at first, this ontology precludes the idea that Marx’s ‘historical dialectic’ 
involves the application of some ‘fundamental laws of dialectics’ to human history so as to demonstrate the 
inevitability of Communism, as was proposed by Soviet ‘Diamat’. This and other related questions will be 
addressed in Chapter Four. 
92 A notable exception is found in Ted Winslow’s paper “’Internal relations’ and Marx’s ‘materialist conception of 
history’” (2015, Capital & Class 39, no. 1: 95-110). 
93 According to Hegel it consists in the comprehension of “the positive in the negative.” In his view it is “the most 
important aspect of dialectic” and “for thinking which is as yet unpractised and unfree it is the most difficult” 
(Hegel 1969, 56). 
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ontological and epistemological foundations of his method as his thought developed will be 
presented throughout this chapter.94 
2. Ancient Hellenic Philosophy and the “exploration of the rational” 
Marx was initially exposed to the origins of the ontological idea that “Reason directs the 
World” in an ancient Hellenic tradition of philosophy that he studied in university. As Hegel 
claimed, it was Anaxagoras who “was the first to enunciate the doctrine that νοῦς…or Reason, 
governs the world.”95 For Heraclitus, another notable progenitor of this tradition, “all things 
come to pass in accordance with” the “logos.”96 According to Hegel, the ‘intelligent’ order of the 
cosmos is evident, for example, in the “movement of the solar system” which “takes place 
according to unchangeable laws” which are “Reason, implicit in the phenomena in question.”97 
Thus Hegel proposed that the “sole business of science is to make conscious” the “work which is 
accomplished by the reason of the thing itself.”98 It is within this philosophic tradition that we 
should locate the ontological foundations of Marx’s assertion that “the ultimate aim” of Capital 
was “to reveal the economic law of motion of modern society,” one of “the natural laws of its 
                                                          
94 If this goes unrecognized we risk making the mistake of interpreting his ‘mature’ critique of capitalism primarily 
as an attempt to expose the transitory character of the capitalist mode of production. Allen Wood, for instance, 
claimed that the “ultimate aim of Marx’s theory, of course, is to reveal the tendencies to change inherent in 
bourgeois society” (Wood 2004, 226). This view is not entirely correct because Marx emphasized the transitory 
character of capitalism insofar as he claimed to see the immanent development of a “higher” social form from 
within the social life-process of capitalism. Cf. McCarney’s claim that “what underlies Marx’s conception of the 
practical significance of his social theory is his allegiance to an idea of method derived ultimately from Hegel,” i.e., 
“the phenomenological dialectic,” and that “the central substantive insight of dialectics is” the “idea that behind 
the phenomenal forms of existing society there is a more rational order struggling to be born” (McCarney 1990, 
114, 193). 
95 Hegel 1956, 11. Cf. Hegel 1969, 50 and Hegel 1968, 331-2, 339-40. 
96 Heraclitus 2001, 2. 
97 Hegel 1956, 11. “To consider something rationally,” Hegel claimed, “means not to bring reason to bear on the 
object from outside in order to work upon it, for the object is itself rational for itself; it is the spirit in its freedom, 
the highest apex of self-conscious reason, which here gives itself actuality and engenders itself as an existing 
world” (Hegel 1991, 60). 
98 Hegel 1991, 60. For him, of course, this is ultimately the process of “Spirit” or “Mind” becoming conscious of 
itself: “the aim of all genuine science is just this, that mind shall recognize itself in everything” (Hegel 1971, 1). 
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movement.”99 On the one hand, the existence of social and political “science” of this sort entails 
that we can have real insight into our social life-process, enabling us to take conscious, 
collective, and ultimately “free” control of it; on the other hand, it also entails that we cannot 
“put forward fantastic solutions” to “social antagonisms” in the place of such knowledge.100 
Hegel emphasized that “we must clearly distinguish” between Anaxagoras’ principle and 
“intelligence as self-conscious Reason” and he claimed that it was Socrates who “adopted the 
doctrine of Anaxagoras” and radically transformed it, taking “the first step in comprehending the 
union of the Concrete with the Universal.”101 Socrates agreed with Anaxagoras that ‘Mind’ is a 
sovereign force in the world but he maintained that it was most truly active in the shared 
consciousness of human beings; hence the sentiment attributed to him by Plato that “I am 
devoted to learning; landscapes and trees have nothing to teach me—only the people in the city 
can do that.”102 Marx thought that this tradition (and the philosophy of Hellenic antiquity in 
general) reached its zenith with Aristotle103 for whom the “function” of humanity “is an activity 
of soul which follows or implies a rational principle,” i.e., “logos.”104 This tradition is thus 
                                                          
99 Marx 1976, 92. 
100 Marx 2010c, 298. 
101 Hegel 1956, 12-13. As A.E. Taylor put it, “Mind, said Anaxagoras, is the cause of all natural law and order, just as 
mind is the cause of the orderliness and coherence of human action. To Socrates this suggested that the universe 
at large is the embodiment, like a properly conducted human life, of coherent rational plan” (Taylor 1952, 64). 
102 Plato 1997, 510. Cf. Marx’s claim that “Feuerbach’s aphorisms seem to me incorrect only in one respect, that he 
refers too much to nature and too little to politics. That, however, is the only alliance by which present-day 
philosophy can become truth” (Marx 1975d, 400). 
103 Hegel maintained that “With Anaxagoras a light, if still a weak one, begins to dawn, because the understanding 
is now recognized as the principle. Aristotle says of Anaxagoras: ‘But he who said that reason (nous), in what lives 
as also in nature, is the origin of the world and of all order, is like a sober man as compared with those who came 
before and spoke at random’” (Hegel 1968, 319). 
104 Aristotle 1998, 13. 
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foundational for Marx’s philosophical anthropology insofar as he conceived of the human 
“species being” as “a universal and therefore a free being.”105 
Aside from his direct study of ancient Hellenic philosophy, Marx was also exposed to this 
tradition in a renewed form through his studies of German philosophy, especially in the writings 
of Hegel. The idea of “Reason” underwent further development in Hegel’s philosophy and he 
articulated it as 
“Substance, as well as Infinite Power; its own Infinite Material underlying all the 
natural and spiritual life which it originates, as also the Infinite Form,—that which 
sets this Material in motion. On the one hand, Reason is the substance of the 
Universe; viz. that by which and in which all reality has its being and subsistence. On 
the other hand, it is the Infinite Energy of the Universe…. It is the infinite complex of 
things, their entire Essence and Truth. It is its own material which it commits to its 
own Active Energy to work up; not needing, as finite action does, the conditions of 
an external material of given means from which it may obtain its support, and the 
objects of its activity. It supplies its own nourishment and is the object of its own 
operations. While it is exclusively its own basis of existence, and absolute final aim, 
it is also the energising power realising this aim; developing it not only in the 
phenomena of the Natural, but also of the Spiritual Universe—the History of the 
World. That this ‘Idea’ or ‘Reason’ is the True, the Eternal, the 
                                                          
105 Marx 1964, 112. Cf. Aristotle’s view that “reason more than anything else is [humanity]” and Hegel’s claim that 
“the universal” which unites all of humanity, “man as man,” is “mind” (Aristotle 1998, 226; Hegel 1971, 1). 
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absolutely powerful essence…is the thesis which…has been proved in 
Philosophy.”106 
Textual evidence indicates that Hegel’s idea of “reason” as “the substance of the Universe” had a 
profound influence on Marx in his formative years and that he “received the inner call to 
comprehend,” as Hegel put it, whereby he came to “recognize reason as the rose in the cross of 
the present” which enabled him “to delight” in it.107 His writings also indicate that this 
philosophical orientation influenced his revolutionary disposition. In May 1843, he wrote to 
Arnold Ruge: “You will not say that I value the present time too highly. And if I do not despair, 
it is only the desperate situation of the present that fills me with hope.”108 Another letter to Ruge 
from September 1843 suggests that this disposition of Marx’s was directly associated with what 
Hegel termed the “rational insight” and “reconciliation with actuality” that “philosophy” granted 
Marx’s “inner” calling.109 Marx wrote that “Reason has always existed, but not always in rational 
form. The critic, therefore, can start with any form of theoretical and practical consciousness and 
develop the true actuality out of the forms inherent in existing actuality as its ought-to-be and 
goal.”110 Capital indicates that he sublated this into his ‘mature’ theory and “scientific” critique 
of capitalism and political economy, in which he attempted to “make conscious” the “work” of 
“reason” which is “implicit in the phenomena” of life in capitalist society. Hegel’s idea of 
“reconciliation” was for Marx an inherently revolutionary one. 
 
                                                          
106 Hegel 1956, 9-10. 
107 Hegel 1991, 22. 
108 Marx 1967, 210. 
109 Hegel 1991, 22. 
110 Marx 1967, 213. 
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Sean Sayers associates the Young Hegelian “critical approach,” i.e., the “utopian and 
subjective wishful thinking” that abandoned the “scientific attitude of studying what is,” with 
Marx’s idea of the activity of the “critic” in 1843.111 While Sayers is justified in defining 
“subjective wishful thinking” as utopian, it is mistaken to associate this with Marx’s position in 
1843 because, based on the philosophical premises which are evident in his writing at the time, 
Marx thought “reason” is “what is.” Thus Marx’s position in 1843 does not entail that “the world 
is judged and criticised in light of how it ought to be,” as Sayers maintains.112 Insofar as Marx 
critically appropriated the Hegelian principle that “philosophy is exploration of the rational,” his 
revolutionary social theory is “for that very reason the comprehension of the present and actual, 
not the setting up of a world beyond which exists” only “in the errors of a one-sided and empty 
ratiocination.”113 This idea is expressed in the manuscripts posthumously published as The 
German Ideology in which Marx and Engels wrote that “Communism is for us not a state of 
affairs which is to be established, an ideal to which reality [will] have to adjust itself. We call 
communism the real movement which abolishes the present state of things.”114 In this way, Marx 
took up what Hegel described as the “task of philosophy,” i.e., to “comprehend what is” because 
“what is is reason.”115 This principle was vital for Marx’s idea of the relationship between theory 
                                                          
111 Sayers 1987, 153. 
112 Ibid. 
113 Hegel 1991, 20. McCarney claimed that Marx was concerned with “what Hegel calls ‘surrender to the life of the 
object’, and the thinking of that life in systematic, discursive form” (McCarney 2000, 67). In recent literature, 
Caligaris and Starosta maintain that what “is rational in Hegel’s dialectic” is “its method of immanent development 
of the life of the subject-matter” (Caligaris and Starosta 2014, 67). Cf. Starosta 2015, 62. 
114 Marx and Engels 1998, 57. 
115 Hegel 1991, 21. Hegel states further that if “theory does indeed transcend [its] own time, if it builds itself a 
world as it ought to be, then it certainly has an existence, but only within…opinions, a pliant medium in which the 
imagination can construct anything it pleases” (Ibid., 22). It follows that since every philosophy “is a philosophy of 
its time,” it “provides satisfaction only for those interests which are appropriate to their time” (Hegel 1968, 106). 
“Socrates,” for example, “did not grow like a mushroom out of the earth, for he stands in continuity with his time” 
(Hegel 1968, 384). It is evident that Marx also held a similar position. He maintained that “philosophers do not 
spring up like mushrooms out of the ground; they are products of their time, of their nation, whose most subtle, 
valuable and invisible juices flow in the ideas of philosophy” (Marx 1975d, 195). 
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and practice. For him, a genuinely “scientific” theory of “communism” depicts it as it “emerges” 
from the “womb” of capitalist society, unlike the fanciful imagination of ‘utopian’ reformers 
who have not attained sufficient insight into their contemporary circumstances and instead make 
fantastic plans for the future.116 
3. “Dialectic” as the Onto-Methodological “higher movement of reason” 
One of Marx’s most well-known statements on the “dialectical method” can be found in 
the 1873 afterword to Capital where he wrote that it is a process of “inquiry” whereby we 
“appropriate the material in detail,” “analyse its different forms of development” and “track 
down their inner connection. Only after this work has been done can the real movement be 
appropriately presented. If this is done successfully…the life of the subject-matter is now 
reflected back in the ideas.”117 The onto-methodological nature of “dialectic” is difficult to 
discern from only this passage, although it can be pieced together from this and other sources in 
the writing of Marx and clarified with the aid of Hegel’s work. It is important to stress the 
ontological aspect of Marx’s idea of “dialectic” because of the increasingly common tendency to 
treat it simply as if it were a mere theoretical tool.118 Bertell Ollman, for instance, has placed an 
excessive emphasis on the methodological aspect of “dialectic” in Marx’s thought; e.g., 
                                                          
116 Marx 2010, 346. Contrary to Guido Starosta’s claim that “Marx’s materialist dialectical science entailed the 
transcendence of all philosophy,” Marx remained ‘philosophical’ in this sense (Starosta 2016, 52). Starosta argues 
that Marx abandoned “the abstract character of idealist philosophy as present in” Hegel because “the very essence 
of philosophy” is “to be indifferent to the real movement of human practice. Within the limits of philosophical 
thought, no real mediation is possible between theory and practice,” and “the relation between theory and 
practice cannot but become inverted” (Ibid., 14). However, the standpoint of philosophy according to Hegel as 
outlined above is not inconsistent with the fact that Marx turned “his attention on the way human life is materially 
produced” (Ibid., 15). It is rather a necessary ontological foundation for the kind of “science” characteristic of 
Marx’s ‘materialist’ “dialectical method.” 
117 Marx 1976, 102. 
118 Cf. Hegel 1969, 56. A typical example can be found in Arthur Schipper’s review of Dialectics in World Politics in 
which he describes “dialectics” as consisting of “a highly intuitive set of methodological tools,” a “sophisticated 
theoretical machinery,” and “a step-by-step method for applying this machinery” (Schipper 2016). 
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“dialectics is a way of thinking that brings into focus the full range of changes and interactions 
that occur in the world.”119 Ironically, this view omits the “full range” of Marx’s idea of 
“dialectic” because it ignores its fundamental ontological dimension. As McCarney argued, 
“questions of ontology” must be entertained as well because “no account of dialectic can be 
adequate without treating them.”120 
The ontological meaning of “dialectic” is conveyed, though in an abstract and obscure 
way, when it is presented as the grand process of change in the cosmos or the transformative 
power at work in the flux of things. Hegel did in fact claim that it is “in general the principle of 
all motion, of all life, and of all activation in the actual world.”121 However, as the principle of 
“all activation in the actual world,” “dialectic” does not simply denote ‘change’ per se, although 
this is certainly an essential aspect of it. On the contrary, as an onto-cosmological principle, 
“dialectic” is a feature of the developmental movement of “reason” which takes place ‘within’ 
the ‘objective world’ and the activity of thought.122 We can observe this, for instance, in Hegel’s 
Science of Logic where he treats “dialectic” simultaneously as an ontology and as a mode of 
thought, even within a single sentence: “we call dialectic the higher movement of reason in 
which…seemingly utterly separate terms pass over into each other spontaneously, through that 
which they are, a movement in which the presupposition sublates itself.”123 
                                                          
119 Ollman 2003, 12. 
120 McCarney 1987, 181. Cf. his claim that in “the usual litanies...of what is living and what is dead in Hegel, it is his 
ontological vision that is most readily assigned to the philosophical graveyard” (Ibid., 162). 
121 Hegel 1991b, 128-129. “Everything around us can be regarded as an example of dialectic. For we know that, 
instead of being fixed and ultimate, everything finite is alterable and perishable, and this is nothing but the 
dialectic of the finite, through which the latter, being implicitly the other of itself, is driven beyond what 
immediately is and overturns into its opposite” (Ibid., 130). 
122 At this point it is perhaps helpful to recall Hegel’s idea that “reason” is both ‘substance’ and ‘subject’. According 
to him, “everything turns on grasping and expressing the True, not only as Substance, but equally as Subject” 
(Hegel 1977, 10). Cf. Whitehead’s claim that there “is Reason, asserting itself above the world, and there is Reason 
as one of many factors within the world” (Whitehead 1929, 10). 
123 Hegel 1969, 105. 
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The unity of the ontological and methodological dimensions of “dialectic” is conspicuously 
presented in Hegel’s Encyclopaedia Logic. In this text we read that the form of “the logical” has 
“three sides”: “the side of abstraction or of the understanding,” “the dialectical or negatively 
rational side,” and “the speculative or positively rational one.”124 Thus the “dialectical” is 
necessarily present as a form of thought corresponding to the “negatively rational” side of the 
“logical,” hence Hegel’s claim in the Science of Logic that “dialectic” is “a necessary function of 
reason.”125 The implications for methodology become clearer when we compare “dialectical” 
thinking to the thought of what Hegel calls the “understanding,” i.e., thought which “stops short 
at the fixed determinacy and its distinctness vis-à-vis other determinacies” and “behaves toward 
its ob-jects in a way that separates and abstracts them.”126 The moment of the “understanding” is 
a necessary moment in the process of cognition, but to treat the finite abstractions of the 
“understanding” as ‘concrete’ or true in-themselves is a distortion of reality.127 Thus the moment 
of the “understanding” is supplanted by the “dialectical moment” which “is the self-sublation of 
                                                          
124 Hegel 1991b, 125. 
125 Hegel 1969, 56. 
126 Hegel 1991b, 125-26. Engels described an analogous tendency in the thinking characteristic of the natural 
sciences: “The analysis of Nature into its individual parts” has “left us as a legacy the habit of observing natural 
objects and natural processes in their isolation, detached from the whole vast interconnection of things; and 
therefore not in their motion, but in their repose; not as essentially changing, but as fixed constants; not in their 
life, but in their death” (Engels 1934, 27). Whitehead, too, emphasizes the fact that the ‘materialist’ ontology of 
the natural sciences results in a conception of a “lifeless” nature (Whitehead 1968, 127). Cf. the comedic novel 
Tristram Shandy (of which Marx was very fond): “There lies your mistake, my father would reply;—for, in Foro 
Scientiae there is no such thing as MURDER,—‘tis only DEATH, brother” (Sterne 2009, 56). In this context it is 
interesting to note Hegel’s claim that an abstraction “detached from what circumscribes it”—whereby it attains 
“an existence of its own and a separate freedom”—is the result of “the tremendous power of the negative; it is the 
energy of thought, of the pure 'I'. Death, if that is what we want to call this non-actuality, is of all things the most 
dreadful, and to hold fast what is dead requires the greatest strength. Lacking strength, Beauty hates the 
Understanding for asking of her what it cannot do. But the life of Spirit is not the life that shrinks from death and 
keeps itself untouched by devastation, but rather the life that endures it and maintains itself in it. It wins its truth 
only when, in utter dismemberment, it finds itself” (Hegel 1997, 19). 
127 To do so is to commit what Whitehead termed the “Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness” (Whitehead 1925, 58). 
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these finite determinations on their own part, and their passing into their opposites.”128 Put 
simply, this tendency of the finite to sublate itself129 constitutes the “dialectical” nature of 
‘reality’ (i.e., “the logical” or “reason”).130 All finitude is ultimately a moment in an infinite 
process,131 famously expressed by Heraclitus’ “πάντα ῥεῖ” (“everything flows”). In this view the 
entire ‘cosmos’ is alive in the sense of being an active process.132  
The ultimate nature of the finite is thus “ideality,”133 hence the importance of the 
“dialectical” for Hegel’s Idealism.134 This dialectical ‘passing over’ of the finite, whereby 
                                                          
128 Hegel 1991b, 128. Cf. Marx’s claim that “the laws of appropriation or of private property, laws based on the 
production and circulation of commodities, become changed into their direct opposite through their own internal 
and inexorable dialectic” (Marx 1976, 729). 
129 According to Hegel, this “is what everything finite is: its own sublation” (Hegel 1991b, 128). The finite “sublates 
itself by virtue of its own nature, and passes over, of itself, into its opposite” (Ibid., 129). 
130 For Hegel “all finite things…are affected with untruth; they have a concept, but their existence is not adequate 
to it. For this reason they must go to ground. The animal as something singular has its concept in its kind, and the 
kind frees itself from singularity through death” (19991b, 60). Cf. Marx: “Death seems to be a harsh victory of the 
species over the definite individual and to contradict their unity. But the particular individual is only a particular 
species-being, and as such mortal” (Marx 1964, 138). 
131 This idea is elaborated in Hegel’s distinction between the “spurious or negative infinite” and “true Infinity.” The 
“spurious” infinite “is nothing but the negation of the finite” whereby “the finite arises again in the same way, so 
that it is no more sublated than not,” i.e., when something “becomes an other, but the other is itself a something, 
so it likewise becomes and other, and so on ad infinitum” (Hegel 1991b, 149). We have “genuine Infinity” when 
what something “passes into is entirely the same as what passes into it—neither having any further determination 
than this identical one of being an other—in its passing into another, [that] something only comes together with 
itself”—i.e., when something is related “to itself in the passing and in the other” (Ibid., 151). This is also known as 
“the negation of the negation,” i.e., when “the Infinite is affirmative, and it is only the finite which is sublated” 
(Ibid., 152). Hegel regarded the “genuine Infinite” as “the basic concept of philosophy” (Ibid.). The context within 
which Marx applied this concept of the “negation of the negation” in Capital requires the ontology elaborated 
here. 
132 “How true,” wrote Thomas Carlyle, “that there is nothing dead in this Universe; that what we call dead is only 
changed, its forces working in inverse order! 'The leaf that lies rotting in moist winds,' says one, 'has still force; else 
how could it rot?'... The thing that lies isolated inactive thou shalt nowhere discover.... [Indeed], what is this 
Infinite of Things itself, which men name Universe, but an action, a sum-total of Actions and Activities? The living 
ready-made sum-total of these three,—which Calculation cannot add, cannot bring on its tablets; yet the sum, we 
say, is written visible: All that has been done, All that is doing, All that will be done! Understand it well, the Thing 
thou beholdest, that Thing is an Action, the product and expression of exerted Force: the All of Things is an infinite 
conjugation of the verb To do. Shoreless Fountain-Ocean of Force, of power to do; wherein Force rolls and circles, 
billowing, many-streamed, harmonious.... From beyond the Star-galaxies, from before the Beginning of Days, it 
billows and rolls,—round thee, nay thyself art of it, in this point of Space where thou now standest, in this moment 
which thy clock measures” (Carlyle 2002, 331-2). 
133 The “truth of the finite is…its ideality” (Hegel 1991b, 152). 
134 Ibid., 153. “This ideality of the finite is the most important proposition of philosophy, and for that reason every 
genuine philosophy is Idealism. Everything depends on not mistaking for the Infinite that which is at once reduced 
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finitude sublates itself, is the power of negativity, i.e., the ontological antithesis of “finite” or 
“one-sided” determinations. The internal relation of antitheses makes them each a moment in the 
process of their self-sublation.135 For example, the categories of “Being” and “Nonbeing” are 
negatively related to each other. The existence of one implies the existence of the other, and they 
cannot exist without each other. Grasped at the level of their negative unity, they pass infinitely 
over into each other. Their unity is unfathomable for the abstractive intellect that Hegel called 
“understanding.” With “speculative” thought their “positive” unity—their sublation—is known 
as “Becoming.” 
‘Dialectical negativity’ is a key component of the philosophy of ‘internal relations’ (also 
known as ‘Process Philosophy’). This mode of thought understands determinate ‘things’ as 
relations (or, to put it another way, as activities). Ollman explains that “the philosophy of 
internal relations” treats “the relations in which anything stands as essential parts of what it is, so 
that a significant change in any of these relations registers as a qualitative change in the system 
of which it is part”; thus “relations rather than things” are “the fundamental building blocks of 
reality.”136 Relations are internal to each “thing”137 and determine the movement of identity.138 
                                                          
in its determination to what is particular and finite” (Ibid.). In his lectures on the history of philosophy Hegel 
maintained that, in a word, “Idealism” means that the finite must be sublated. 
135 Cf. Marx’s claim that “What constitutes dialectical movement is the coexistence of two contradictory sides, 
their conflict and their fusion into a new category” (Marx 1976, 168). 
136 Ollman 2003, 5. Anne F. Pomeroy writes that “a philosophy of internal relations is one in which there is a real 
transmission of historical data and a constitution of each ‘entity’ by its particular relational incorporation of that 
data, yielding process…as the organic movement of inheritance and the productive relationality to, of, and by that 
inheritance. It is thus that any part examined can be analyzed at the multiple levels of its constitutive relations” 
(Anne 2004, 25). 
137 Ollman calls this “ontological relations” (Ollman 2003, 25). 
138 With an ontology of internal relations, reality is conceived as a totality and as process. As Allen Wood claimed, 
in Marx’s eyes the world “is a system of organically interconnected processes” (Wood 2004, 208). Thus it is only an 
abstract rendering of the life-world that gives us the picture of stable ‘things’ with an apparent self-sustaining 
identity. Cf. Whitehead’s claim that “There is a conventional view of experience, never admitted when explicitly 
challenged, but persistently lurking in the tacit presuppositions. This view conceives conscious experience as a 
clear-cut knowledge of clear-cut items with clear-cut connections with each other. This is the conception of a trim, 
tidy, finite experience uniformly illuminated. No notion could be further from the truth. In the first place the 
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As an ontological principle, ‘dialectical negativity’ is present throughout Marx’s writings. For 
instance, he presented the wage-labour/capital relation as an “internal relation” and 
“contradiction,” and hence as “a dynamic relationship driving towards resolution.”139 
Marx’s claims regarding the existence of the “dialectic of negativity” in the production 
process of capitalism indicates that his idea of a “dialectical” inquiry into the “real movement” of 
capitalist society is premised on the idea of “dialectic” as a “higher movement of reason.” For 
example, in The Holy Family he wrote that the 
“question is not of what this or that proletarian, or even the whole proletariat, at the 
moment considers as its aim. The question is what the proletariat is, and what, 
consequent on that being, it will be compelled to do. Its aim and historical action is 
irrevocable and obviously demonstrated in its own life situation.”140  
It is a question of “what the proletariat is” because—to use Hegel’s phrase—“what is is reason.” 
The “higher movement of reason” is also invoked in Marx’s assertion that the “proletariat” is 
“the negative side of the contradiction” between itself and “its opposite, the condition for its 
existence, what makes it the proletariat, i.e., private property.”141 According to him, “private 
property...drives itself in its economic movement towards its own dissolution...only inasmuch as 
it produces the proletariat as proletariat, that misery conscious of its spiritual and physical 
misery...and therefore self-abolishing.”142 
                                                          
equating of experience with clarity of knowledge is against evidence. In our own lives, and at any one moment, 
there is a focus of attention, a few items in clarity of awareness, but interconnected vaguely and yet insistently 
with other items in dim apprehension, and this dimness shading off imperceptibly into undiscriminated feeling” 
(Whitehead 1929, 78). 
139 Marx 1964, 132. 
140 Marx and Engels 1956, 53. 
141 Ibid., 51. 
142 Ibid., 52. 
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4. Phenomenology and the “Higher Dialectic of the Concept” 
The phenomenological character of Marx’s thought also owes much to Hegel’s influence 
and we are able to derive substantial insights into it through an examination of Hegel’s writings. 
In the process we shall see that Marx’s so-called ‘inversion’ of Hegel’s method is not what it 
appears, and that their methods are, in fact, essentially similar. Hegel defined phenomenology as 
the “Science of Knowing in the sphere of appearance.”143 This phenomenological “dialectic” of 
“appearance” and “essence” is evoked, for instance, by Hegel’s claim that “nature is rational 
within itself” and that “it is this actual reason present within it which knowledge must investigate 
and grasp conceptually—not the shapes and contingencies which are visible on the surface, but 
nature’s eternal harmony, conceived, however, as the law and essence immanent within it.”144 
According to Marx, “all science would be superfluous if the form of appearance of things 
directly coincided with their essence.”145 There are various other passages in Marx’s writings 
which demonstrate this phenomenological approach to the critique of political economy.146 For 
instance, he thought that “Surplus-value and the rate of surplus-value” are “the invisible essence 
to be investigated, whereas the rate of profit and hence the form of surplus-value as profit are 
visible surface phenomena.”147 This phenomenological orientation is also evident in his 
                                                          
143 Hegel 1977, 493. 
144 Hegel 1991, 12. “For what matters,” Hegel wrote, “is to recognize in the semblance of the temporal and 
transient the substance which is immanent and the eternal which is present” (Ibid, 20). Cf. Aristotle’s claim 
regarding “scientific knowledge”: “We all suppose that what we know is not even capable of being otherwise; of 
things capable of being otherwise we do not know, when they have passed outside our observation, whether they 
exist or not. Therefore the object of scientific knowledge is of necessity. Therefore it is eternal; for things that are 
of necessity in the unqualified sense are all eternal; and things that are eternal are ungenerated and imperishable” 
(Aristotle 1998, 140). 
145 Marx 1981, 956. 
146 In a discussion about the phenomenological “dialectic of appearance” in Marx’s work, Enzo Paci claimed that 
the “reader of Capital who follows the dynamics of the analysis cannot fail to be struck by the continuous 
metamorphosis of appearance and reality” (Paci 1972, 423). 
147 Marx 1981, 134. 
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treatment of “estranged” consciousness and in the course of his elaboration he evokes the 
ontological concepts of internal relations and dialectical negativity as well. He claimed that in an 
“estranged form of appearance” the “inner connections” of phenomena “remain hidden,”148 and 
that we see this, for example, with Lassalle’s conception of wages. In his view Lassalle 
“followed the bourgeois economists in mistaking the appearance of the matter for its essence,” 
whereas Marx’s “scientific insight” in this instance was “that wages are not what they appear to 
be, namely the value or price of labour, but only a disguised form of the value or price of labour 
power.”149 
There are numerous instances in Hegel’s writings in which he makes the 
phenomenological distinction between “that which is only appearance, transient and 
insignificant” from “that which truly and in itself merits the name of actuality.”150 “Actual 
knowledge,” he claimed, “insofar as it does not remain outside the object but in fact occupies 
itself with it, must be immanent to the object, the proper movement of its nature, only expressed 
in the form of thought and taken up into consciousness.”151 This “dialectical” relationship of 
                                                          
148 Ibid., 956. He also mentioned this in a letter to Engels where he claimed that the “vulgar economist’s way of 
looking at things arises, namely, because it is only the immediate phenomenal form of these relations that is 
reflected in their brains and not their inner connection. Incidentally, if the latter were the case what need would 
there be of science?” (Marx 1975, 179). 
149 Marx 2010c, 352. It thus “became clear that the wage labourer is only allowed to work for his own livelihood, 
i.e., to live, if he works a certain amount of time without pay for the capitalist”; that “the whole capitalist system of 
production turns on the prolongation of this free labour”; and that “the system of wage labour is consequently a 
system of slavery” (Ibid.). Engels claimed that “socialism became a science” with the “discoveries” of “the 
materialist conception of history and the revelation of the secret of capitalist production by means of surplus 
value” (Engels 1934, 33). 
150 1991b, 29. Cf. his discussion about “the conscious insight into the untruth of phenomenal knowledge” in the 
Phenomenology (Hegel 1977, 50). 
151 Hegel 2007b, 43. 
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subject and object152 inherent in the process of cognition is present throughout Hegel’s work153 
and coupled with it is an idea of consciousness which is also present in Marx’s writings. 
According to Hegel, “consciousness is, on the one hand, consciousness of the object, and on the 
other, consciousness of itself.... Since both are for the same consciousness, this consciousness is 
itself their comparison.”154 A significant implication that arises from this is expressed in Hegel’s 
claim that “in the alteration” of our “knowledge, the object itself alters for [us] too, for the 
knowledge that was present was essentially a knowledge of the object.”155 This can be elaborated 
in conjunction with the idea of “intentionality.” Franz Brentano described “intentionality” as “the 
fact that something is an object for the mentally active subject, and, as such, is present in some 
manner in his consciousness, whether it is merely thought of or also desired, shunned, etc.”156 
Marx’s writings indicate the existence of an incipient idea of “intentionality” in his thought. He 
claimed, for instance, that “my object can only” exist “for me insofar as my essential power 
exists for itself as a subjective capacity; because the meaning of an object for me goes only so far 
                                                          
152 Hegel thought that subjectivity and objectivity are “thoroughly dialectical” and that it is “absurd” to consider 
them “as a fixed and abstract antithesis” (Hegel 1991b, 273). 
153 He claimed that “the task of science, and more precisely of philosophy, is nothing but the overcoming of this 
antithesis [between subjectivity and objectivity] through thinking. In cognition, what has to be done is all a matter 
of stripping away the alien character of the objective world that confronts us” (Hegel 1991b, 273). 
154 (Hegel 1997, 54). McCarney argued that “Hegel insists” that consciousness “is always consciousness of 
something” (McCarney 1987, 165). 
155 In other words, “as the knowledge changes, so too does the object, for it essentially belonged to this 
knowledge” (Hegel 1977, 54). He referred to this “dialectical movement which consciousness exercises on itself 
and which affects both its knowledge and its object” as “precisely what is called experience” (Ibid., 55). 
156 Brentano 2015, 189. It can be described further as “reference to a content, direction toward an object...or 
immanent objectivity. Every mental phenomenon includes something as object [intentionally] within itself” (Ibid., 
92). 
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as my sense goes.”157 This aspect of Marx’s thought also bears the influence of Aristotle158 
whose On The Soul159 contains an nascent theory of “intentionality.”160 
In Brentano’s wake, Edmund Husserl reinvigorated the idea of “intentional 
experiences.”161 The phenomenological character of Marx’s method is congruent with Husserl’s 
treatment of phenomenology as a science grounding experience in “the world as the universal 
horizon, common to all men, of actually existing things.”162 Consider, for instance, the way in 
which Marx makes the commodity into a phenomenon at the outset of Capital. He claims that it 
“appears at first sight an extremely obvious, trivial thing,” but that “analysis brings out that it is a 
very strange thing, abounding in metaphysical subtleties and theological niceties.”163 This 
moment in the process of Marx’s method parallels Husserl’s “phenomenological reflection,” 
which he also called “epoché.” In short, this denotes the act of placing in question all “hitherto 
existing convictions” and forbidding “in advance any judgemental use of them.”164 According to 
                                                          
157 Marx 1964, 140. 
158 Cf. Aristotle’s claim that “the perceptive being is, in potency, such as the perceived thing already is in full 
activity.... So it is acted upon when it is not like the perceived thing, but when it is the state that results from being 
acted upon, it has become likened to it, and is such as that is” (Aristotle 2004, 99). 
159 Marx was closely familiar with this text and even translated it into German. 
160 Aristotle claimed: “If thinking works the same way perceiving does, it would either be some way of being acted 
upon by the intelligible thing, or something else of that sort. Therefore it must be without attributes but receptive 
of the form and in potency not to be the form but to be such as it is” (Ibid., 138-9); “the intellect, in its being-[at]-
work, is the things it thinks” (Ibid., 148). Put another way: “what thinks and what is thought are the same thing, for 
contemplative knowing and what is known in that way are the same thing” (Ibid., 142); “Knowledge, in its being-at-
work, is the same as the thing it knows” (Ibid., 145). 
161 Husserl 1999, 323-324. He described this as the “being directed” to objects which is “an immanent essential 
feature of the respective experiences involved” and maintained that “in the experiences of consciousness 
themselves, that of which we are conscious is included as such” (Husserl 1970, 85). Cf. Whitehead’s claim that 
“thought is a factor in the fact of experience,” and thus “the immediate fact is what it is, partly by reason of the 
thought involved in it. The quality of an act of experience is largely determined by the factor of the thinking which 
it contains” (Whitehead 1929, 80). 
162 Husserl 1970, 164. 
163 Marx 1976, 163. Cf. Paci’s claim that “Marx has brought to light what political economy as a science has hidden. 
He began from the ‘data’ and discovered what the data were hiding. His analysis is phenomenological, since it has 
transformed the data into phenomena. The same thing happens when an ideology is examined: the reality hidden 
beyond the ideological construction is eventually discovered” (Paci 1972, 391). The “trinity formula” is an example 
of “a mystery that Marx wants to bring to light and phenomenologically transform into a phenomenon” (Ibid., 428). 
164 Husserl 1970, 76.  
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Husserl “phenomenological reflection leads to a multiple and yet synthetically unified 
intentionality. There are continually varying differences in the modes of appearing of objects, 
which are caused by the changing of our ‘orientation’...with the consequent differences in 
perspective involved.”165 He claimed further that 
“If one attends to the distinction between things as ‘originally one’s own’ and as 
‘empathized’ from others, in respect to the how of the manners of appearance, and if 
one attends to the possibility of discrepancies between one’s own and empathized 
views, then what one actually experiences originaliter as a perceptual thing is 
transformed, for each of us, into a mere ‘representation of’, ‘appearance of’, the one 
objectively existing thing..... ‘The’ thing itself is actually that which no one 
experiences as really seen, since it is always in motion, always, and for everyone, a 
unity for consciousness of the openly endless multiplicity of changing experiences 
and experienced things, one’s own and those of others.”166 
Husserl’s meaning here is not that “things” cannot be truly known or universally experienced as 
actually existing and it would be a mistake to think that his phenomenological “epoché” results 
in a radical skepticism. The same principle stands for the philosophy underlying Marx’s motto, 
as recorded in a “Confessions” questionnaire in 1865: “De omnibus dubitandum.” Hegel’s 
writing is useful for articulating this aspect of Marx’s philosophy as well. 
Hegel claimed that “everything must be doubted, all presuppositions given up, to reach the 
truth as created through the [Concept].”167 He infamously articulated the realisation of actual 
                                                          
165 Husserl 1999, 324. 
166 Husserl 1970, 164. 
167 Hegel 1968, 406. 
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knowledge as the union of the “Concept”—which for him is subjective—and objectivity, and he 
called this unity the “Idea”:168 
“For since the rational, which is synonymous with the Idea, becomes actual by 
entering into external existence, it emerges in an infinite wealth of forms, 
appearances, and shapes and surrounds its core with a brightly coloured covering in 
which consciousness at first resides, but which only the concept can penetrate in 
order to find the inner pulse,169 and detect its continued beat even within the external 
shapes.”170 
It is generally agreed among scholars of Marx’s work that he diverges from Hegel at this point. 
Upon further examination, however, it becomes evident that Marx remained a lot closer to 
Hegel’s Idealism than is commonly believed. For instance, in his analysis of a form of thought in 
which “everything appears upside down,” Marx used a manner of expression that parallels 
Hegel’s phenomenological description of the “external existence” of “the rational”: 
“The finished configuration of economic relations, as these are visible on the surface, 
in their actual existence, and therefore also in the notions with which the bearers and 
agents of these relations seek to gain an understanding of them, is very different from 
the configuration of their inner core, which is essential but concealed, and the 
concept corresponding to it. It is in fact the very reverse and antithesis of this.”171 
                                                          
168 Hegel 1991b, 214. Cf. Ian Fraser’s claim that “When the objective reality…corresponds with the universal 
concept…then the Idea…is realised as reason and truth. When they are not in correspondence then the result is 
untruth or ‘mere Appearance’” (Fraser 1997, 87). 
169 Cf. Heraclitus: “One thunderbolt strikes root through everything” (Heraclitus 2001, 19). 
170 Hegel 1991, 20-1. According to Hegel, this “development of the Idea as the activity of its own rationality is 
something which thought, since it is subjective, merely observes, without for its part adding anything extra to it” 
(Hegel 1991, 60). 
171 Marx 1981, 311.  
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In Hegelian terms, comprehending what Marx described as “the concept corresponding to” the 
object of thought is achieved via the “higher dialectic of the concept” (the concept’s “moving 
principle”): 
“The higher dialectic of the concept consists not merely in producing and 
apprehending the determination as an opposite and limiting factor, but in producing 
and apprehending the positive content and result which it contains; and it is this alone 
which makes it a development and immanent progression. This dialectic, then, is not 
an external activity of subjective thought, but the very soul of the content172 which 
puts forth its branches and fruit organically.”173 
Sayers claimed that Marx “essentially agrees with Hegel’s view” in this passage and Ian Fraser 
claimed that, in general, “Marx is talking about the concept and its actualization just as Hegel is 
despite Marx’s attempt to confine Hegel’s dialectic to the realm of thought.”174 After all, Marx 
identified “the nature of capital” with “the essential character of its very concept.”175 
5. Marx’s “Speculative” Thought and Undue Criticism of Hegel 
Marx’s critical comments about Hegel’s “dialectical method” complicates the 
interpretation of his own. It is well known that Marx took issue with the way in which Hegel 
attributed a kind of mystical agency to the “Idea,” treating it as a form of alienation whereby 
rational thought is attributed to the “Concept” existing independently from the minds of human 
                                                          
172 Engels described this as “the Hegelian ‘inner purpose’—i.e., a purpose which is not imported into Nature by 
some third party acting purposively, such as the wisdom of providence, but lies in the necessity of the thing itself” 
(Engels 1934, 78). 
173 Hegel 1991, 60. 
174 Sayers 1978, 158; Fraser 1997, 99. 
175 Marx 1973, 415. Cf. his claim in the third volume of Capital that in “a general analysis of the present kind, it is 
assumed throughout that actual conditions correspond to their concept, or, and this amounts to the same thing, 
actual conditions are depicted only in so far as they express their own general type” (Marx 1981, 242). 
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individuals. Commentators on Marx’s work generally agree that it was this move, according to 
Marx, which resulted in the mystification of the “dialectical method.” For example, Hegel 
claimed that the 
“Concept, which is initially only subjective proceeds to objectify itself by virtue of 
its own activity and without the help of an external material or stuff. And likewise 
the object is not rigid and without process; instead, its process consists in its proving 
itself to be that which is at the same time subjective, and this forms the advance to 
the Idea.”176 
This is indeed a key issue that prompted Marx’s divergence from Hegel’s Idealism.177 In 1873 
Marx articulated his criticism as follows: 
“My dialectical method is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its direct 
opposite. To Hegel, the life process of the human brain, i.e., the process of thinking, 
which, under the name of ‘the Idea,’ he even transforms into an independent subject, 
is the demiurgos of the real world, and the real world is only the external, 
phenomenal form of ‘the Idea.’ With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else 
than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of 
thought.”178 
                                                          
176 Hegel 1991b, 273. 
177 Engels claimed that “in its Hegelian form,” the “dialectical method” was “unusable” because for Hegel 
“dialectics is the self-development of the concept,” whereby “the dialectical development apparent in nature and 
history…is only a copy of the self-movement of the concept going on from eternity, no one knows where, but at all 
events independently of any thinking human brain. This ideological perversion had to be done away with” (Engels 
1958, 43-44). 
178 Marx 1976, 102. 
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Hegel did in fact write that the “developed, authentic actuality” of the Idea “is to be as 
subject and so as spirit.”179 However, insofar as it is “subject” as “spirit,” it is arguable that 
humanity is the “subject” within which Hegel’s “Idea” is realized. According to Hegel, the 
“Idea” is the unity of the “Concept” and objectivity180—hence his assertion that we must “base 
science…on the development of thought and the concept”—but from the perspective of his 
philosophy this unity is only achieved in the thinking mind, the “Spirit,” of humanity.181 Hegel’s 
identification of the human being with “Reason” means that we are a real subject to the extent 
that “self-conscious Reason” has developed. After all, he wrote that overcoming the “alien 
character of the objective world that confronts us” requires “tracing…what is objective back to 
the Concept, which is our innermost self” (my emphasis).182 The point at which mysticism 
appears to arise most strongly, however, is with the Absolute Idea: “the Idea that thinks itself” 
and “is [present] as thinking”—the “Idea” which, according to Engels, “is only absolute insofar 
as [Hegel] has absolutely nothing to say about it.”183 
At the end of his Encyclopaedia Logic, Hegel wrote that “Up to this point the Idea in its 
development through its various stages has been our ob-ject; but from now on, the Idea is its own 
ob-ject.”184 He associated the “Absolute Idea” with the “νοήσεως νόησις” of Aristotle, i.e., ‘the 
thought of thought’ (“God”185 conceived as pure contemplative activity), and yet for Hegel this 
could also be a comment on the ‘divine’ nature of rational thought itself—and of humanity as the 
                                                          
179 Hegel 1991b, 287. 
180 “The Idea is what is true in and for itself, the absolute unity of Concept and Objectivity…. The Idea is the Truth; 
for this means that objectivity corresponds with the Concept” (Hegel 1991b, 286). 
181 Hegel 1991, 15; Hegel 1991b, 286. 
182 Hegel 1991b, 273. 
183 Ibid., 303; Engels 1958, 13. 
184 Hegel 1991b, 303. 
185 According to Hegel “God alone is the genuine agreement between Concept and reality” (Hegel 1991b, 60). 
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self-consciously rational being—rather than the “Absolute Idea” per se.186 In fact, Hegel’s 
definition of “God” as “Unity of the Universal and Individual” is consistent with the way he 
describes fully developed humanity, i.e., self-consciously rational individuals.187  
Even though Marx was adamant that his “dialectical method” was the “direct opposite” of 
Hegel’s, textual evidence indicates that Marx’s “method” was essentially Hegelian insofar as he 
sublated the ontological idea that “Reason directs the world,” adopted a phenomenological 
orientation, and conveyed the activity of “speculative” thought in his writing. Marx’s disparaging 
remarks about Hegel’s “speculative” philosophy188 are misleading for interpreters of his self-
proclaimed ‘materialist’ inversion of Hegel’s method.189 Abundant textual evidence indicates 
that Marx thought “speculatively.” In the manuscript that became the third volume of Capital, he 
wrote that uncovering “the real, inner connections of the capitalist production process is a very 
intricate thing and a work of great detail; it is one of the tasks of science to reduce the visible and 
merely apparent movement to the actual inner movement.”190 Marx’s recognition of the “inner 
connections” of the capitalist mode of production is “dialectical” (“negatively rational”) in 
                                                          
186 As Geraets et al. claim, “Hegel…is clearly claiming that our thinking has at this stage become ‘divine’” (Ibid., 
335). 
187 Hegel 1956, 50. Cf. Husserl’s claim that “Along with [our] growing, more and more perfect cognitive power over 
the universe, [we] also [gain] an ever more perfect mastery over [our] practical surrounding world, one which 
expands in an unending progression. This also involves a mastery over humankind as belonging to the real 
surrounding world, i.e., mastery over [ourselves] and [each other], an ever greater power over [our] fate, and thus 
an ever fuller ‘happiness’—‘happiness’ as rationally conceivable for [us]. For [we] can also know what is true in 
itself about values and goods. All this lies within the horizon of this rationalism as its obvious consequence for 
humanity. Humanity is thus truly an image of God. In a sense analogous to that in which mathematics speaks of 
infinitely distant points, straight lines, etc., one can say metaphorically that God is the ‘infinitely distant human’” 
(Husserl 1970, 66). 
188 E.g., Marx 1964, 170-193; Marx 1973, 102. 
189 The fact that Marx charged Hegel with mysticism has encouraged readers who are sympathetic to his thought 
to write off Hegel as an Idealist whose “speculative” philosophy was of no importance for Marx’s method because 
it is dissociated from consideration of the ‘material’ world. Norman Levine, for instance, claims that “Marx 
retained many forms of the Hegelian Method after they were shed of their Speculative content” and that he 
“confined the Hegelian System within the Speculative, which he rejected” (Levine 2012, 12, 72). 
190 Marx 1981, 428. 
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Hegel’s sense of the “dialectic” as “the immanent transcending” which overcomes the “one-
sidedness and restrictedness of the determinations of the understanding.”191 However, the 
manner in which Marx comprehended what he believed to be the “actual” movement of the 
social life-process of capitalism in Capital also involved “speculative” thought because in that 
text he “apprehends the unity of the determinations in their opposition, the affirmative that is 
contained in their dissolution and in their transition.”192 It is more accurate to describe Marx’s 
method as “speculative” because the “dialectical” moment is sublated within the “positive” 
moment. If Marx’s cognition had stopped at the “negatively rational” moment he would be stuck 
positing the mere transience of capitalism.  
The significance of “speculative” thought for Marx’s revolutionary social theory is evident, 
for example, in his recognition of the “inner connection” between economic conditions of “rent 
(landed property), profit (capital) and wages (wage labour),” which he thought are “conditions of 
struggle and antagonism” that contain the potential for revolutionary social transformation.193 
The activity of the “critic” that he described in his letter to Ruge, presented in Capital and 
elsewhere, displays the birth process of “communist society” as “the true reality.”194 Thus while 
his analysis of the capitalist mode of production and criticism of the way it appears to classical 
and “vulgar” political economists operates in accordance with the principle of “dialectical” 
                                                          
191 Hegel 1991b, 128. This is why “the dialectical,” according to Hegel, “constitutes the moving soul of scientific 
progression” and “is the principle through which alone immanent coherence and necessity enter into the content 
of science” (Hegel 1991b, 128). 
192 Ibid., 131. Cf. Hegel’s claim that “the essential character of the rational” is “just to bring together what is 
separated” (Hegel 1971, 49). 
193 1975c, 64. Cf. Marx’s critical remark about ‘utopian socialists’ in The Poverty of Philosophy who “see in poverty 
nothing but poverty, without seeing in it the revolutionary, subversive side, which will overthrow the old society” 
(Marx and Engels 1976, 177). 
194 Hence Engels claim that the “task of economic science” is to indicate the “imminent dissolution” of the 
capitalist system “and to reveal, within the already dissolving economic development, the elements of the future 
new organisation of production and exchange” (Engels 1934, 168). 
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negativity, his thought is “speculative” nonetheless. We see this, for instance, in a letter to 
Engels: 
“At last we have arrived at the forms of manifestation which serve as the starting 
point in the vulgar conception: rent…; profit…from capital; wages, from labour. But 
from our standpoint things now look different. The apparent movement is explained. 
Furthermore, A. Smith’s nonsense, which has become the main pillar of all political 
economy hitherto…is overthrown. The entire movement in this apparent form. 
Finally, since those 3 items (wages, rent, profit (interest)) constitute the sources of 
income of the 3 classes of landowners, capitalists and wage labourers, we have 
the class struggle, as the conclusion in which the movement and disintegration of the 
whole shit resolves itself.”195 
This kind of “speculative” thinking is present in the infamous passage on the “negation of the 
negation” in chapter thirty-two of the first volume of Capital.196 
6. The “Concrete” Nature of “Speculative” Thought and Clarification of Marx’s 
‘Empiricism’ 
Rather than providing clarity on the matter, it appears that Marx’s excessively strong 
distinction between Hegel’s method and his own has for the most part encouraged a range of 
misinterpretations.197 A common misinterpretation is the tendency to think that Marx was a kind 
                                                          
195 Marx and Engels 1988, 25. 
196 Marx 1976, 929. Marx claimed that “capitalist production begets, with the inexorability of a natural process, its 
own negation. This is the negation of the negation. It does not re-establish private property, but it does indeed 
establish individual property on the basis of the achievements of the capitalist era: namely co-operation and 
possession in common of the land and the means of production produced by labour itself” (Ibid.). 
197 Theorists whose work contributes to the ‘New Dialectic’ school, for instance, interpret Marx’s “dialectical 
method” in an excessively formal and schematic way. In this tradition, Marx’s so-called “systematic 
dialectic” is understood as “a method of exhibiting the inner articulation of a given whole” (Arthur 2014, 
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of ‘materialist’-Empiricist that diverges fundamentally from Hegel’s method.198 Marx claimed 
that “Hegel fell into the illusion of conceiving the real as the product of thought concentrating 
itself…whereas the method of rising from the abstract to the concrete is only the way in which 
thought appropriates the concrete, reproduces it as the concrete in the mind.”199 And yet what 
Marx described as “concrete” implies the activity of “speculative” thought and not simply the 
‘material world’ that we perceive sensuously.200  
Hegel maintained that “the speculative…expressly contains the very [abstract] antitheses at 
which the understanding stops short…sublated within itself; and precisely for this reason it 
proves to be concrete and a totality.”201 This is because the speculatively “rational,” “positive 
result” of “dialectic,” “although it is something-thought and something-abstract, is at the same 
time...a unity of distinct determinations.”202 Marx made an essentially similar claim in the 
Grundrisse: 
“The concrete is concrete because it is the concentration of many determinations, 
hence unity of the diverse.203 It appears in the process of thinking, therefore, as a 
process of concentration, as a result, not as a point of departure, even though it is the 
                                                          
269). Caligaris and Starosta explain that “most contributors [to the ‘New Dialectic’ school] agree that the 
structure of the argument in Capital is organised in a dialectical form which, at the very least, can be said to 
draw formal inspiration from the general form of movement of categories that Hegel deploys in his Logic” 
(Caligaris and Starosta 2014, 89). 
198 H.T. Wilson, for example, claimed that “Marx endorsed an empirical method in explicit opposition to the 
speculative method of Hegel” (Wilson 1991, 61). 
199 Marx 1973, 101. 
200 Cf. Hegel 1991b, 78-9. 
201 Hegel 1991b, 132. In fact, according to Hegel, speculative “philosophy does not deal with mere abstractions or 
formal thoughts at all, but only with concrete thoughts” (Ibid., 131). He states further that "Philosophy does not 
waste time with...empty and otherworldly stuff. What philosophy has to do with is always something concrete and 
strictly present" (Ibid., 150). 
202 Ibid., 131. 
203 Cf. Hegel’s Encyclopaedia Logic: “As for…concreteness of content, it simply means that the ob-jects of 
consciousness are known as inwardly determined, and as a unity of distinct determinations” (Ibid., 76). 
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point of departure in reality and hence also the point of departure for observation and 
conception.”204 
It would thus be a mistake to interpret Marx’s ‘materialism’ as another form of Empiricism 
which alleges that the “concrete” is simply the ‘material world’ that we perceive sensuously. 
Hegel claimed that the issue with this kind of “Materialism,” i.e., “the view in which matter as 
such counts as what is genuinely objective,” is that it overlooks the fact that “matter is itself 
already something abstract, something which cannot be perceived as such. We can therefore say 
that there is no ‘matter’; for whenever it exists it is always something determinate and concrete. 
Yet this abstract ‘matter’ is supposed to be the foundation of everything sensible.”205 Marx’s 
‘materialist’ epistemology is not consistent with this kind of ‘materialist’ Empiricism; on the 
contrary, his description of what counts as “concrete” is the “result” of “thinking” and it is 
consistent with Hegel’s “speculative” claim that “‘Matter’ is an abstraction precisely because 
form is present in it, to be sure, but only as an indifferent and external determination.”206  
Ultimately, Marx’s claim that the “premises” 207 he starts out with are “real premises” that 
can “be verified in a purely empirical way” must be interpreted in accordance with the 
ontological and phenomenological nature of his method.208 His idea that “Sense-
perception...must be the basis of all science” presupposes that our senses have “become human,” 
and “senses capable of human gratification”—“the human nature of the senses”—have a 
                                                          
204 Marx 1973, 101. 
205 Hegel 1991b, 79. 
206 Ibid., 159. 
207 These premises are “the real individuals, their activity and the material conditions of their life, both those which 
they find already existing and those produced by their activity” (Marx and Engels 1998, 36-7). 
208 Ibid. Cf. Husserl’s claim that “Empiricism can only be overcome by the most universal and consistent empiricism, 
which puts in place of the restricted [term] ‘experience’ of the empiricists the necessarily broadened concept of 
experience [inclusive] of intuition which offers original data, an intuition which in all its forms...shows the manner 
and form of its legitimation through phenomenological clarification” (Husserl 1990, 335). 
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“rational” character which entails the “intentionality” of a ‘self-consciously rational’ subject.209 
Marx claimed that  
“If [humanity] draws all [its] knowledge, sensation, etc., from the world of the senses 
and the experience gained in it, then what has to be done is to arrange the empirical 
world in such a way that [humanity] experiences and becomes accustomed to what is 
truly human in it and that [we become] aware of [ourselves] as [human beings].”210  
Thus his claim that the “question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is 
not a question of theory” but “a practical question” is not a sufficient basis for identifying him as 
a conventional Empiricist.211 Marx associates sense experience with the moment of appearance 
in the process of cognition involved in a “scientific analysis.”212 He claimed, for instance, that 
the  
“general and necessary tendencies of capital must be distinguished from their forms 
of appearance. 
While it is not our intention here to consider the way in which the immanent laws of 
capitalist production manifest themselves in the external movement of the individual 
                                                          
209 Marx 1964, 143; 134; 141. Cf. McCarney’s claim that “Marx’s dialectic presupposes from the start a subject 
meeting minimal conditions of rationality and capable of developing through the dialectical process so as to meet 
more exacting ones,” and thus “the possibility arises that a vindication of dialectics may have at its core not an 
empirical regularity but a movement of reason” (McCarney 1990, 118; 14). 
210 Marx 1975b, 130. 
211 Marx and Engels 1998, 569. Cf. Whitehead’s idea that “there is progress from thought to practice, and regress 
from practice to the same thought. This interplay of thought and practice is the supreme authority” (Whitehead 
1929, 81). 
212 Cf. Whitehead’s claim that “sense perception for all its practical importance is very superficial in its disclosure of 
the nature of things. This conclusion is supported by the character of delusiveness—that is, of illusion—which 
persistently clings to sense perception. For example, our perception of stars which years ago may have vanished.... 
My quarrel with modern epistemology concerns its exclusive stress upon sense perception for the provision of 
data respecting nature. Sense perception does not provide the data in terms of which we interpret it” (Whitehead 
1968, 133). 
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capitals, assert themselves as the coercive laws of competition, and therefore enter 
into the consciousness of the individual capitalist as the motives which drive him 
forward, this much is clear: a scientific analysis of competition is possible only if we 
grasp the inner nature of capital, just as the apparent motions of the heavenly bodies 
are intelligible only to someone who is acquainted with their real motions, which are 
not perceptible to the senses.”213 
7. A Note on the Relationship between Hegel’s Philosophy and Marx’s Thought, and its 
Significance for ‘Marxism’ 
There are indeed substantial grounds for Fraser’s claim that “Hegel’s and Marx’s dialectic 
are not opposites” but “are instead intrinsically similar.”214 The similarity suggests that the 
“essential task” of a ‘Marxist’ social theory is, as McCarney claimed, “to discover and express 
the rational potentiality” within the capitalist order which “accords with the midwife role of 
theory in dialectical tradition.”215 “What is required to make such a role viable,” he continued, 
“is the assumption that the present really is pregnant with a more rational future, that, in 
Hegelian terminology, the rational is the actual”—an “assumption” in “pressing need of 
justification.”216 Regardless of whether this can be justified or not—and whether or not we agree 
with Hegel that it “has been proved in Philosophy”—it is not possible to critically appropriate 
Marx’s “dialectical method” without the sublation of the ontological idea that “Reason directs 
the world.” This ontological principle is ultimately indispensable for his interest in the 
“dialectical immanent nature” (to use Hegel’s phrase) of capitalism while he sought to 
                                                          
213 Marx 1976, 433. 
214 Fraser 1997, 82. 
215 McCarney 1990, 129. 
216 Ibid. 
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‘scientifically’ comprehend the “real movement” of its genesis, life, and death as it engenders the 
possibility of a “free” mode of social life.217 
To treat “reason” as the substance of ‘everything’ is to go against the ‘materialism’ that 
many ‘Marxists’ define themselves by. As McCarney claimed, the “real problem is whether one 
needs the assumption that reason is the substance not just of ‘spiritual’ but also of ‘external’ 
things.”218 However, the analysis of Marx’s writings in this chapter indicates that this “problem” 
is not an issue for the view he expressed in them. Ultimately, Hegel’s claim that “the supreme 
and ultimate purpose of science” is “to bring about the reconciliation of the reason that is 
conscious of itself with the reason that is, or actuality, through cognition of” its “accord with 
actuality and experience” is consistent with Marx’s revolutionary orientation.219 This general 
principle manifests in his writings as part of the philosophical basis for revolutionary discord. 
After all, Marx did not interpret Hegel’s infamous claim that “What is rational is actual; and 
what is actual is rational” as a conservative statement or some kind of philosophical vindication 
of the existing order.220 It was instead a vital source of philosophical inspiration for Marx’s 
attempt at a “relentless criticism of all existing conditions.”221 
 
                                                          
217 Hegel 1969, 105; Marx and Engels 1998, 57. 
218 McCarney 2000, 74. 
219 Hegel 1991b, 29. According to Hegel, philosophy’s “accord with actuality and experience” is “an outward 
touchstone” for “the truth of philosophy” (Ibid.). 
220 Hegel 1991, 20. Mészáros claimed that the “function” of philosophy in the Hegelian sense is “reconciliatory 
resignation” to “the false positivity of the established world” which “could only result in an essentially pessimistic 
worldview of unavoidable reconciliation and inward-oriented resignation” (Mészáros 2011, 38). Cf. Fraser’s claim 
that this statement “does not mean that what currently exists is rational in its observable form and that Hegel is 
therefore justifying existing institutions and conditions. It is rather that the rational is present even within an 
imperfect world and the Speculative philosopher’s task is to comprehend this rationality” (Fraser 1997, 90). Engels 
thought that Hegel’s statement is revolutionary because it carries the meaning that “All that exists deserves to 
perish” (Engels 1958, 11). 
221 Marx 1967, 212.  
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Chapter Two - Philosophical Anthropology 
“By the sea, by the desolate nocturnal sea, 
Stands a youthful man, 
His breast full of sadness, his head full of doubt. 
And with bitter lips he questions the waves: 
‘Oh, solve me the riddle of life! 
The cruel, world-old riddle, 
Concerning which already many a head hath been racked. 
Heads in hieroglyphic hats, 
Heads in turbans and in black caps, 
Periwigged heads, and a thousand other 
Poor, sweating human heads. 
Tell me, what signifies man? 
Whence does he come? Whither does he go? 
Who dwells yonder above the golden stars?’ 
The waves murmur their eternal murmur, 
The winds blow, the clouds flow past. 
Cold and indifferent twinkle the stars, 
And a fool awaits an answer.” 
          - Heinrich Heine222 
                                                          
222 Heine 1982, 21. 
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1. “Nihil humani a me alienum puto” 
Marx’s idea of humanity originated in the same ancient Hellenic philosophical tradition as 
his ontology. Throughout his work he described various aspects of the “human being” but the 
definition that most accurately captures his idea of humanity is that we are a “free” being when 
fully developed.223 This is fundamentally because we are a consciously “rational” being. With 
the development of our “species-powers” we are able to feel, think and act with knowledge of 
the “universal,” which is “reason,” as it pertains to all aspects of our life. Thus according to Marx 
the “five senses,” along with our “mental” and “practical senses,” can be more or less 
“rational.”224 As he put it, the “human” species has the potential to know “how to apply 
everywhere the inherent standard to the object,” which in his view applies to the ethical, 
aesthetic, and intellectual aspects of our life-activity (all of which are unique to “human” 
existence).225 
This view of Marx’s owes much to his Aristotelianism and the Enlightenment thinkers who 
were also influenced by the Hellenic tradition. As Aristotle maintained, “reason more than 
anything else is [humanity].”226 The original ancient Greek word which is translated here as 
“reason” is logos, although it cannot be fully expressed by a single word in the English language. 
The idea of logos evokes the dual character of “Reason” as both the intelligible law of 
phenomena but also as a subjective capacity for thought and activity. Our inherent potential to 
develop this ‘rationality’ is the basis for Aristotle’s claim that “the good and the well is thought 
to reside in the function” of humanity which is “the activity of the soul which follows or implies 
                                                          
223 The notion of “full human development” arises in Capital and it is claimed that the goal of “the education of the 
future” is to produce “fully developed human beings” (Marx 1976, 533, 614). 
224 Marx 1964, 141. 
225 Marx 1964, 114. 
226 Aristotle 1998, 266. Cf. Marx’s claim that “Human beings would have to be men of intellect” (Marx 1967, 205). 
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a rational principle” (logos).227 In other words, “human good” in Aristotle’s ethical philosophy is 
“activity of soul exhibiting excellence, and if there are more than one excellence, in accordance 
with the best and most complete.”228 A “eudaimonic” life can be described as a flourishing life 
because it involves the development and enjoyment of the capacities—i.e., virtues229—required 
for actualizing this “principle” in our life-activity, in common with others who have also 
developed these capacities. An examination of the anthropological philosophy at the basis of 
Marx’s idea of a “free” life in “communist society” demonstrates that he was no stranger to the 
idea of “virtuosity.”230 In his view, a “free” life requires the development of the virtues required 
for knowing and actualizing “universal” intellectual, ethical, and aesthetic principles (e.g., the 
“laws of beauty”) in our life-activity. 
Marx’s vision of freedom involves an understanding of how our developed “species-
powers” coincide with “free” life-activity. A fundamental basis for distinguishing between 
humans and animals is the character of our life-activity. “The whole character of a species,” 
Marx claimed, “is contained in the character of its life activity.”231 It is commonly argued that 
Marx thought our productive character is essential to this distinction,232 but this is only partly 
accurate. It is evident that Marx thought human beings “begin to distinguish themselves from 
animals as soon as they begin to produce their means of subsistence,” but this is because of the 
“universal” character of human labour.233 “Admittedly animals also produce,” Marx thought, but 
                                                          
227 Aristotle 1998, 12-13. 
228 Ibid., 14. 
229 “Virtue,” for Aristotle, “is a state of character concerned with choice...this being determined by a rational 
principle” (Aristotle 1998, 39). He wrote that “we are adapted by nature to receive” virtue but that it is “made 
perfect by habit” (Ibid., 28). 
230 Marx 1973, 693. 
231 Marx 1964, 113. 
232 Karsten Struhl, for instance, claimed that “For Marx, the distinguishing feature of the human species is our 
unique form of production” (Struhl 2016, 83). 
233 Marx and Engels 1998, 37. 
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the human species is unique insofar as it “produces universally” (and we have the potential to 
participate “universally” in other activities).234 Thus even though the way we produce is a unique 
form of life-activity, we are more accurately distinguished from animals by our potential for 
“universality” and the freedom that flows from it. As Marx claimed, “free, conscious activity is 
[humanity’s] species character,” and the essential difference between human beings and animals 
is that we are a “universal and therefore a free being.”235 
There is not a firm consensus on the meaning of Marx’s idea of “universality” in scholarly 
circles. One of the more prevalent tendencies is to interpret it as a kind of all-roundedness of 
human capacities. Sayers writing provides a typical example:  
“According to Marx, human beings are ‘universal’ beings, endowed with universal 
capacities and powers. To develop fully as human beings they must exercise these 
capacities and powers in an all-round way. Other animals, by contrast, are governed 
by particular drives and instincts; they have only limited powers and are capable of 
engaging only in limited and particular activities for particular purposes.”236  
As Marx claimed, “the more universal [humanity] (or the animal) is, the more universal is the 
sphere of inorganic nature on which [we live]…. The universality of [humanity] appears in 
practice precisely in the universality which makes all nature [our] inorganic body.”237 Thus Marx 
                                                          
234 Marx 1964, 113. 
235 Ibid., 112. 
236 Sayers 2011, 143. In short, “Human production is universal in its scope” (Ibid., 145). Sayers also defined the 
concept of ‘universality’ as a kind of generality or a characteristic that is common to us all: “It is quite evident that 
there are certain needs and other characteristics which are common to all human beings, pretty well regardless of 
their particular social or historical situation, and it is equally evident that Marx recognizes this. For example, the 
need for food is clearly a human universal.... This basic need for food is not a historical phenomenon, it is a 
universal and relatively unchanging feature of the human condition due to our biological constitution” (Sayers 
1998, 151). 
237 Marx 1964, 112. 
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did in fact describe “universality” in the colloquial sense of all-round development,238 but what is 
here a matter of emphasis should not overshadow the richness of Marx’s meaning. As a basis for 
freedom, “universality” must be understood as that which is “universal” in the sense of “reason” 
or “logos,” although the “universality” that Marx associates with humanity is connected to the 
idea of all-round development nonetheless. As Jean Vanier explained, virtue is “a human being’s 
capacity to act well, think well, or produce a good work. It implies excellence.”239 Insofar as “the 
universality of individual needs [and] capacities” are the “capabilities of [the] species,” they are 
“rational,” and “the totally developed individual” is an individual that is both virtuous and 
developed in an all-sided way.240 Marx also referred to this individuality as “the rich 
individuality which is as all-sided in its production as in its consumption.”241 
This two-fold meaning of “universality” as “rational” and “total” development is evident 
in the following passage from Marx’s 1844 ‘Paris manuscripts’. He claimed that an animal  
“produces one-sidedly, whilst [humanity] produces universally.... An animal 
produces only itself, whilst [humanity] reproduces the whole of nature.... An animal 
forms only in accordance with the standard and the need of the species to which it 
belongs, whilst [humanity] knows how to produce in accordance with the standard of 
every species, and knows how to apply everywhere the inherent standard to the 
object.”242 
                                                          
238 This sense of the term “universality” also enters into Marx’s social critique. For example: “If the circumstances 
in which the individual lives allow him only the [one]-sided development of one quality at the expense of all the 
rest, [if] they give him the material and time to develop only that one quality, then this individual achieves only a 
one-sided, crippled development” (Marx and Engels 1998, 280). 
239 Vanier 2001, 19-20. 
240 Marx 1973, 488; Marx 1967, 467, 618. 
241 Marx 1973, 325. 
242 Marx 1964, 113-114. Compare Hegel’s claim that “Animals find what they need for the satisfaction of their 
wants immediately before them; human beings, by contrast, relate to the means for the satisfaction of their wants 
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Acting and producing with knowledge of the “inherent standard” evokes the idea of our “nature” 
as a “rational” being, and as Marx’s work matured there was no break from this idea that the 
essentially “human” character of our productive activity—and our life-activity generally—is our 
ability to direct ourselves in accordance with “logos.” In Capital, for instance, Marx defined 
human labour as activity involving “mind,” and the way he elaborates our purposefulness is 
more clearly associated with the activity of “self-conscious reason”: 
“At the end of every labour process, a result emerges which had already been 
conceived by the worker at the beginning, hence already existed ideally. Man not 
only effects a change of form in the materials of nature; he also realizes his own 
purpose in those materials. And this is a purpose he is conscious of, it determines the 
mode of his activity with the rigidity of a law, and he must subordinate his will to it. 
This subordination is no mere momentary act…. [A] purposeful will is required for 
the entire duration of the work.”243 
“An instrument of labour is a thing, or a complex of things, which the worker 
interposes between himself and the object of his labour and which serves as a 
conductor, directing his activity onto that object. He makes use of the mechanical, 
physical and chemical properties of some substances in order to set them to work on 
                                                          
as something that they themselves bring forth and shape. Thus, even in what is here external, [humanity] is related 
to [itself]” (Hegel 1991b, 62). Kant also shared a similar view: “Reason is the ability of a creature to extend the 
rules and ends of the use of all its powers far beyond its natural instincts, and reason knows no limits in the scope 
of its projects. Reason itself does not function according to instinct, but rather requires experimentation, practice 
and, instruction in order to advance gradually from one stage of insight to the next” (Kant 2006, 5). Cf. Rousseau’s 
claim that “Man, dispersed among the beasts, would observe and imitate their activities and so assimilate their 
instincts, with this added advantage that while every other species has only its own instinct, man, having perhaps 
none which is peculiar to himself, appropriates every instinct” (Rousseau 1984, 81-82).  
243 Marx 1976, 283-284. 
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other substances as instruments of his power, and in accordance with his 
purposes.”244 
In a footnote to the second passage cited above, Marx invokes Hegel’s idea that “Reason is as 
cunning as it is mighty.”245 This indicates that Marx wanted to express the “fact that the 
subjective purpose, as the power over these processes (in which the objective gets used up 
through mutual friction and sublates itself), keeps itself outside of them and preserves itself in 
them.”246 In other words, Marx was claiming that it is potentially free insofar as our subjective 
purpose is “universal” or “rational” and we have developed the knowledge and ability to carry it 
out.247  
The “universal” character of human production is thus not specifically its social character, 
although this is nevertheless a fundamental aspect of it in Marx’s writing. He makes this 
distinction in what became the third volume of Capital under Engel’s editorship. He argues that 
we “must distinguish…between universal labour and communal labour” because even though  
“both play their part in the production process, and merge into one another,...they are 
each different as well. Universal labour is all scientific work, all discovery and 
invention. It is brought about partly by the cooperation of men now living, but partly 
                                                          
244 Ibid., 285. Cf. McCarney: “The labour process is inherently purposive and the workers may be thought of as 
exercising reason in the choice of means to realize their purposes in it” (McCarney 1990, 134). 
245 Hegel 1991b, 284. “Its cunning,” according to Hegel, “generally consists in the mediating activity which, while it 
lets objects act upon one another according to their own nature, and wear each other out, executes only its 
purpose without itself mingling in the process” (Ibid.). 
246 Ibid. 
247 Knowledge of Kant’s work is also relevant for interpreting these passages in Capital. In his Critique of Judgement 
he defined “art” (and human “labour”) in essentially the same way (and he also used the analogy of a bee): “By 
right it is only production through freedom, i.e. through an act of will that places reason at the basis of its action, 
that should be termed art. For, although we are pleased to call what bees produce (their regularly constructed 
cells) a work of art, we only do so on the strength of an analogy with art; that is to say, as soon as we call to mind 
that no rational deliberation forms the basis of their labour, we say at once that it is the product of their nature (of 
instinct), and it is only to their creator that we ascribe it as art” (Kant 2007, 132). 
62 
 
also by building on earlier work. Communal labour, however, simply involves direct 
cooperation of individuals.”248  
However, Marx’s emphasis on “scientific work” (i.e., predominantly intellectual activity) is 
somewhat misleading because our “universal” character encompasses our “practical” capacities 
as well. As Marx claimed, we are “affirmed in the objective world not only in the act of 
thinking, but with all [our] senses.”249 His idea of the “human nature of the senses”250 includes 
the “mental” and “practical senses” associated with aesthetic objects and ethical 
experience/practice. Thus unlike other animals we are able to produce in accordance with the 
“laws of beauty” and direct ourselves in accordance with the principle of “justice.”  
Marx’s idea of the “mental” and “practical senses” is one of many indications that he 
believed we have ethical capacities that can be “universally developed.” For instance, he claimed 
that “In so far as man, and hence also his feeling, etc., is human, the affirmation of the object by 
another is likewise his own gratification.”251 Marx’s work indicates that he thought there is a 
‘universal standard’ (“rational principle”) for ethical activity and experience that we can know, 
feel, and act in accordance with, i.e., once we develop the virtue for it.252 Aristotle’s influence on 
Marx in this respect is also evident and familiarity with the idea of “moral virtue” is helpful for 
interpreting the philosophical basis of Marx’s idea of developed “practical senses” like “will” 
                                                          
248 Marx 1981, 199. 
249 Marx 1964, 140. 
250 “It is obvious,” Marx wrote, “that the human eye enjoys things in a way different from the crude, non-human 
eye; the human ear different from the crude ear, etc.” (Ibid., 140). 
251 Marx 1964, 165. Cf. Hegel’s claim that “If feelings are of the right sort it is because of their quality or content—
which is right only so far as it is intrinsically universal or has its source in the thinking mind” (Hegel 1971, 231). 
252 Hegel elaborated a similar idea in a discussion on “Law” and “Morality.” He described them as “universal 
existences, objects and aims” which “are discovered only by the activity of thought, separating itself from the 
merely sensuous, and developing itself, in opposition thereto; and which must on the other hand, be introduced 
into and incorporated with the originally sensuous will, and that contrarily to its natural inclination” (Hegel 1956, 
41). 
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and “love.” Aristotle distinguished between “desiderative reason” and “ratiocinative desire.” For 
the sake of clarity it is worth quoting Aristotle at length:  
“What affirmation and negation are in thinking, pursuit and avoidance are in desire; 
so that since moral virtue is a state of character concerned with choice, and choice is 
deliberate desire, therefore both the reasoning must be true and the desire right, if the 
choice is to be good, and the latter must pursue just what the former asserts. Now this 
kind of intellect and of truth is practical; of the intellect which is contemplative, not 
practical nor productive, the good and the bad state are truth and falsity respectively 
(for this is the work of everything intellectual); while of the part which is practical 
and intellectual the good state is truth in agreement with right desire. 
The origin of action—its efficient, not its final cause—is choice, and that of choice is 
desire and reasoning with a view to an end. This is why choice cannot exist either 
without reason and intellect or without a moral state; for good action and its opposite 
cannot exist without a combination of intellect and character. Intellect itself, 
however, moves nothing, but only the intellect which aims at an end and is practical; 
for this rules the productive intellect as well, since everyone who makes for an end, 
and that which is made is not an end in the unqualified sense (but only an end in a 
particular relation, and the end of a particular operation)—only that which is done is 
that; for good action is an end, and desire aims at this. Hence choice is either 
desiderative reason or ratiocinative desire, and such an origin of action is man.”253  
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For Marx, truly “human” purposes express what Aristotle here describes as “ratiocinative 
desire.” In the next chapter it will be shown that, in Marx’s view, the potentially “free” character 
of our social life-activity depends on the development of “moral virtue” for the realization of 
“justice” (which is a “universal” ethical “principle”), defined by Aristotle as the practice of 
“complete virtue” in relations with others; and the fifth chapter will show that Marx’s idea of 
revolutionary subjectivity is an individuality which is advanced in the development of “moral 
virtue” as a result of certain features of their life-activity, and that this subjective capacity is 
integral for initiating the establishment of a “free” society. 
2. Human Self-Creation and the Role of Labour in Our Transformative Relationship with 
Nature 
In Marx’s writing revolutionary subjectivity is depicted as a form of individuality which 
emerges amid the activities and relations of the productive process in capitalist society. A 
successful revolution which marks the transition to truly “human” life is the result of a broader 
historical process of “human” development out of our bestial origin in nature, from which we 
emerge with only the potential to become free. 254 According to Marx this process is driven from 
the outset by fundamental features of our socio-productive activity.255 In his view the labour 
process is the locus of the dialectic between human activity as natural activity and the natural 
activity of humanity in which nature is turning into humanity as humanity is transforming nature 
and becoming consciously free.256  
                                                          
254 “Freedom,” Hegel claimed, “as the ideal of that which is original and natural, does not exist as original and 
natural. Rather it must be first sought out and won; and that by an incalculable medial discipline of the intellectual 
and moral powers. The state of Nature is, therefore, predominantly that of injustice and violence, of untamed 
natural impulses, of inhuman deeds and feelings” (Hegel 1956, 40-41). 
255 Marx’s view of this process will be explored further in Chapter Four. 
256 Cf. Engels’ claim that humanity is “that mammal in which nature attains consciousness of itself” (Engels 1940, 
17). 
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We participate in this fundamentally social life-activity initially only to satisfy immediate 
“natural necessity” and according to Marx the growth of our “species-powers” is an unintended 
result of it.257 Through labour we alter the natural world—as we find it altered by socio-historical 
activity—and ourselves as well. As Marx claimed in Capital, 
“Labour is...a process by which [humanity], through [its] own actions, mediates, 
regulates and controls the metabolism between [itself] and nature. [We set] in motion 
the natural forces which belong to [our] own body…in order to appropriate the 
materials of nature in a form adapted to [our] own needs. Through this movement 
[we act] upon external nature and [change] it, and in this way [we] simultaneously 
[change our] own nature. [We develop] the potentialities slumbering within nature, 
and [subject] the play of its forces to [our] own sovereign power.”258  
A fundamental aspect of Marx’s notion of humanity is that we are self-created.259 From his 
perspective, real self-determination essentially involves self-creation.260 Humanity is able to have 
a free relationship with nature—in which we are self-determined but not independent of nature 
                                                          
257 He thought that the initial impetus for the growth of our consciousness (and language) was the necessity of 
working collectively to satisfy the ‘material’ needs associated with our natural-physical life (Marx and Engels 1998, 
37). Cf. his claim in the Grundrisse that “Not only do the objective conditions change in the act of production, but 
the producers change, too, in that they bring out new qualities in themselves, develop themselves in production, 
transform themselves, develop new powers and ideas, new modes of intercourse, new needs and new language” 
(Marx 1973, 494). 
258 Marx 1976, 283. 
259 He claimed that “the entire so-called history of the world is nothing but the creation of man through human 
labour” (Marx 1964, 145). 
260 “A being only considers himself independent when he stands on his own feet; and he only stands on his own 
feet when he owes his existence to himself” (Ibid., 144). Cf. Engels’ claim that “Man is the sole animal capable of 
working his way out of the merely animal state—his normal state is one appropriate to his consciousness, one to 
be created by himself” (Engels 1940, 187). McCarney attempted to elaborate this aspect of Marx’s work in relation 
to Hegel’s philosophy: “Freedom, [Hegel] tells us, is ‘self-sufficient being’, and so ‘If I am self-sufficient, I am also 
free.’ Thus, the basic idea of freedom is of a life which is at the subject’s own disposal, determined by self and not 
by whatever is external to and other than self. Such a conception of freedom as self-determination is not only in 
keeping with everyday thinking but also captures the basis for the mainstream treatment of the topic by 
philosophers since the Greeks” (McCarney 1991, 23). 
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per se—insofar as we develop our “species-powers” because nature is governed by ‘natural 
laws’ which are “reason.”261 In this way the human being—as “self-conscious reason”—is fully 
developed nature. Marx articulated this dialectic of nature and humanity in the following 
passage: 
“The human essence of nature primarily exists only for social man, because only 
here is nature a link with man, as his existence for others and their existence for him, 
as the life-element of human actuality—only here is nature the foundation of man’s 
own human existence. Only here has the natural existence of man become his human 
existence and nature become human. Thus society is the comprehended, essential 
unity of man with nature, the true resurrection of nature, the fulfilled naturalism of 
man and humanism of nature.”262  
With the growth of our inherent capacity for “universally” conscious labour, the development of 
productive technology and organization, etc., we are able to overcome the alien and dominating 
character of nature overtime.263 As Marx put it, “the human being comes to relate more as 
watchman and regulator to the production process”; e.g., we insert “the process of nature, 
transformed into an industrial process, as a means between [ourselves] and inorganic nature, 
mastering it.”264 Marx does not suggest that we will be entirely independent from the necessity 
                                                          
261 Cf. Hegel’s claim that “Nature is an embodiment of Reason,” and it is therefore “unchangeably subordinate to 
universal laws” (Hegel 1956, 12). 
262 Marx 1967, 305-6. 
263 Cf. his claim that “nature becomes one of the organs of [humanity's] activity, which [we annex] to [our] own 
bodily organs, adding stature to [ourselves] in spite of the Bible” (Marx 1976, 285). 
264 Marx 1973, 704-706. Cf. McCarney’s claim that the “rationality which is a defining feature of human labour 
must have a central place in [the] process of [human] self-creation. At least part of its significance lies in the 
internal connection with the development of the human capacity to cope with the external world. This 
development is, for both Marx and Hegel, an integral part of humanity’s self-creation, and, in another aspect, 
simply is the growth of the productive forces” (McCarney 1990, 134-135). 
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for instrumental activity associated with our organic body, although this does not necessarily 
entail activity determined by something other than the human ‘self’. Instead, freedom—in an 
“advanced phase of communist society”—can be characterized as being in tune with nature and 
adapting it as much as possible to our “universal” life-activity rather than being subjected to its 
unconquered might,265 but the “natural necessity” associated with the maintenance of our life at a 
desirable standard (or at all) will remain because we are always internally related to nature. 
This transformation and control over forces of the natural world through labour involves 
the modification of features of our own natural-physical being throughout the historical process. 
Marx imagined “the full development of human mastery over the forces of nature, those of so-
called nature as well as of humanity’s own nature.”266 Hegel’s philosophy was an important 
influence on Marx in this regard,267 although this Hegelian view of the “self-creation” of 
humanity comes with a terrible catch. “At the same pace that mankind masters nature,” Marx 
claimed, “man seems to become enslaved to other men or to his own infamy.”268 Appropriating 
Hegel, Marx made “estrangement” a key feature of the social labour process (throughout the 
“prehistory of human society”) which provides the dynamism whereby “reason” becomes 
increasingly conscious and we create the objective and subjective conditions for a life in which 
the full development of humanity is consciously pursued as an end-in-itself.269 
                                                          
265 Hence Marx’s claim that “communism, as fully developed naturalism, equals humanism, and as fully developed 
humanism equals naturalism; it is the genuine resolution of the conflict between man and nature and between 
man and man” (Marx 1964, 135). 
266 Marx 1973, 488. Cf. Fromm’s claim that humanity, “while like all other creatures is subject to forces which 
determine [it], is the only creature endowed with reason, the only being who is capable of understanding the very 
forces which [it] is subjected to and who by [its] understanding can take an active part in [its] own fate and 
strengthen those elements which strive for the good” (Fromm 1947, 234). 
267 In the Phenomenology, for instance, Hegel claims that in the labour process we rid ourselves of our “attachment 
to natural existence in every single detail” by “working on it” (Marx 1977, 117). 
268 Marx 2010b, 299. 
269 Marx 1977, 22. Marx’s idea of “estrangement” will be explored further in Chapter Four. 
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3. Marx’s Aristotelian Idea of “Nature” and the Paradox of Humanity’s Historical Genesis 
The question as to whether an idea of “human nature” exists in Marx’s work is 
controversial. Some interpreters claim that it does not exist while those who claim it does often 
differ in what it supposedly is, and the different approaches in the literature on the topic tend to 
emphasize various elements abstracted from Marx’s general idea. Those who claim that Marx 
did not have an idea of ‘human nature’ tend to invoke his emphasis on the historical diversity 
and determination of definite cultural forms of social character and this is contrasted to the idea 
of a “universal human nature.” From the outset this view is inconsistent because it nevertheless 
proposes an idea of “human nature,” i.e., something intrinsically “human”; and ultimately, as 
Norman Geras argued, “if diversity in the character of human beings is in large measure set 
down by Marx to historical variation,” the fact that they “have a history” is explained “in turn by 
some of their general and constant, intrinsic, constitutional characteristics; in short by their 
human nature.”270 
Indeed, Marx distinguished between “human nature in general” and “human nature as 
historically modified in each epoch.”271 This is relatively well-recognized in contemporary 
literature,272 although the distinction continues to be a source of difficulty because Marx also 
evidently thought that “all history is nothing but a continuous transformation of human 
nature.”273 The paradoxical character of Marx’s philosophical position on this matter has 
contributed to the interpretation that he thought “human nature” is ultimately determined by 
historically fluid “social relations.” Sayers writing provides a typical illustration here as well: 
                                                          
270 Geras 1983, 67. 
271 Marx 1976, 759. 
272 Karsten Struhl, for example, claimed that “Marx’s historical concept of human nature is grounded in a robust 
trans-historical concept of human nature” (Struhl 2016, 81). 
273 Marx and Engels 1976, 192. 
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“Human nature necessarily exists in a specific social and historical context, and social relations 
are always the result of specific and historically determined forms of human nature.... Human 
beings are social and historical beings through and through.”274  
This is a misrepresentation of Marx’s idea that “human nature” is “trans-historical” and yet 
takes on a diversity of forms through the historical process. His idea of “nature” in this instance 
is like Aristotle’s idea of “each thing’s nature” as “the character it has when its coming-into-
being has been completed.”275 On the basis of Marx’s ontology, social relations (i.e., the 
“ensemble of social relations”) are conceived as internal relations. On this basis the paradoxical 
nature of Marx’s claim that the “nature which develops in human history—the genesis of human 
society—is [humanity’s] real nature” is coherent.276 Thus although it is evident that Marx 
thought socio-historical life is uniquely “human” and that these processes are involved in 
determining our identity, in light of what the present analysis has demonstrated it is also evident 
                                                          
274 Sayers 1998, 150. “Marx’s approach,” he claims, “is historical and relative, not trans-historical and absolute” 
(Ibid., 137). Sayers associated “the notion of a universal ‘human essence’” with the idea of “an unchanging set of 
human potentialities” and contrasted it to the idea that “not only needs but also powers and potentialities are in a 
process of social and historical development” (Ibid.). He ultimately maintains an inconsistent view: “it is clear that 
there are universal and trans-historical, relatively unchanging human characteristics and, in that sense, a universal 
human nature” (Ibid., 151). 
275 Aristotle 1998b, 3. 
276 Marx 1964, 143. This becoming of “human nature” is a problem for the abstractive intellect that Hegel called 
“the understanding” because to this consciousness it is as though we are positing the non-existence of humanity 
while simultaneously positing its existence—as if a grapevine is not a grapevine until it has grown grapes. Cf. the 
following passage from Marx’s 1844 Manuscripts:  
“Generatio aequivoca is the only practical refutation of the theory of creation.... You will...ask: Who begot the first 
man, and nature as a whole? I can only answer you: Your question is itself a product of abstraction. Ask yourself 
how you arrived at that question. Ask yourself whether your question is not posed from a standpoint to which I 
cannot reply, because it is wrongly put. Ask yourself whether that progression as such exists for a reasonable mind. 
When you ask about the creation of nature and man, you are abstracting, in so doing, from man and nature. You 
postulate them as non-existent, and yet you want me to prove them to you as existing. Now I say to you: Give up 
your abstraction and you will also give up your question. Or if you want to hold on to your abstraction, then be 
consistent, and if you think of man and nature as non-existent, then think of yourself as non-existent, for you too 
are surely nature and man. Don’t think, don’t ask me, for as soon as you think and ask, your abstraction from the 
existence of nature and man has no meaning. Or are you such an egotist that you conceive everything as nothing, 
and yet want yourself to exist? ...[For] the socialist man the entire so-called history of the world is nothing but the 
creation of man through human labour, nothing but the emergence of nature for man, so he has the visible, 
irrefutable proof of his birth through himself, of the process of his creation” (Marx 1964, 144-145). 
70 
 
that he did not reduce “human nature” to the fluctuating idiosyncrasies of character arising from 
shifting socio-historical relations. 
For Marx, our “nature” is not begun anew in each era; in his view, all historical variations 
are definite expressions of the development of our “universal human nature.” For example, he 
considered different “religions as nothing more than different stages in the evolution of the 
human spirit, as different snake skins shed by history” (and humanity is “the snake that wore 
them”).277 This bears the influence of Hegel’s notion of gradations in ‘Spirit’s consciousness of 
freedom’ which he thought is expressed in all moments of social life (art, science, politics, 
etc.).278 The “ensemble of social relationships” is thus also a manifestation of the “human spirit” 
and the collective “universal” powers of human beings at a definite stage of development. 
Indeed, in Marx’s view all products of our activity are an objectification of the degrees of 
development of our “essential powers”; e.g., the productive forces, which are “the power of 
knowledge objectified.”279 
The “state power does not hover in mid-air,”280 as it were, but neither do the individuals 
who the state rests on. In secondary literature it is generally accepted that Marx thought our 
existence is determined in a substantial way by the conditions and relations associated with our 
fundamental life-activity in each definite form of society.281 The “attitude of the merchant,” for 
                                                          
277 Marx 1994, 3. 
278 Cf. Marx’s claim that “In the case of an individual...whose life embraces a wide circle of varied activities and 
practical relations to the world, and who, therefore, lives a many-sided life, thought has the same character of 
universality as every other manifestation of his life” (Marx and Engels 1998, 280-81). 
279 Marx 1973, 62. Marx claimed that the “history” of the “development of the productive forces” corresponds “at 
every stage” with “the history of the development of the forces of the individuals themselves” (Marx and Engels 
1998, 91). 
280 Marx 2010b, 238. Cf. Aristotle’s claim that the “city-state is excellent” because “the citizens who participate in 
the constitution are excellent” (Aristotle 1998b, 213). 
281 Cf. Marx’s claim from 1845 when he and Engels were attempting to articulate the premises of what became 
known as the ‘materialist conception of history’: “By producing their means of subsistence men are indirectly 
producing their material life…. This mode of production must not be considered simply as being the reproduction 
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example, “depends entirely on the degree of development of the capitalist mode of production 
and not on his own will.”282 But Marx’s perspective is often misunderstood and it is not 
uncommon to encounter misinterpretations of his idea of the ‘Base-Superstructure’283 relation 
which excessively emphasize the determination of human life by the “economic structure of 
society” at the expense of his idea of human subjectivity, reducing the “human mind” to the 
status of an epiphenomenon and ultimately discarding what Marx thinks is our “human nature.” 
Alan Wood summed up the prevailing view succinctly (in relation to the question of “moral 
beliefs”): 
“According to historical materialism, people’s moral beliefs and the motives to 
adhere to them are part of the ‘ideological superstructure’ of society…. Historical 
materialism proposes to explain the social influence of moral beliefs by the way in 
which they contribute to the basic economic tendencies in the society in which they 
are found. And it proposes to account for the content of these beliefs by the way it 
helps to stabilize a social system or promote class interests.”284 
Wood’s interpretation leaves out the fact that from Marx’s perspective the “social system,” 
“class interests,” and the social relations of production are always an expression of the collective 
“universal” powers of human beings at a definite stage of development. Marx emphasized the 
                                                          
of the physical existence of the individuals. Rather it is a definite form of activity of these individuals…a definite 
mode of life on their part. As individuals express their life, so they are. What they are, therefore, coincides with 
their production, both with what they produce and with how they produce. Hence what individuals are depends 
on the material conditions of their production” (Marx and Engels 1998, 37). 
282 Marx 1981, 421-422. 
283 He claimed that the “totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the 
real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of 
social consciousness. The mode of production of material life constitutes the general process of social, political and 
intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that 
determines their consciousness” (Marx 1977, 20-21). 
284 Wood 2004, 132. 
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definite character of historically specific forms of society because it is necessary for social 
analysis and critique. Thus Wood’s claim that “Marx proposes to explain the character of a 
society’s legal system, politics and moral or religious beliefs by showing how they serve to 
sanction its social relations” is not entirely incorrect, but it only partially captures Marx’s 
meaning.285  
The excessive emphasis which is often placed on the ‘economic base’ is associated with 
the erroneous opinion that his idea of the establishment of moral/ethical values is based on a kind 
of economic determinism. If this were the case, his idea that we can actualize self-determined 
“universal” values would be meaningless because these values would always be given. Marx’s 
writing indicates that, in his view, there are moral/ethical values which we can know through our 
life-activity as “universally developed individuals” and that they are a vital component of free 
life which is our ‘universal nature.’ 
Marx thought that one of our defining characteristics is our self-creation but this aspect of 
our “nature” is only substantially achieved in a “rational state of society,” when “reason” 
consciously directs the world.286 He perceived a time “when the objective world becomes 
everywhere for [humanity] in society the world of [humanity’s] essential powers—human 
reality.”287 In his view the realization of “human nature” is achieved in the life lived in an 
“advanced phase of communist society.” An analysis of his vision of this life is essential for 
comprehending his idea of revolutionary subjectivity because revolutionary subjects are going to 
initiate the establishment of it; and even though they will not experience the flourishing of our 
“human nature,” Marx thought that their life-activity and experience in capitalism would develop 
                                                          
285 Ibid., 105. 
286 Marx 2010c, 88. 
287 Marx 1964, 140. 
73 
 
their consciousness of it nonetheless. He claimed, for example, that “English and French workers 
have formed associations in which they exchange opinions not only on their immediate needs as 
workers, but as human beings.”288 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
288 Marx 1975b, 52. 
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Chapter Three – “Communist Society” 
“I dream’d that was the new city of Friends, 
Nothing was greater there than the quality of robust love, it led the rest, 
It was seen every hour in the actions of the people of that city, 
All in their looks and words.” 
            - Walt Whitman289 
1. “Universally Developed Individuals” and the General Character of “Communist 
Society” 
 Marx’s statements about his vision of the “communist organization of society” indicate 
that he thought it would enable us to live what Aristotle described as “an active life of the 
element that has a rational principle.”290 This life-activity actualizes “universal” intellectual, 
aesthetic and ethical principles: “truth,” “beauty” and “love.” The latter will be elaborated below 
in conjunction with Aristotle’s idea of “justice,” which is the practice of “complete virtue”291 in 
relations with others, and his idea of true “friendship,” which is the mutually recognized and 
reciprocal practice of virtue when the requisite degree of intimacy is present.292 This ethical 
character of social relations is vital for the functioning of the society “in which the free 
development of each is the condition for the free development of all.”293 Marx’s idea of “an 
                                                          
289 Whitman 1975, 164. 
290 Aristotle 1998, 13. Cf. Aristotle’s claim that “political communities must be taken to exist for the sake of 
[beautiful] actions” (Aristotle 1998b, 81). 
291 According to Aristotle, “This form of justice...is complete virtue, although not without qualification, but in 
relation to our neighbour. And therefore justice is often thought to be the greatest of virtues, and ‘neither evening 
nor morning star’ is so wonderful; and proverbially ‘in justice is every virtue comprehended’. And it is complete 
virtue in its fullest sense because it is the actual exercise of complete virtue. It is complete because he who 
possesses it can exercise his virtue not only in himself but towards his neighbour also; for many men can exercise 
virtue in their own affairs, but not in their relations to their neighbour” (Aristotle 1998, 108). 
292 Of course, Marx rejected Aristotle’s position on ‘natural’ slaves, his xenophobia and his sexism. 
293 Marx 2010, 87. 
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association of free” individuals “working with the means of production held in common, and 
expending their many different forms of labour-power in full self-awareness as one single social 
labour force”294 indicates that he developed a more concrete understanding of how “reason” 
consciously “directs the world” as his thought developed: when “the associated producers, 
rationally regulating their interchange with Nature,” bring “it under their common control” in 
“conditions most favourable to, and worthy of, their human nature.”295 Indeed, he described an 
“advanced phase of communist society” as a mode of life in which “the practical relations of 
everyday life” between individuals and between humanity and nature “present themselves” in “a 
transparent and rational form.”296 In this kind of life “the interconnection of production as a 
whole” is a law which, “being grasped and therefore mastered by” the “combined reason” of “the 
agents of production,” “brings the productive process under their common control.”297 
The “communist” mode of production aims at the “free development of all abilities of the 
whole” person and it is predicated on the perfect practice of virtue.298 “Universally developed 
individuals” would populate this society and experience truly “free activity” which, according to 
Marx, is “for the communists the creative manifestation of life arising from the free development 
of all abilities.”299 The “free and full development” of the individual is “based on the universal 
development of [all] individuals,” i.e., on fostering their “universal relations,” “all-round needs 
and universal capacities.”300 According to Marx the desire for such a life was already 
                                                          
294 Marx 1976, 171. 
295 Marx 1981, 959. 
296 Marx 1976, 173. 
297 Marx 1981, 365. Cf. Hegel’s claim that “it is the nature of humanity to press onward to agreement with others; 
human nature only really exists in an achieved community of minds” (Hegel 1977, 43). 
298 Chief among the virtues are those of a “moral” and “intellectual” sort. Aristotle claimed that “the work of 
[humanity] is achieved only in accordance with practical wisdom as well as with moral virtue; for virtue makes us 
aim at the right mark, and practical wisdom makes us take the right means” (Aristotle 1998, 155). 
299 Marx and Engels 1998, 242; Marx 1973, 162. 
300 Marx 1973, 487, 158. 
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manifesting in capitalist society. He claimed that “workers assert in their communist propaganda 
that” the “task of every person is to achieve all-round development of all his abilities, including, 
for example, the ability to think.”301 Thus he imagined “communist society” as a social order 
“where nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity but each can become accomplished in any 
branch he wishes” because “society regulates the general production and thus makes it possible 
for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow.”302 It must be reemphasized that Marx 
meant “universal” not merely in the sense of ‘all-round’ development but also in the sense of 
“rational.” The idea of all-around development is indeed present in Marx’s notion of “universally 
developed individuals” but as a condition of freedom this “universal” development entails 
virtuosity. As Marx claimed, 
“Even if in certain social conditions, everyone were an excellent painter, that would 
by no means exclude the possibility of each of them being also an original painter…. 
In any case, with a communist organisation of society, there disappears the 
subordination of the artist to local and national narrowness, which arises entirely 
from division of labour, and also the subordination of the individual to some definite 
art, making him exclusively a painter, sculptor, etc.; the very name amply expresses 
the narrowness of his professional development and his dependence on division of 
                                                          
301 Marx and Engels 1998, 309. “The all-round realisation of the individual will only cease to be conceived as an 
ideal…when the impact of the world which stimulates the real development of the abilities of the individual is 
under the control of the individuals themselves, as the communists desire” (Ibid.). 
302 Ibid., 53. Engels, too, maintained that life in what Marx described as “an advanced phase of communist society” 
presupposes the all-round development of individuals: “Industry carried on in common and according to plan by 
the whole of society presupposes moreover people of all-round development, capable of surveying the entire 
system of production.... [The] communist organisation of society will give its members the chance of an all-round 
exercise of abilities that have received all-round development” (Marx and Engels 1976, 353). 
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labour. In a communist society, there are no painters but only people who engage in 
painting among other activities.”303  
2. Realms of Life-Activity and the Character of Social Relations in “Communist Society” 
The stable social harmony that Marx thought would characterize “an advanced phase of 
communist society” derives from the “full development of human mastery over the forces of” 
our “own nature.”304 This “mastery” is expressed in the character of communist society’s 
activities and relations. Marx distinguished between two essential realms of activity within this 
society: the “realm of necessity” and the “true realm of freedom.”305 His language may be 
misleading because both of these realms are moments of a “free” life. Aside from the fact that 
they are determined by “self-conscious reason,” a fundamental reason why they are free is 
because they embody relations equivalent to Aristotelian “justice” and true “friendship.” In the 
words of a poet, they can be described as 
Realms where the air we breathe is love.306 
The “realm of necessity” involves all instrumental activity, i.e., for needs arising from the 
natural-biological aspect of our being, including the means for this activity itself, as well as for 
the needs arising from the “true realm of freedom.” It both develops and requires the virtues of 
“universally developed individuals.” On the basis of “just” social relations, goods which are 
socially produced are socially distributed for all to achieve the all-round cultivation of their 
                                                          
303 Marx 1973, 417-418. 
304 Ibid., 488. 
305 Marx 1981, 959. 
306 Shelley 1956, 146. 
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abilities and talents.307 The “realm of necessity” would be carried out with the least possible 
amount of time and energy expenditure, which makes it “attractive work.” We would minimize 
the amount of time and energy required for it in order to maximize time and energy for fully 
“free,” “end in itself” activity in the “realm of freedom.”308 Marx thought that “the realm of 
natural necessity expands with [our] development.”309 This would lead to hitherto unrivalled 
development of the productive powers of society because he considered “the development of the 
individual” as “a force of production” and since “communist society” is premised on the “saving 
of labour time” which is “equal to an increase of free time, that is time for the full development 
of the individual,” this “in turn reacts back upon the productive power of labour as itself the 
greatest productive power.”310 Thus in this mode of life “necessary labour time will be measured 
by the needs of the social individual” and  
“the development of the power of social production will grow so rapidly that, even 
though production is now calculated for the wealth of all, disposable time will grow 
for all. For real wealth is the developed productive power of all individuals. The 
measure of wealth is then not any longer, in any way, labour time, but rather 
disposable time.”311 
‘Free time’ in “communist society” is “both idle time and time for higher activity.”312 Such 
“higher activity” is the time spent engaging in and enjoying the activities associated with the 
                                                          
307 Cf. Aristotle’s claim that “if all were to strive towards what is [beautiful] and strain every nerve to do the [most 
beautiful] deeds, everything would be as it should be for the common weal, and everyone would secure for himself 
the goods that are greatest, since virtue is the greatest of goods” (Aristotle 1998, 236-7). 
308 Marx 1973, 611. 
309 Marx 1981, 959. 
310 Marx 1973, 711. It would be a time “when the all-round development of individuals has also increased their 
productive powers and all the springs of cooperative wealth flow more abundantly” (Marx 2010c, 347). 
311 Marx 1973, 708. 
312 Ibid., 712. 
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actualization of virtuous aesthetic and intellectual principles in “the true realm of freedom.” The 
“free development of individualities” and “the general reduction of the necessary labour of 
society to a minimum” is integral for “that development of human energy which is an end in 
itself” because it “corresponds to the artistic, scientific etc. development of the individuals in the 
time set free, and with the means created, for all of them.”313 This “higher activity” is an end-in-
itself314 and its “rational” character is the basis for Marx’s claim that really free labour “cannot 
become play.”315 As he claimed, “Really free working, e.g. composing, is at the same time 
precisely the most damned seriousness, the most intense exertion,” because we have to produce 
in accordance with the “inherent standard of the object.”316 Compare Kant’s claim that  
“in all free arts something of a compulsory character is still required...(e.g., in the 
poetic art there must be correctness and wealth of language, likewise, prosody and 
metre). For not a few leaders of a newer school believe that the best way to promote 
a free art is to sweep away all restraint and convert it from labour into mere play.”317 
Ultimately, Marx thought that “Our productions would be so many mirrors reflecting our 
essential nature” because they would involve an objectification of the “universal.”318 
The “realm of natural necessity” has a liberating character in such circumstances because it 
is determined by “reason.” Marcuse denied this and his view was uncritically accepted by many 
critical theorists. “No matter how justly and rationally the material production may be 
                                                          
313 Marx 1973, 706; Marx 1981, 959. Cf. Wood 2004, 29. 
314 Aristotle maintained that “those activities are desirable in themselves from which nothing is sought beyond the 
activity. And of this nature virtuous actions are thought to be; for to do [beautiful] and good deeds is a thing 
desirable for its own sake” (Aristotle 1998, 261). 
315 Marx 1973, 712. 
316 Ibid., 611. 
317 Kant 2007, 133-4. 
318 Marx 1994, 53. 
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organized,” he claimed, “it can never be a realm of freedom and gratification.”319 Insofar as the 
working day “would remain a day of unfreedom, rational but not free,” Marcuse thought that 
“real human freedom would prevail only outside the entire sphere of socially necessary 
labour.”320 For Marx, on the contrary, even though the “realm of natural necessity” remains a 
realm of instrumental necessity and does not become an end-in-itself, i.e., even though we would 
not spend unnecessary time labouring in this realm because of its instrumental nature, this is not 
enough to qualify it as simply unfree. It can be carried out “universally”—in both senses of this 
term—and undertaken within “free” social relations (“free association”). Furthermore, in step 
with the growth of scientific knowledge and technical aptitude as it relates to the production 
process, it increasingly requires less of our direct involvement as we develop the technological 
basis of production321 and discover new and better ways of carrying it out rationally, in harmony 
with the cosmic flow of life.322 It would also be carried out in accordance with the “laws of 
beauty” (e.g., food can be made to taste good with the practice of culinary arts).323 In short, 
instrumental labour that cannot be overcome would be done “rationally” and thus as freely as 
possible.  
In these conditions “labour would be a free manifestation of life and an enjoyment of 
life.”324 As Marx put it, labour becomes “a vital need” because “the external aims become 
stripped of the semblance of merely external natural urgencies, and become posited as aims 
                                                          
319 Marcuse 1962, 142. 
320 Marcuse 1969, 21.  
321 Even Marcuse claimed that “the development of the productive forces beyond their capitalist organization 
suggests the possibility of freedom within the realm of necessity” (Ibid.). 
322 Marx thought that “the process” of “material production” is “the life process in the realm of the social” (Marx 
1976, 990). 
323 Marcuse wanted an aesthetic ethos to permeate a liberated society, but in his view art should become mere 
play. 
324 Marx 1994, 53. 
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which the individual [themselves] posits—hence as self-realization, objectification of the subject, 
hence real freedom, whose action is, precisely, labour.”325 Engels elaborated this vision in his 
claim that “productive labour, instead of being a means to the subjection of men, will become a 
means to their emancipation, by giving each individual the opportunity to develop and exercise 
all his faculties, physical and mental, in all directions; in which, therefore, productive labour will 
become a pleasure instead of a burden.”326 
The ethical character of social relations in “communist society” is essential for the freedom 
embodied in the activity of instrumental social labour because it is premised on conscious 
“reciprocal love” (as articulated in the Aristotelian sense above) even if it is not intimate enough 
to be mutually recognized.327 From the outset, activity in the “realm of natural necessity” 
actualizes a “just” distribution principle: “From each according to [their] ability, to each 
according to [their] needs.”328 However, aside from being an instrumental necessity, “justice” is 
also an end-in-itself and it is therefore essential for freedom in a twofold sense: 1) it is 
indispensable for self-realization in an instrumental way because everyone is provided with what 
they need to become “universally developed,”329 and 2) it is desirable for “universally developed 
individuals” as an end-in-itself and therefore an integral component of activity in “the true realm 
of freedom.” Marx claimed that in conditions that are intimate enough for mutual recognition, “I 
would [be]...the mediator between you and the species and you would [experience]...me as a 
reintegration of our own nature and a necessary part of yourself; I would [be]...affirmed in your 
                                                          
325 Marx 2010c, 347; Marx 1973, 611. 
326 Engels 1934, 322. 
327 Marx 1964, 169. 
328 Marx 2010c, 347. 
329 According to Marx, “the genuine and free development of individuals” that takes place in “communist society” 
is “determined precisely by the connection of individuals...which consists partly in the economic prerequisites and 
partly in the necessary solidarity of the free development of all,” and “in the universal character of the activity of 
individuals” (Marx and Engels 1998, 465). 
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thought as well as your love…. What happens so far as I am concerned would also apply to 
you.”330 Freedom is fundamentally intersubjective in the dual sense that its content is “universal” 
(e.g., “the laws of beauty”) and that the free experience of the other is necessary to complete the 
free experience of each individual.  
This fragmentary writing can be elaborated in conjunction with a similar account of 
freedom in Hegel’s philosophy. According to Hegel “true freedom...consists in my identity with 
the other” whereby “I am only truly free when the other is also free and is recognized by me as 
free.”331 Marx’s vision of “communist” social relations indicates that individuals would have 
developed what Hegel called “Universal self-consciousness” which is “the affirmative awareness 
of self in an other self” whereby “each has ‘real’ universality in the shape of reciprocity, so far as 
each knows itself recognized in the other freeman, and is aware of this in so far as it recognizes 
the other and knows him to be free.”332 Hegel claimed further that “the mutually related self-
conscious subjects, by setting aside their unequal particular individuality, have risen to the 
consciousness of their real universality, of the freedom belonging to all, and hence the intuition 
of their specific identity with each other.”333 This kind of relationship is consonant with the 
interpersonal basis of the ‘independence’ of “universally developed individuals” in Marx’s idea 
of “a rational state of society” (organized on the basis of the aforementioned principle “From 
each according to [their] ability, to each according to [their] needs”).334 “In this state of universal 
                                                          
330 Marx 1994, 53. 
331 Hegel 1971, 171. 
332 Ibid., 176. 
333 Ibid. Cf. Hegel’s claim that “Spirit is the knowledge of oneself in the externalization of oneself; the being that is 
the movement of retaining its self-identity in its otherness” (Hegel 1977, 459). 
334 Marx 2010c, 88. 
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freedom,” Hegel claimed, “in being reflected into myself, I am immediately reflected into the 
other person, and, conversely, in relating myself to the other I am immediately self-related.”335 
The consciously reciprocated “love” that Marx envisioned can be further articulated in 
accordance with what Aristotle called true “friendship.” It is based on the mutually recognized 
and reciprocated practice of virtue336 between “universally developed individuals,” whereby the 
‘eudaimonic’ experience of the other is the purpose of the relationship for both individuals.337 
Aristotle claimed that “mutual love involves choice and choice springs from a state of character,” 
and in relations intimate enough, individuals  
“wish well to those whom they love, for their sake, not as a result of feeling but as a 
result of a state of character. And in loving a friend [individuals] love what is good 
for themselves; for the good [individual] in becoming a friend becomes a good to 
[their] friend.”338  
Such individuals are “sharing a single soul,” as Aristotle put it, and are therefore “in a sense the 
same thing, though in separate individuals.”339 
                                                          
335 Hegel 1971, 176-177.  
336 As Vanier put it, "Friendship requires this inner stability in a person, an inner structure or state of character that 
Aristotle calls virtue.  The virtues are intellectual or moral qualities that steer the will, the capacity to judge and 
engage one’s freedom for another person’s good” (Vanier 2001, 68). Thus it is not sufficiently accurate to claim, as 
Richard Miller did, that this society “is held together by mutual caring” (Miller 1981, 327). 
337 Cf. Ollman’s claim—which omits the idea of the ‘perfect practice of virtue’—that the “desire to please is not 
associated with any sense of duty, but with the satisfaction one gets at this time in helping others.... We can 
approximate what takes place here if we view each person as loving all others such that he or she can get pleasure 
from the pleasure they derive from his or her efforts.... Marx is universalizing this emotion...to the point where 
each person is able to feel it for everyone whom his/her actions effect, which in communism is the whole of 
society.... [People] at this time also engage in communal activities for the sheer pleasure of being with others. 
Human togetherness has become its own justification” (Ollman 1978, 72-73). 
338 Aristotle 1998, 200-1. 
339 Aristotle 2011, 127; Aristotle 1998, 213. Aristotle thought that “being a friend amounts to being a separate self. 
Perceiving a friend, then, must be in a manner perceiving oneself, and in a manner knowing oneself” (Aristotle 
2011, 138). 
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Marx’s depiction of this intersubjective experience of “mutual and recognized love” in an 
“advanced phase of communist society” indicates that what he called the “human need” for 
“the other person as a person” would become ubiquitous.340 This idea of experiencing each other 
as a “person” can be articulated in Hegelian terms as the recognition of an individual in their 
“single existence as possessing universality” and, “therefore, as inherently infinite” (i.e., as 
“rational” and “free”).341 In such relations we would recognize this “infinite” worth of all other 
human beings as ends-in-themselves and act toward each other in ways that affirm our shared 
“universal” freedom by practicing “complete virtue.” ‘Infinity’ also manifests for our 
consciousness in another way because love, as it were, ‘increases in amount’ when it is shared. 
As Hegel claimed, love “is a mutual giving and taking…. The lover who takes is not thereby 
made richer than the other; he is enriched indeed, but only so much as the other is. So too the 
giver does not make himself poorer; by giving to the other he has at the same time and to the 
same extent enhanced his own treasure.”342 In the words of a poet, 
“True Love in this differs from gold and clay,  
That to divide is not to take away.”343 
Ultimately, Marx’s vision of the character of social relations in “communist society” is 
relevant for our understanding of his idea of revolutionary subjectivity because an incipient form 
of these relations, and thus also the ethical capacities corresponding to it, must develop among 
revolutionary subjects in capitalism as a conditional necessity for the initiation of the 
revolutionary transition to “communist society.”  
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341 Hegel 1971, 70. 
342 Hegel 1961, 307. 
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“For now we see in a mirror dimly, but then face to face; now I know in part, but then I 
will know fully just as I also have been fully known.”344 
3. A Note on “the first phase of communist society” 
Marx imagined a period of transition between capitalism and “an advanced phase of 
communist society.” He described this initial phase of the revolutionary transformation of 
capitalism as “the first phase of communist society” and he claimed that there is a 
“corresponding period of transformation in the political sphere and in this period the state can 
only take the form of a revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat.”345 It is during this period of 
the “self-government of the producers” that we initiate the reorganization of social life into 
conditions in which our “essential powers” can flourish.346 “What the proletariat has to do,” 
Marx maintained, “is to transform the present capitalist character of…organized labour and [the] 
centralized means of labour, to transform them from the means of class rule and class 
exploitation into forms of free associated labour and social means of production.”347 
This transitory period is not what Marx described as “crude communism” in 1844, i.e., the 
form it took in the minds of various early ‘utopian’ socialists (e.g. Babouvists), although there 
are some similarities with his discussion in the Critique of the Gotha Program. For example, in 
1844 he claimed that 
“The community is only a community of labour, and equality of wages paid out by 
communal capital—by the community as the universal capitalist. Both sides of the 
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345 Marx 2010c, 355. 
346 Ibid., 210. 
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relationship are raised to an imagined universality—labour as the category in which 
every person is placed, and capital as the acknowledged universality and power of 
the community.”348 
In the Critique of the Gotha Program he wrote that in this period “everyone is just a worker like 
everyone else,” i.e., “individuals are regarded only as workers and nothing else is seen in them, 
everything else is ignored.”349 However, as he claimed in The Civil War in France, this is 
qualified by the fact that even in situations when the “Commune does not do away with the class 
struggles, through which the working classes strive to the abolition of all classes and, therefore, 
of all [class rule],” it nevertheless “affords the rational medium in which that class struggle can 
run through its different phases in the most rational and humane way.”350 The character of the 
commune is a reflection of the collectivity of individual characters of the people that make it up. 
On Marx’s premises, “crude communism” is an early manifestation of the “socialist principle” 
which is maintained by “crude and thoughtless” individuals who have not developed sufficiently 
in the womb of capitalist society—it is a “still immature communism.”351 Premature attempts at 
social reform or revolution (e.g., Owen’s New Lanark or Soviet Russia) have immature results. 
Marx claimed that the “first phase” of “communist society” is still circumscribed by 
“bourgeois right” and “bourgeois limitation” because it “has just emerged after prolonged birth 
pangs from capitalist society.”352 It is “inevitable” that this phase is in “every respect, 
economically, morally, and intellectually...still stamped with the birth-marks of the old society 
                                                          
348 Marx 1964, 134. 
349 Marx 2010c, 346-7. 
350 Ibid., 253. 
351 Marx 1967, 213; Marx 1964, 135. Consider, for example, Marx’s claim that “crude communism is only the 
culmination” of “General envy constituting itself as a power,” i.e., “the disguise in which greed re-establishes itself 
and satisfies itself” (Ibid., 133). 
352 Marx 2010c, 346. 
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from whose womb it has emerged” because the individuals creating it are raised in capitalist 
society; however, establishing the conditions for “a new and better society” requires a 
progressive development of human capacities preceding the revolution nonetheless, as well as 
amid the presence of these “defects” in the post-revolutionary period.353 In short, the subjective 
capacities (including and especially ethical capacities) that are required to initiate the 
revolutionary transition must begin to develop within capitalist society. 
4. Philosophical Controversies: the “Universal” Nature of Freedom and the Principle of 
“Justice” in Marx’s Writings 
After what has preceded we are in a better position to take into account two distinct yet 
interrelated points of philosophical contention and debate regarding Marx’s thought. These are 1) 
the controversy over the idea of freedom as “universal” in an ‘objective’/intersubjective sense, 
and 2) the controversy over the idea of a principle of “justice” of the same sort.354 These ideas, of 
course, are points of contention in themselves outside of any consideration of Marx’s work.  
From the perspective of Marx’s ‘Historical Materialism’ our species-life is a movement of 
transition from animal life in nature to the freedom of an elevated humanity. It thus calls for an 
attitude toward social theory which involves a perspective contrary to the prevalent assumption 
that there can be no “universal” experience of freedom. From the perspective of Marx’s social 
theory, the idea that the meaning of “freedom” is only relative to particular groups or 
                                                          
353 Ibid., 288. 
354 Cf. Hegel’s claim that “the State is the externally existing, genuinely moral life. It is the union of the universal 
and essential with the subjective will, and as such it is Morality. The individual who lives in this unity has a moral 
life, a value which consists in this substantiality alone. Sophocles’ Antigone says: ‘The divine commands are not of 
yesterday nor of today; no, they have an infinite existence, and no one can say whence they came.’ The laws of 
ethics are not accidental, but are rationality itself. It is the end of the State to make the substantial prevail and 
maintain itself in the actual doings of men and in their convictions. It is the absolute interest of Reason that this 
moral whole exist” (Hegel 1956, 40). 
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individuals355—and thus that there are only incommensurable freedoms—is an expression of 
“estrangement.” This idea of freedom is closely associated with the misanthropic opinion that 
there exists an unresolvable antithesis between individual freedom and social existence and that 
we are, as a result, doomed to speak longingly of a ‘good life’, as though we can imagine it in an 
‘ideal world’ but believe it is impossible to experience in any actually conceivable society.  
In the philosophical tradition to which Marx belongs, this view of freedom is one-sided and 
deficient of substance in comparison to the idea that freedom is achieved through the 
intersubjective unity of the “universal” wills of individuals.356 This is expressed, for example, in 
Marx’s idea that “universal human emancipation” can only be attained in a society based on 
“production by freely associated” individuals “under their conscious and planned control.”357 
This is a key reason why Marx thought that “personal freedom becomes possible only within the 
community.”358 Indeed, his writing indicates that in his view this would begin to arise out of 
necessity in the revolutionary situation: 
“With the community of revolutionary proletarians…who take their conditions of 
existence and those of all members of society under their control…it is as individuals 
that the individuals participate in it. For it is the association of individuals (assuming 
                                                          
355 Hegel described this as the “atomistic principle” of Liberalism which “insists upon the sway of individual wills,” 
and he claimed that its ascension in the modern world is the “problem…with which history is now occupied, whose 
solution it has to work out in the future” (Ibid., 452). The rise of this principle has brought with it what he called 
the “perpetually recurring misapprehension of Freedom” which “consists in regarding that term only in 
its formal, subjective sense, abstracted from its essential objects and aims” (Ibid., 41). 
356 This is what Hegel called the “rational Will” (Ibid., 38). 
357 Marx 1994, 10; Marx 1976, 173. 
358 “Only within the community,” he claimed, “has each individual the means of cultivating his gifts in all 
directions.... In the real community the individuals obtain their freedom in and through their association” (Marx 
and Engels 1998, 86-87).  
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the advanced stage of modern productive forces, of course) which puts the conditions 
of the free development of movement of individuals under their control.”359 
In his vision of an emancipated society, our individuality is not lost in a dull, abstract 
homogeneity of subjectivities; instead, it exists as a vibrant moment in the total “movement of 
becoming” of distinct individuals developing themselves “universally.”360 On Marx’s premises 
every human being has the potential to develop the “rational” capacities required to actualize it. 
If the development of an individual is stunted or they are disabled in some way, they do not 
thereby cease to be an end-in-themselves and their wellbeing would remain an integral aspect of 
a “rational” social order nonetheless.361 
These issues concerning Marx’s idea of freedom overlap with the controversy over the idea 
of “justice” in his work. In the literature on his thought there is a disagreement about whether 
“universal” ethical values, like “justice,” exist in his writing. In the last chapter we encountered a 
prevalent view of Marx’s thought, i.e., that he espoused a kind of socio-historical relativism for 
the determination of ethical values. In this view, which rests upon a misconception of his ‘Base-
Superstructure’ formulation, both the socio-historical conditions of life and the values that arise 
                                                          
359 Ibid., 86. 
360 As Avineri claimed, Marx’s idea of communism “is not a collectivism which subsumes the individual under an 
abstract whole; it is rather an attempt to break down the barriers between the individual and society and to try to 
find the key to the reunion of these two aspects of human existence” (Avineri 1968, 89). Cf. Hegel’s idea that the 
“substance of the Spirit is freedom. From this, we can infer that its end in the historical process is the freedom of 
the subject to follow its own conscience and morality, and to pursue and implement its own universal ends; it also 
implies that the subject has infinite value and that it must become conscious of its supremacy. The end of the 
world Spirit is realised in substance through the freedom of each individual” (Hegel 1956, 55). 
361 According to Marx, in these conditions “that portion of the product” of “labour which goes into the worker’s 
own individual consumption” is “freed from its capitalist limit and expanded to the scale of consumption that” is 
“required for the full development of individuality”;  “surplus labour and surplus product are also reduced” to 
“form an insurance and reserve fund,” and “for the constant expansion of reproduction in the degree determined 
by social need”; and both “the necessary labour” and “the surplus labour are taken to include the amount of 
labour that those capable of work must always perform for those members of society not yet capable, or no longer 
capable of working” (Marx 1981, 1015-16). 
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in these conditions are ultimately transient and fleeting. Sayers, for instance, maintains that 
“Marxism does not involve a moral approach to history; but rather a historical approach to 
morality. It cannot and does not appeal to universal moral principles or values; for the essential 
insight of Marxism is that morality is a social and historical phenomenon.”362 This mistakenly 
conflates Marx’s anti-moralism with an ethical-relativism rooted in fluctuations of historically 
determinate forms of social life-activity. Marx espoused a “universal” principle of “justice” but 
he was not moralistic. Indeed, moralism is inconsistent with this in principle. Throughout their 
lives Marx and Engels maintained the perspective that 
“communists do not oppose egoism to selflessness or selflessness to egoism….. The 
communists do not preach morality at all. 
They do not put to people the moral demand: love one another, do not be egoists, 
etc.; on the contrary, they are very well aware that egoism, just as much 
selflessness, is in definite circumstances a necessary form of the self-assertion of 
individuals. Hence, the communists by no means want...to do away with the ‘private 
individual’ for the sake of the ‘general’, selfless man. That is a figment of the 
imagination.”363 
Thus although Marx’s idea of “justice” is a “universal moral principle,” it is not a ‘categorical 
ought’ and he is not moralistic because, in his view, our conception of what is “just” or morally 
                                                          
362 Sayers 1998, 116. 
363 Marx and Engels 1998, 265. Cf. Hegel’s claim that “a person is a specific existence; not man in general (a term to 
which no real existence corresponds)” (Hegel 1956, 24). 
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“right” and “good” reflects the development of our “moral virtuosity” which coincides with the 
definite conditions of social life-activity that we are creatures of.364 Hence his claim that 
“If correctly understood interest is the principle of all morality, man’s private interest 
must be made to coincide with the interest of humanity. If man is unfree in the 
materialistic sense, i.e., is free not through the negative power to avoid this or that, 
but through the positive power to assert his true individuality, crime must not be 
punished in the individual, but the anti-social sources of crime must be destroyed, 
and each man must be given social scope for the vital manifestation of his being. If 
man is shaped by environment, his environment must be made human. If man is 
social by nature, he will develop his true nature only in society, and the power of his 
nature must be measured not by the power of the separate individual but by the 
power of society.”365 
In short, from Marx’s perspective our moral/ethical ideas shift historically in accordance with the 
movement of our “universal” development. His ‘universal principle of justice’ is therefore valid 
for individuals who have developed “reason” to the extent required for it. Human “self-
realization” entails the development of the ability to actualize ideal social relations, i.e., to freely 
determine our relations in accordance with the “universal” ethical good that we ‘ratiocinatively’ 
desire. 
An accurate grasp of Marx’s philosophical premises is required to reconcile this 
paradoxical position of his, i.e., that moral/ethical values are historically specific while 
                                                          
364 “My standpoint,” Marx wrote, “from which the development of the economic formation of society is viewed as 
a process of natural history, can less than any other make the individual responsible for relations whose creature 
he remains, socially speaking, however much he may subjectively raise himself above them” (Marx 1976, 92). 
365 Marx 1975b, 130-131. 
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simultaneously asserting the existence of a “universal” principle of “justice.”366 An analysis of 
some statements from Engels can help to further clarify this question. “The idea of equality,” he 
claimed, “both in its bourgeois and in its proletarian form, is itself a historical product, the 
creation of which required definite historical conditions which in turn themselves presuppose a 
long previous historical development. It is therefore anything but an eternal truth.”367 And yet in 
the same work he also wrote: “Are there…eternal truths, final and ultimate truths? Certainly 
there are.”368 Indeed, the claim that the truth of ethical experience is only subjectively relative, 
determined within particular socio-historical conditions, and so on, is itself supposedly an 
“ultimate” and “eternal truth.”369 On the basis of the ontological and anthropological premises of 
‘Historical Materialism’ there is no contradiction in Engels’ position. In his criticism of Owen’s 
New Lanark, for instance, it is evident that Engels shared these premises with Marx: “the 
relatively favourable conditions in which [Owen] had set them were still far removed from 
allowing them an all-round and rational development of character and mind, and much less a free 
life.”370 Thus any kind of claim which maintains that Marx “does not appeal to transcendent 
standards” but rather to those that are “immanent, historical and relative in character” fails to 
notice that these two apparently contradictory positions are coherently united in his thinking.371 
                                                          
366 This is why Geras, for instance, claims that there is “an inconsistency—or paradox” in Marx’s “attitude to 
normative questions” (Geras 1984, 84). Cf. Tony Burns who agrees “with Geras that Marx’s pronouncements on 
justice are contradictory” (Burns 2005, 153).  
367 Engels 1934, 121. 
368 Ibid., 100. 
369 Cf. Whitehead’s claim that “the discordance over moral codes witnesses to the fact of moral experience. You 
cannot quarrel about unknown elements. The basis of every discord is some common experience, discordantly 
realized” (Whitehead 1929, 86). Cf. also the words of Socrates in Plato’s Gorgias dialogue: “if human beings didn’t 
share common experiences, some sharing one, others sharing another, but one of us had some unique experience 
not shared by others, it wouldn’t be easy for him to communicate what he experienced to the other. I say this 
because I realize that you and I are both now actually sharing common experience” (Plato 1997, 826).  
370 Engels 1934, 288. 
371 Sayers 1998, 131. In a more recent work Sayers claims that Marx’s “criticism of capitalism implied in the 
concept of alienation does not appeal to universal moral standards...it is historical and relative. Overcoming 
alienation must also be conceived in historical terms, not as the realisation of a timeless, universal moral ideal, but 
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5. Questioning the Possibility of Knowledge about “Communist Society” 
In the literature on Marx’s work it is not uncommon to come across the idea that Marx 
thought we cannot attain substantial knowledge about the freedom that would be actualized in a 
social form that has yet to be created. For instance, in his book Philosophy and Revolution, 
Stathis Kouvelakis claims that, for Marx, communism is “a radically open-ended political form 
that is yet to come” and that in his writings he “consistently avoids...anything resembling 
a...positive representation” of it.372 While Marx left behind relatively few and fragmentary 
writings about his vision of “communist society” he described its essential features with clarity 
and in definite terms nonetheless, especially its social relations, its labour process, and its life-
activity in general. Much of its actual details will necessarily be discovered in the course of its 
creation—after all, one of the results of the experience of the Paris Commune was that “the 
political form...under which to work out the economical emancipation of labour” was “at last 
discovered” through the act of bringing it into existence—but he did not think that we cannot 
know about the fundamental elements of “an advanced phase of communist society” before we 
bring it into being.373 
There is a world of difference between “writing receipts” for “the cook-shops of the 
future” and knowing the potentialities of our present circumstances through a “critical analysis of 
the actual facts.” The “speculative” nature of his “dialectical method” of critique involves 
                                                          
as the dialectical supersession of capitalist conditions achieved in communism” (Sayers 2011, xii-xiii). The mistaken 
assumption underlying this erroneous interpretation is expressed in Sayers’ claim that “principles of justice are not 
eternally self-evident or rational; they are historical and relative” (Sayers 1998, 144). As we have seen, Marx 
explicitly identified an “advanced phase of communist society”—including this society’s ethical values and the 
relations embodying them—with “reason.” Cf. Wood’s claim that “When Marx and Engels say that people at 
different times and places have held diverse views about the nature of ‘eternal justice’, they are not espousing 
relativism; they are rather arguing that there are no ‘eternal’ rational principles or formal criteria of justice, 
applicable irrespective of time and circumstances” (Wood 2004, 133-134). 
372 Kouvelakis 2003, 313-14. 
373 Marx 2010c, 212. 
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comprehending the work of “reason” in the “actual facts” in order “to find the new world 
through criticism of the old.”374 Marx did not write about a guaranteed “sexual minimum” like 
Fourier or plans as precise as the ‘utopian socialists’ who designed such elaborate schemes that 
at times even included instructions on how to organize the cutlery on the dinner table.375 Marx 
was not interested in laying out such intricate details or attempting his own social experiment, 
but he still thought that the fundamental elements of a “free” life and the general character of the 
social organization that it requires must be understood and consciously desired in order to bring 
it into being. 
Marx wrote about “communist society” because its foundations are allegedly already being 
created—and not only its ‘material’ foundation. He wrote with conviction about the kind of 
relationships that he thought would exist in an emancipated society because he maintained that 
he was able to perceive—amid the flux of phenomena associated with the living movement of 
the capitalist system376—that the germ of this social ethos was present. He thought he had 
recognized a tendency for cultures of revolutionary solidarity to arise out of the life-experience 
of working people and his writing indicates that he thought he had direct experience of the 
transformative potential of working class life.377 His work suggests that this lured him onward in 
                                                          
374 Marx 1967, 212. Even though Whitehead’s idea of “speculative” thought is somewhat different from the 
Hegelian version that Marx critically appropriated, his idea that “speculative Reason works” to “submit itself to the 
authority of facts without loss of its mission to transcend the existing analysis of facts” is instructive in this instance 
(Whitehead 1929, 85). 
375 Hunt 2009, 68. 
376 “Cooperative factories,” for example, “provide the proof that the capitalist has become…superfluous as a 
functionary in production” (Marx 1981, 511). 
377 Consider, for example, Marx’s claim that “When communist artisans associate with one another, theory, 
propaganda, etc., is their first end. But at the same time, as a result of this association, they acquire a new need—
the need for society—and what appears as a means becomes an end. In this practical process the most splendid 
results are to be observed whenever French socialist workers are seen together. Such things as smoking, drinking, 
eating, etc., are no longer means of contact or means that bring together. Company, association, and conversation, 
which again has society as its end, are enough for them; the brotherhood of man is no mere phrase with them, but 
a fact of life, and the nobility of man shines upon us from their work-hardened bodies” (Marx 1964, 154-55). 
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the struggle for proletarian revolution and human emancipation, contributing to what Whitehead 
termed “noble discontent,” the “value” of which—to follow Whitehead’s reasoning—laid “in the 
hope” that “never deserted” his “glimpses of perfection.”378 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
378 Whitehead 1967, 12. “The factor in human life provocative of a noble discontent is the gradual emergence into 
prominence of a sense of criticism, founded upon appreciations of beauty, and of intellectual distinction, and of 
duty” (Ibid., 11). 
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Chapter Four – History 
“To think of time—of all that retrospection. 
To think of to-day, and the ages continued henceforward. 
Have you guess’d you yourself would not continue? 
Have you dreaded these earth-beetles? 
Have you fear’d the future would be nothing to you? 
Is to-day nothing? is the beginningless past nothing? 
If the future is nothing they are just as surely nothing. 
To think that the sun rose in the east—that men and women were flexible, real, alive—that 
everything was real and alive, 
To think that you and I did not see, feel, think, nor bear our part, 
To think that we are now here and bear our part.” 
- Walt Whitman379 
1. “Reason nevertheless prevails”  
From Marx’s perspective, life-activity in an “advanced phase of communist society” is the 
realization of our “nature” in the sense of what we are when fully developed. His interpretation 
of the historical record of human life thus involves a teleological idea of our genesis and there is 
abundant evidence which indicates that he thought there has indeed been progress toward our 
‘end’, i.e., toward freedom. “Reason directs the world,” as it were, though the form that this 
takes in human history in Marx’s work is not some kind of Providence; nor is it merely an 
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external “dialectic” of nature, although “Reason” is ‘at work’ in an ontological sense in the 
development of nature into humanity. This is the grand paradox of Marx’s social theory, i.e., that 
“Reason” (which according to him “has always existed, but not always in reasonable form”) is at 
work throughout our development and thus through elements of our irrational activity—in a way 
that we are not conscious of—which impels the development of rational subjectivity (“self-
conscious reason”). Marx critically appropriated this idea primarily from Hegel. In short, the 
form that “Reason” unavoidably takes in the historical process of human development—which is 
directly connected to the activity of “the human mind”—is “estrangement.” In Marx’s work this 
is manifest chiefly in the form of the bourgeois “passions” and the “estranged” labour process of 
capitalism. 
We encounter Marx’s sublation of the ontological idea that “Reason directs the world” 
(and the “speculative” character of his thought) in the various instances in which he presented 
“estrangement” in capitalist society as positive because of its developmental consequences. 
There is a substantial amount of evidence to support this interpretation of Marx’s thought. In 
1877 he maintained that Capital shows how the capitalist mode of production “has itself created 
the elements of a new economic order” because its “historical tendency” is to beget “with the 
inexorability of a law of Nature its own negation” and provide “an unprecedented expansion of 
the productive forces of social labour and the universal development of every individual 
producer.”380 Similar claims are found elsewhere: In the third volume of Capital he claims that 
the “development of the productive forces of social labour is capital’s historic mission and 
justification,” and thus it “unwittingly creates the material conditions for a higher form of 
                                                          
380 Marx 1975c, 293. In this way capitalism has, “despite itself,” been “instrumental in creating the means of social 
disposable time...and thus to free everyone’s time for their own development” (Marx 1973, 708). 
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production.”381 In the first volume of Capital he claims that “the capitalist mode of production is 
a historically necessary condition for the transformation of the labour process into a social 
process.”382 Alongside these developments in the material forces of production, capitalist society 
creates the subjectivity that will carry out the revolution and constitute the agents of the initial 
phases of the transitory process through which this “new society is springing up.”383  
As Hegel put it, “there is Reason in history.”384 Sufficiently recognizing and correctly 
interpreting the form that this idea takes in Marx’s thought is especially complicated because of 
the fact that an adequate grasp of Hegel’s philosophy of history is required in order to avoid 
misunderstanding. McCarney, for instance, claims that Hegel thought “History” is “rational 
because reason is present in it as substance and subject. It is plain that a doctrine which 
presupposes rational subjectivity in this form,” i.e., “reason as an autonomous creative subject,” 
is “not available to Marx.”385 This statement is only partly true in relation to Marx. For him there 
is no otherworldly, all-powerful subject or Providence guiding history, but from his perspective 
“reason” does exist, in a qualified sense, as a subject in history nonetheless; i.e., we are 
ultimately the “rational” subject, although our “reason” is initially only an implicit potential and 
the development of our species is governed by “universal” laws (which are “reason”) which 
regulate our developmental life-activity.386 Thus it is not entirely accurate to maintain that 
“Reason is actual in history in so far as it is embodied in a subject which is the vital force of the 
                                                          
381 Marx 1981, 368. 
382 Marx 1976, 453.  
383 Marx 2010c, 176. Cf. Marx’s claims about the “great historical mission” of the trade unions and “the class that 
bear in their hands the regeneration of mankind”: in his view it is only “in present capitalist society” that “the 
material etc. conditions have finally been created which enable and compel the worker to break this historical 
curse” (Ibid., 91, 99, 343). 
384 Hegel 1971, 277. 
385 McCarney 1990, 130. 
386 Marx claimed, for example, that “the struggle of class against class” is “the prime mover of all social progress” 
(Marx 2010, 108). 
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movement of objective reality” as McCarney did, because the “reason” implicit in the lawful 
movements of the solar system or the movements of the molecules in our bodies, for example, is 
not a subjective entity.387 “Reason” is ‘at work’ as the “substance” of things, as a “power” which 
determines the course of “objective reality” in an ontological sense, but in this instance it is not a 
subjective being. 
Marx did not ascribe our historical genesis to some predestined plan of “Reason” as if it 
were an all-powerful subject which is separate from humanity, conspiring and arranging things to 
fulfil its Will, but neither is it simply an ‘impersonal’, mechanical process in the natural world. 
Marx thought “there is Reason in history” not because it is determining our activity from beyond, 
no-one knows where, but in the Hegelian sense that “Reason” is immanent in our own 
subjectivity, although it does not attain a fully rational form until our development is completed. 
Hegel claimed that “the material in which the Ideal of Reason is wrought out” is “Personality 
itself—human desires—Subjectivity generally. In human knowledge and volition, as its material 
element, Reason attains positive existence.”388 For him, therefore, the  
“only consistent and worthy method which philosophical investigation can adopt, is 
to take up History where Rationality begins to manifest itself in the actual conduct of 
the World's affairs (not where it is merely an undeveloped potentiality),—where a 
condition of things is present in which it realises itself in consciousness, will and 
action.”389 
                                                          
387 McCarney 1990, 168. 
388 Hegel 1956, 38. 
389 Ibid., 59. 
100 
 
This view is present in Marx’s analysis as well. In his treatment of our development he 
emphasized the definite character of human activity in capitalism that he thought was 
“indispensable” for the development of rational subjectivity and the corresponding progressive 
transformation of our life-world. For example, in an article about the victory of the Union forces 
in Maryland during the American Civil War on September 17, 1862, he claimed that “Reason 
nevertheless prevails in world history.”390 His writings from this period indicate that he thought 
wage-labour in capitalism has greater positive consequences for human development than slave 
labour. The victory of Northern capitalism over the slave mode of production in the South thus 
represented a historical advance in the process of the development of the “human spirit.” He 
compared the developmental potentials of slavery and “free” wage-workers and claimed that the 
difference between the “free worker’s work” and the work of the slave functions to “fit” the 
wage-worker “for quite a different historical role.”391 He thought that North America was where 
these advantages of wage-labour are “most obviously” present “in stark contrast to” the “nature 
of slave labour.”392 
It is evident that Marx thought history had provided evidence for his views. Karl Löwith 
was therefore mistaken, from Marx’s perspective at least, to think that “History” is “meaningful 
only by indicating some transcendent purpose beyond the actual facts.”393 On the contrary, as 
Marx claimed, “if we did not find concealed in society as it is the material conditions of 
production and the corresponding relations of exchange prerequisite for a classless society, then 
                                                          
390 Marx 1984, 249. 
391 Marx 1976, 1033-34. 
392 Ibid.  
393 Löwith 1949, 5. For Löwith, the “claim that history has an ultimate meaning implies a final purpose or goal 
transcending the actual events,” so that to “ask earnestly the question of the ultimate meaning of history takes 
one’s breath away; it transports us into a vacuum which only hope and faith can fulfil” (Ibid., 6, 4). 
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all attempts to explode it would be quixotic.”394 Thus he attempted to explain how capitalist 
“relations are themselves produced” along “with the material preconditions of their dissolution,” 
and “that their historical justification as a necessary form of economic development and of the 
production of social wealth may be undermined.”395 After all, Marx thought that “scientific” 
insight into the genesis of “the communist organization of society” entails being able to 
comprehend it as it “emerges” from the “womb” of capitalist society. “A great mind,” Hegel 
argued, “has great experiences, when it looks into nature or history; it sees what is rational and 
expresses it.”396 
2. The Development of Humanity through “Estrangement” in History 
Abundant evidence indicates that the idea of the development of “self-conscious reason” 
through “estrangement” was an essential feature of Marx’s ‘Historical Materialism’ even though 
a theory of “the so-called general development of the human mind” is not suitable for the 
comprehension of “social existence” apart from a comprehension of “the material conditions of 
life.”397 Marx’s ‘materialism’ is entirely consistent with the idea that the human species is 
developing its cognitive abilities throughout history. He perceived every feature of our socio-
historical life-activity as an objectification of the powers of our “mind.”398 Evidence can be 
drawn from throughout the span of Marx’s post-1845 writings (i.e., the generally accepted time 
of his ‘materialist turn’) which indicates that an idea of “the general development of the human 
mind” is a fundamental feature of his ‘Historical Materialism’. However, there exists a relatively 
                                                          
394 Marx 1973, 159. 
395 Marx 1976, 1065. 
396 Hegel 1991b, 60. 
397 Marx 1977, 20-21. According to Engels, with Marx’s work “idealism was driven from this last refuge, the 
philosophy of history; now a materialist conception of history was propounded, and the way found to explain 
man’s consciousness by his being, instead of, as heretofore, his being by his consciousness” (Engels 1934, 32). 
398 Marx 1976, 284. 
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widespread misunderstanding of Marx’s theoretical rift with German Idealism which has led 
many Marxists and non-Marxists alike to overlook or deny the essential role of the development 
of “the human mind” in Marx’s view of human history and his overall social theory (aside from 
revolutionary class-consciousness).  
Marx’s emphasis on our corporeality is often cited as a basis for denying that the “human 
mind” plays a fundamental role in his ‘Historical Materialism’ but in his view the socio-material 
modes of production which satisfy our needs as corporeal beings are expressions of the degree to 
which “the human mind” has developed. In short, Marx did not treat the activity of “mind” as an 
epiphenomenon even though he maintained that this development is also conditioned by 
developments in our physical constitution and life. “We see how the history of industry and the 
established objective existence of industry,” he claimed, “are the open book of [humanity’s] 
essential powers, the perceptibly existing human psychology.”399 The development of “mind” is 
thus a causal influence which determines the development of our ‘socio-material’ conditions. 
This is evident, for example, in his claim that “the conquest of the forces of nature by the social 
intellect is the precondition of the productive power of the means of labour as developed into the 
automatic process.”400 Marx always presupposed that this “intellect” was a “precondition” in this 
way.401 
A peculiar feature of the manifestation of “self-conscious reason” is that it proceeds 
through “estrangement” which, in a word, is a process whereby humanity’s powers, as a 
collectivity of individual subjects, take on an independent and hostile existence and are 
                                                          
399 Marx 1975, 302. He claimed that “products of human industry” are “organs of the human brain, created by the 
human hand; the power of knowledge, objectified” (Marx 1973, 706). 
400 Ibid., 709. 
401 He spoke, for example, of the “development of the material (and hence also the intellectual) forces of 
production” (Ibid., 502). 
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experienced as if they are actually independently animate objects. In capitalism it has reached a 
fever pitch: it is “a social formation in which the process of production has mastery over 
[humanity],” an estranged social power which is “independent not only of isolated individuals 
but even all of them together.”402 Since Marx’s death it seems that the process of “estrangement” 
has become intensified, confirming his claim that “Capital shows itself more and more to be...an 
alienated social power which has gained an autonomous position and confronts society as a 
thing, and as the power that the capitalist has through this thing.”403 This is not just a simple 
hallucination on our part. As Marx claimed, “the worker actually treats the social character of his 
work, its combination with the work of others for a common goal, as a power that is alien to him; 
the conditions in which this combination is realized are for him the property of another.”404 Marx 
paints a perplexing picture of our history: the “estrangement” at the basis of our “long and 
tormented development” is a “necessary” phase in the development of our “universality” and the 
life-world corresponding to it, including the specific form of “estrangement” experienced in 
capitalism.405 As he maintained, the 
“most extreme form of alienation, wherein labour appears in the relation of capital 
and wage labour, and labour, productive activity appears in relation to its own 
conditions and its own product, is a necessary point of transition—and therefore 
already contains in itself, in a still only inverted form, turned on its head, the 
                                                          
402 Marx 1976, 175; Marx and Engels 1998, 263. 
403 Marx 1981, 373. 
404 Ibid., 178-9. 
405 He claimed that “so long as man does not recognise himself as man and does not organise the world humanly, 
this common life appears in the form of alienation, because its subject, man, is a being alienated from itself. Men 
as actual, living, particular individuals, not in an abstraction, constitute this common life. It is, therefore, what men 
are. To say that man alienates himself is the same as saying that the society of this alienated man is the caricature 
of his actual common life, of his true generic life. His activity, therefore, appears as a torment, his own creation as 
a force alien to him, his wealth as poverty, the essential bond connecting him with other men as something 
unessential so that the separation from other men appears as his true existence” (Marx 1994, 46). 
104 
 
dissolution of all limited presuppositions of production, and moreover creates and 
produces the unconditional presuppositions of production, and therewith the full 
material conditions for the total, universal development of the productive forces of 
the individual.”406 
These claims are reiterated throughout Marx’s writings. For instance, he claimed that 
“capitalist production in its highest development is a necessary point of transition 
towards the transformation of capital back into the property of individual producers, 
but rather as their property as associated producers, as directly social property. It is 
furthermore a point of transition towards the transformation of all functions formerly 
bound up with capital ownership in the reproduction process into simple functions of 
the associated producers, into social functions.”407 
And elsewhere he maintained that 
“[At] the level of material production, of the life-process in the realm of the 
social…we find...the inversion of subject into object and vice versa. Viewed 
historically this inversion is the indispensable transition without which wealth as 
such, i.e. the relentless productive forces of social labour, which alone can form the 
material base of a free human society, could not possibly be created by force at the 
expense of the majority. This antagonistic stage cannot be avoided.... What we are 
confronted by here is the alienation of man from his own labour.”408 
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Without a grounding in Marx’s philosophical premises it is impossible to understand his general 
claim that “it is only through the most tremendous waste of individual development that the 
development of humanity in general is secured and pursued” in “that epoch of history that 
directly precedes the conscious reconstruction of human society.”409  
That Hegel had some influence on Marx’s view of history is generally accepted, but the 
extent of his influence and its precise nature is not properly recognized. Marx’s youthful 
criticism of Hegel took aim at his articulation of the struggle for freedom in terms of “Spirit’s” 
self-estrangement and diremption in nature and the eventual return to itself with consciousness of 
its own essential freedom. In the process of clarifying his own thoughts he claimed that  
“Hegel’s view of history presupposes an abstract or Absolute Spirit which develops 
in such a way that mankind is only a Mass, a conscious or unconscious vehicle for 
Spirit. Hence Hegel provides for the development of a speculative, esoteric history 
within empirical exoteric history. This history of mankind becomes the history of the 
abstract spirit of mankind, thus a spirit beyond actual man.”410  
However, rather than simply abandoning Hegel’s perspective, Marx sublated his idea of the 
“human spirit.” For Marx, like Hegel, the realization of freedom takes place as a result of the 
development of “the human mind” through a process of “estrangement,” and he expressed this in 
a way that is essentially similar to Hegel’s claim that “Reason” attains “positive existence” 
through the “desires” of individuals. This feature of ‘Historical Materialism’ is inconspicuously 
implied in a letter from Engels to Borgius: 
                                                          
409 Marx 1981, 182. 
410 Marx 1967, 383. He described “Hegel’s view of history” as “only the speculative expression of the Christian-
Germanic dogma of the antithesis between Spirit and Matter, God and the World” (Ibid.). 
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“By economic relations, considered by us to be the determinant upon which the 
history of society is based, we understand the manner in which men of a certain 
society produce those products among themselves.... 
While men may make their own history, they have not hitherto done so with a 
concerted will in accordance with a concerted plan, not even in a given and clearly 
delimited society. Their aspirations arc at variance, which is why all such societies 
are governed by necessity of which the counterpart and manifestation is chance. The 
necessity which here invariably prevails over chance is again ultimately 
economic.”411 
This clash of interests that Engels referred to is the aspect of “estrangement” which manifests as 
social antagonisms that have progressive consequences. This kind of social antagonism plays a 
significant role in Kant’s understanding of humanity’s development as well. He called it 
“unsociable sociability” and his treatment of it is informative for the purpose of interpreting 
Marx’s view of human history.  
Kant was interested in making sense of “the transition from the brutishness of a merely 
animal creature to humanity, from the leading reins of instinct to the direction of reason, in a 
word, from the guardianship of nature into the state of freedom.”412 He also thought that our 
capacity for self-creation is a unique characteristic of our species—and yet he claimed that  
“nature pursues a regular course...and gradually leads our species from the low level 
of animal nature to the highest level of humanity by its own art (an art which nature 
compels humankind to invent) and develops, in this seemingly disorderly 
                                                          
411 Engels 2004, 264-66. 
412 Kant 2006, 29. 
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arrangement, those original predispositions [of our species] in a fully regular 
manner.”413  
In the end he did not think that we could “reasonably hope” for our full development “without 
presupposing a plan of nature.”414 This “plan of nature” unfolds through our “tendency to enter 
into society” which is connected “with a constant resistance that continually threatens to break 
up this society,” and it is precisely “this resistance that awakens all human powers.”415 We are 
“driven by lust for honor, power, or property, to establish a position” for ourselves among each 
other, and Kant thought that without this “quarrelsomeness,” “jealously competitive vanity” and 
the “insatiable appetite for property and even for power,” all of “the excellent natural human 
predispositions would lie in eternal slumber, undeveloped.”416 According to him this is how “the 
first true steps are taken from brutishness to culture” and “a foundation is laid for a manner of 
thinking which is able, over time, to transform the primitive natural predisposition for moral 
discernment into definite practical principles and, in this way, to ultimately transform into an 
agreement a society that initially had been pathologically coerced into a moral whole.”417 In his 
Critique of Judgement Kant suggests that a class relation between an oppressed labouring group 
                                                          
413 Ibid., 11. 
414 Ibid., 16. According to Kant, “if we consider the free exercise of the human will broadly, we can ultimately 
discern a regular progression in its appearances. History further lets us hope that, in this way, that which seems 
confused and irregular when considering particular individuals can nonetheless be recognized as a steadily 
progressing, albeit slow development of the original capacities of the species” (Ibid., 3). 
415 Ibid., 6-7. 
416 Ibid., 7.  
417 Ibid. Cf. Kant 2007, 261-2. He maintained that in the process we are “thrust into work and hardship, only to find 
means, in turn, to cleverly escape the latter” (Kant 2006, 7). Cf. Hegel’s claim that what “is said about labour” in 
the biblical myth of the Fall is “that it is both the result of the schism”—i.e., “the abandonment of natural unity” 
which entails a “marvellous inner schism of the spiritual”—“and also its overcoming” (Hegel 1991b, 61-62). 
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and a group of expropriators is a fundamental form that “unsociable sociability” takes, but in this 
respect his thinking both converges and differs significantly with Marx’s.418  
Kant was ultimately unable to reconcile our bestial-corporeal element with our inherently 
rational character. From his perspective, on the one hand, the antagonism between the 
individual’s self-interest and the moral demands of our social existence will never truly be 
overcome. On the other hand, a more profound problem is that our ‘empirical-ego’ is situated 
within what he understood as the mechanical determinism of the physical world which precludes 
the experience of freedom. We are forced to conclude that the “goal always remains in the 
distance” as though it is our fate to perpetually strive toward an unattainable destiny.419 Marx 
was aware of this problem in Kant’s thought. He claimed that “Kant makes” the “republic” into 
“the only rational form of state: a postulate of practical reason, which can never be realized but 
whose achievement must always be the goal striven for and adhered to in one’s beliefs.”420 
In his theory of the struggle between “Lord” and “Bondsman,” Hegel incorporated 
elements of Kant’s “unsocial sociability” but believed that the labourer is positioned for an 
advance in “self-consciousness.” He focused his attention on the subjective aspect of this 
“dialectical” socio-productive practice and Marx appropriated this idea in a sublated form; 
namely, that the historical “self-creation of humanity” is a process of “alienation” and 
“transcendence of this alienation,” and that labour “is humanity’s coming-to-be for itself within 
alienation.”421 He agreed with Hegel that labour is a “steeling school” for our self-transformation 
                                                          
418 Cf. his claim that “the majority, in a mechanical kind of way that calls for no special art, provide the necessities 
of life for the ease and convenience of others who apply themselves to...science and art. These keep the masses in 
a state of oppression, with hard work and little enjoyment, though in the course of time much of the culture of the 
higher classes spreads to them also” (Kant 2007, 261). 
419 Kant 2006, 167. 
420 Marx 2010b, 108. 
421 Marx 1964, 177. 
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into a free being and that this development is “only possible in the form of estrangement,”422 
although in Marx’s view “the severe discipline of capital” acting “on succeeding generations” of 
working class individuals is the specific form that “estrangement” has taken in the period 
immediately preceding its overcoming.423 For instance, he claimed that the “universally 
developed individuals” of communist society are a product of “history” and that the 
“degree and the universality of the development of wealth where this individuality 
becomes possible supposes production on the basis of exchange values as a prior 
condition, whose universality produces not only the alienation of the individual from 
himself and from others, but also the universality and the comprehensiveness of his 
relations and capacities.”424 
From this perspective human development goes hand in hand with the violent “slaughter-bench” 
of history which is unavoidable because of our “estrangement.”425 This is inherent in Hegel’s 
idea of the primeval “life and death struggle” between the oppressed labourer and the oppressing 
exploiter—their “fight for recognition”—which he thought “constitutes a necessary moment in 
the development of the human spirit.”426 
                                                          
422 Marx maintained that “Hegel grasps man’s self-estrangement, the alienation of man’s essence, man’s loss of 
objectivity and his loss of realness as self-discovery, change of his nature, objectification and realization. In 
short…Hegel conceives labour as man’s act of self-genesis—conceives man’s relation to himself as an alien being 
and the manifestation of himself as an alien being to be the emergence of species consciousness and species life” 
(Ibid., 187-188). 
423 Marx 1975b, 37; Marx 1964, 177; Marx 1973, 325. 
424 Marx 1973, 162. 
425 Hegel 1956, 21. Engels commented on the unavoidable necessity of development through estrangement: “For it 
is a fact that man sprang from the beasts,” he claimed, “and had consequently to use barbaric and almost bestial 
means to extricate himself from barbarism” (Engels 1934, 203). Cf. Löwith’s claim that the “outstanding 
element...out of which an interpretation of history could arise at all” is “the basic experience of evil and suffering, 
and of man’s quest for happiness. The interpretation of history is, in the last analysis, an attempt to understand 
the meaning of history as the meaning of suffering by historical action” (Löwith 1949, 3). 
426 Hegel 1971, 172-3. Cf. Engels’ claim that for Hegel “the history of mankind no longer appeared as a confused 
whirl of senseless deeds of violence” but “as the process of development of humanity itself” (Engels 1934, 30). 
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Hegel’s influence on Marx’s approach to the struggle between bourgeoisie and proletariat 
notwithstanding, there is a difference which has important implications for the problem of 
revolutionary subjectivity that will be explored in the next chapter. Hegel claimed that “the fight 
for recognition pushed to the extreme…can only occur in the natural state, where men exist only 
as…separate individuals; but it is absent in civil society and the State because here the 
recognition for which the combatants fought already exists.”427 He even claimed that though “the 
State may originate in violence, it does not rest on it.”428 For Marx, on the contrary, violence is 
perpetually present to a varying degree within the State and it takes many more or less overt 
forms within the conditions of bourgeois “civil society.” This undercurrent of violence is still 
evident, for instance, in the social process of production. He wrote that the “alienation of the 
worker in [their] product means” that “the life which [they have] conferred on the object 
confronts [them] as something hostile and alien,” and “if the product” of labour is 
“an alien, hostile, powerful object independent of” the worker, it necessarily follows that 
“someone else is master of this object, someone who is alien, hostile, powerful, and 
independent” of them.429 Wage-labour is thus “an activity performed in the service, under the 
dominion, the coercion, and the yoke of another man.”430 From the perspective of humanity as a 
whole this “estrangement” in capitalism has the peculiar feature that the product of our labour—
capital—becomes a power unto itself. According to Marx, it was shown in Capital “how not 
                                                          
427Hegel 1971, 172. 
428 Ibid. Cf. the following argument in Freud’s response to a letter from Einstein in which he asked Freud whether 
there is “any way of delivering mankind from the menace of war” (Einstein also claimed that “law and might 
inevitably go hand in hand”): “You begin with the relation between Right and Might. There can be no doubt that 
that is the correct starting-point for our investigation. But may I replace the word ‘might’ by the balder and harsher 
word ‘violence’? Today right and violence appear to us as antitheses. It can easily be shown, however, that the one 
has developed out of the other; and, if we go back to the earliest beginnings and see how that first came about, 
the problem is easily solved” (Freud, n.d.). 
429 Marx 1964, 116. 
430 Ibid. 
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merely at the level of ideas, but also in reality, the social character of…labour confronts the 
worker as something not merely alien, but hostile and antagonistic, when it appears before him 
objectified and personified in capital.”431 The “natural state” is thus still present, though in a 
canalized form, in the aggressive “avarice” that drives the oppressive exploitation, competition 
and possessive individualism of capitalism.432  
3. The “Passions” of Capitalists and their “World-Historical” Activity 
Marx essentially agreed with Hegel that “estrangement” is a necessary phase in the process 
whereby “reason” attains “positive existence” and that it works through the “desires” of 
individuals. In Marx’s thought the “passions” of the class of capitalists who are “only capital 
personified,” whose “soul is the soul of capital,” plays an analogous role to the Hegelian 
“passions.”433 Marx argued that the capitalist is “capital personified and endowed with 
consciousness and a will,” whose “subjective purpose” and “sole driving force” is “the 
appropriation of ever more wealth in the abstract” via “the valorization of value,” i.e. “the 
unceasing movement of profitmaking,” the “boundless drive for enrichment” and “passionate 
chase after value.”434 His work indicates that he critically appropriated the Hegelian idea of the 
“passions” of “world-historical individuals” that are instrumental in creating the conditions for 
human emancipation without being conscious of it or intending to.435 There are various instances 
in his writing in which human actors are depicted as acting in ways that unintentionally 
                                                          
431 Marx 1976, 1024-5. 
432 Marx 1981, 182. 
433 Marx 1976, 928, 342. 
434 Ibid., 254. He associates this with “auri sacra fames,” i.e., the ‘accursed hunger for gold’ (ibid.). 
435 He depicts these “passions” as a driving force of the brutality and suffering that characterizes the “slaughter-
bench” of the history of the capitalist mode of production. For instance, in the third volume of Capital he claimed 
that “the filthy avarice of the coal-owners” led to “human sacrifices” (Marx 1981, 182). 
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accomplish “deeds shared in by the community at large” (as Hegel put it).436 For instance, Marx 
claimed in Capital that  
“Except as capital personified, the capitalist has no historical value, and no right to 
historical existence…. It is only to this extent that the necessity of the capitalist’s 
own transitory existence is implied in the transitory necessity of the capitalist mode 
of production. But, in so far as he is capital personified, his motivating force is…the 
acquisition and augmentation of exchange-values. He is fanatically intent on the 
valorization of value; consequently he ruthlessly forces the human race to produce 
for production’s sake. In this way he spurs on the development of society’s 
productive forces, and the creation of those material conditions of production which 
alone can form the real basis of a higher form of society, a society in which the full 
and free development of every individual forms the ruling principle.”437 
Marx identified the capitalists’ avarice as the incessant urge which drives them to 
transform the production process. Capital wants to accumulate and the capitalist needs surplus-
value, and the consequences are world-historical. As Marx claimed in Capital, 
“Accumulation for the sake of accumulation, production for the sake of production: 
this was the formula in which classical economics expressed the historical mission of 
the bourgeoisie in the period of its domination. Not for one instant did it deceive 
itself over the nature of wealth’s birth-pangs. But what use is it to lament a historical 
necessity?”438 
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Marx did not launch a moral critique of bourgeois “passions,” although this did not stop him 
from describing their horrendousness—while simultaneously recognizing their allegedly 
progressive consequences. We encounter this view of his, for example, in one of his articles on 
India:  
“England, it is true, in causing a social revolution in Hindustan was actuated only by 
the vilest interests, and was stupid in her manner of enforcing them. But that is not 
the question. The question is, can mankind fulfil its destiny439 without a fundamental 
revolution in the social state of Asia? If not, whatever may have been the crimes of 
England she was the unconscious tool of history in bringing about that revolution.”440  
He was clear about his view that the bourgeois “passions” are repulsive,441 and yet as “passions” 
in the Hegelian sense they are an unavoidable phase in the process of humanity’s maturation into 
a free being. Thus Marx claimed that “England has to fulfil a double mission in India: one 
destructive, the other regenerating.”442 His description of the consequences of English 
imperialism and the pursuit of the capitalist “passions” in India also indicates that an essential 
feature of the ‘historical dialectic’ is the transformation of human subjectivity: 
“All the English bourgeoisie may be forced to do will neither emancipate nor 
materially mend the social condition of the mass of the people, depending not only 
                                                          
439 Elsewhere Marx equated “destiny” with “inner law” and “tendency” (Ibid., 976). 
440 Marx 2010b, 306-7. Cf. Avineri’s claim that “Marx’s ultimate judgment on British rule in India is far removed 
from a purely moralistic and anti-imperialistic attitude. A strong Hegelian undercurrent of the ‘cunning of reason’ 
can be traced in Marx’s account” (Avineri 1968, 170). 
441 For instance: “There cannot…remain any doubt but that the misery inflicted by the British on Hindustan is of an 
essentially different and infinitely more intensive kind than all Hindustan had to suffer before” (Marx 2010b, 302). 
More generally, he thought that the “profound hypocrisy and inherent barbarism of bourgeois civilization lies 
unveiled before our eyes, turning from its home, where it assumes respectable forms, to the colonies, where it 
goes naked” (Ibid., 324). 
442 Ibid. 
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on the development of the productive powers, but on their appropriation by the 
people. But what they will not fail to do is to lay down the material premises for 
both. Has the bourgeoisie ever done more? Has it ever effected progress without 
dragging individuals and peoples through blood and dirt, through misery and 
degradation?”443 
Marx’s treatment of the capitalist “passions” in the Hegelian sense is explicit in the many 
instances in which he depicts the “bourgeois mode of production” as “the last antagonistic form 
of the social process of production” (because, according to him, “the productive forces 
developing within bourgeois society create also the material conditions for a solution of this 
antagonism”).444 Capitalism has exhibited the most marked tendency to revolutionize the 
productive process445 in order to increase efficiency as a consequence of the constant drive of the 
capitalists’ to increase surplus-value extraction and perpetually accumulate profits.446 According 
                                                          
443 Ibid., 323. Cf. the following passage from a New York Times article about women from rural communities 
becoming factory workers in cities in contemporary India: “Much of what they learned in the village must be 
unlearned here. One evening when Baby begins preparing dinner, several of her roommates protest. She is 
menstruating, and caste tradition dictates that menstruating women must live in isolation, sleeping alone and 
taking care not to step into the kitchen, lest they contaminate the food and water. So two of the younger 
roommates cook, emerging an hour later with a glutinous, inedible glop. At this point, Baby is irritated. 
Menstruating women are allowed to work in the factory, aren’t they? She walks into the kitchen, and the scent of 
spices and onions fills the room. After a brief discussion, they agree that the menstruation rules will be void for as 
long as they are living in Bangalore. Then they stuff themselves with food and fall into a deep sleep. When they are 
introduced to a factory supervisor and dive to touch her feet, a traditional gesture of respect toward elders, the 
supervisor jumps back as if she has been stuck with a hot poker. She then assumes a slight crouch, as if preparing 
to defend herself from further reverence. Back in their bedrooms, the girls laugh hysterically at this. From 
childhood, they have been told that it is disrespectful for a girl to laugh out loud in the presence of elders. In the 
event of irrepressible laughter, girls must cover their mouths with anything at hand: the corner of a dupatta, a 
hand, a washcloth. This lesson, too, flies out the window. In the hostel they laugh like tractors. They laugh so loud 
they spit their water out” (Barry 2016). 
444 Marx 1977, 21-22. 
445 Cf. Marx 1976, 647.  
446 “The driving motive and determining purpose of capitalist production,” Marx claimed, “is the self-valorization of 
capital to the greatest possible extent, i.e. the greatest possible production of surplus-value, hence the greatest 
possible exploitation of labour-power by the capitalist” (Ibid., 449). Engels claimed that political economy became 
a “science” with the “discovery” of surplus-value. 
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to Marx, capitalism “strives consistently towards the infinite increase of the productive forces of 
social labour and calls them into being” because of “the infinite urge to wealth.”447 Thus for him 
this so-called ‘inner logic’ of capitalism is animated by the ‘inner drives’ of individuals (which 
are nevertheless shaped through the activity of the socio-historical process); in other words, this 
‘logic’ has a fundamentally subjective component, hence his inclination to link money with 
human psychology and not only depict it solely as an element of socio-productive practice (in its 
function as a repository of exchange value, for instance). Statements about “Monetary greed” or 
“mania for wealth,” terms like “auri sacra fames” and “profit-mania,” etc., indicate that he 
thought of money as an expression of the “inner world” of “the human mind,” i.e., the 
“perceptibly existing human psychology.”448  
Ultimately there is substantial textual evidence which indicates that Marx’s ‘Historical 
Materialism’ has sublated the Hegelian idea that “Reason” is ‘at work’ in human history. Marx 
chose to emphasize how it is at work through forms of subjective volition that are socially and 
historically determined in part by “economic necessity.”449 In this connection Marx attributed the 
world-historical activity of capitalism to the “concept” of capital. He claimed that capital is 
“the condition of the development of the forces of production as long as they require 
an external spur, which appears at the same time as their bridle. It is a discipline over 
                                                          
447 Marx 1973, 141. 
448 Ibid., 222; Marx 1981, 179. 
449 Cf. his claim about the mercantilist monetary system characteristic of capitalism in its infancy: “The period 
which precedes the development of modern industrial society opens with general greed for money on the part of 
individuals as well as of states. The real development of the sources of wealth takes place as it were behind their 
backs, as a means of gaining possession of the representatives of wealth” (Marx 1973, 225). Marx’s idea that 
money has “a really magical significance behind the backs of individuals”—whereby it acts as “an enormous 
instrument in the real development of the forces of social production”—also plays a role in his idea of the 
development of revolutionary subjectivity (Ibid.). The productive capacities of the working class are an integral 
form of “the forces of social production” that must develop to initiate the creation of “communist society.” His 
claim that greed for money on the part of the working class is “a driving-wheel for the development of all forces of 
production, material and mental,” will be returned to in the next chapter (Ibid., 223). 
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them, which becomes superfluous and burdensome at a certain level of their 
development…. These inherent limits have to coincide with the nature of capital, 
with the essential character of its very concept.”450  
This evokes Hegel’s idea of the “higher dialectic of the concept.” Recall that for Hegel it “is only 
by” the “the Will, the activity of man in the widest sense,” that the “Idea as well as abstract 
characteristics generally” are “realized, actualized; for of themselves they are powerless. The 
motive power that puts them in operation, and gives them determinate existence, is the need, 
instinct, inclination, and passion of man.”451 Capital’s “concept” is “actualized” by the capitalists 
possessed by their “passions.” 
4. The World Market of Global Capitalism and the Establishment of Worldwide Networks 
of Social Intercourse 
A fundamental reason why Marx thought capitalism is “world-historical” is because it is a 
totalizing system that spreads like wild-fire across the globe “through the inner necessity of this 
mode of production and its need for an ever extended market.”452 Indeed, he thought that the 
“tendency to create the world market is directly given in the concept of capital itself.”453 From 
his perspective the “creation of the world market” and “the entanglement of all peoples in the net 
of the world market” is an integral part of “the historic task of the capitalist mode of production” 
which is an unavoidable phase in our development because it contributes to the creation of the 
“material foundations for the new form of production” and the subjectivity required to initiate 
                                                          
450 Ibid., 415. 
451 Hegel 1956, 22. 
452 Marx and Engels 1998, 59; Marx 1981, 344. 
453 Marx 1973, 408. 
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it.454 He thought that the development of the world market establishes forms of globalized 
“universal intercourse founded upon the mutual dependency of mankind, and the means of that 
intercourse.”455 In particular, he thought that the activity of “world-historical” capitalism creates 
conditions that facilitate the development of “real connections” which enable individuals and 
entire societies to overcome forms of isolation that inhibit the development of “intellectual 
wealth.”456  
Marx analysed social conditions lacking such connections in French, German, Indian, and 
Russian communities, among others, and he drew a connection between the prevalence of 
prejudice rooted in isolated social units—“home-bred conditions surrounded by superstition”— 
to the “real intellectual wealth of the individual” which “depends entirely on the wealth of [their] 
real connections.”457 This was significant for Marx particularly because, on his assumptions, the 
growth of these connections are indispensable for the subjective development required for 
carrying out a successful revolutionary movement. This is one of the main reasons he considered 
proletarian conditions more favourable for revolutionary development than peasant conditions. 
As Engels claimed, “the peasants” are “always the bearers of national and local narrow-
mindedness.”458 It is evident that Marx agreed with this assessment. “What separates the peasant 
from the proletarian,” he claimed, is not their “real interest” but their “delusive prejudice.”459  
Marx also linked the lack of “real connections” to populations that give rise to despotic 
state forms. “Bonaparte,” for example, represented “a class,” i.e., “the small peasant 
                                                          
454 Marx 1981, 572; Marx 1976, 929. Cf. Marx 1981, 359; Marx 1973, 161; Marx and Engels 1998, 59. 
455 Marx 2010b, 325. 
456 Marx and Engels 1998, 59. Cf. Marx 2010, 71. 
457 Marx and Engels 1998, 57, 59. 
458 Marx 2010, 215. 
459 Marx 2010c, 257. 
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proprietors.”460 Marx’s claim that it was “the material conditions which made the feudal French 
peasant a small proprietor and Napoleon an emperor” follows from the idea that the conditions of 
the peasantry were not consistent with the development of “intellectual wealth”: 
“Their mode of operation isolates them instead of bringing them into mutual 
intercourse. This isolation is strengthened by the wretched state of France’s means of 
communication and by the poverty of the peasants. Their place of operation, the 
smallholding, permits no division of labour in its cultivation, no application of 
science and therefore no diversity of development, variety of talent, or wealth of 
social relationships.”461 
He had a similar opinion of the “idyllic village communities” in India which, according to him, 
“had always been the solid foundation of Oriental despotism”462 because “they restrained the 
human mind within the smallest possible compass, making it the unresisting tool of superstition, 
enslaving it beneath traditional rules, depriving it of all grandeur and historical energies.”463 A 
principal reason why Marx thought English imperialism would play a partly progressive role in 
India was because it would establish “real connections”:  
“The village isolation produced the absence of roads in India, and the absence of 
roads perpetuated the village isolation. On this plan a community existed with a 
given scale of low conveniences, almost without intercourse with other villages, 
without the desires and efforts indispensable for social advance. The British having 
                                                          
460 Marx 2010b, 238. 
461 Ibid., 241, 238-239. 
462 Even if there are certain geographical conditions and forms of state which Marx associated with so-called 
‘Oriental’ despotism, it is evident that he nevertheless thought that despotism in the ‘Orient’ has essentially the 
same subjective basis as in the ‘Occident’. 
463 Ibid., 306. 
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broken up this self-sufficient inertia of the villages, railways will provide the new 
want of communication and intercourse.”464 
This, however, did not stop Marx from recognizing that “the history of English economic 
management in India” was “a history of futile and actually stupid (in practice, infamous) 
economic experiments.”465 
In Marx’s view, capitalism has a tendency to play a progressive role by transforming rural 
communities and agricultural production in a way that is necessary for “the full development of 
the human race.”466 As he claimed,  
“capital drives beyond national barriers and prejudices as much as beyond nature 
worship, as well as all traditional, confined, complacent, encrusted satisfactions of 
present needs, and reproductions of old ways of life. It is destructive towards all of 
this, and constantly revolutionizes it, tearing down all the barriers which hem in the 
development of the forces of production, the expansion of needs, the all-sided 
development of production, and the exploitation and exchange of natural and mental 
forces.”467 
This indicates further that this process involves a transformation of human subjectivity and that 
the development of “the human mind” is a fundamental feature of his ‘Historical Materialism’: 
“In the sphere of agriculture, large-scale industry has a more revolutionary effect 
than elsewhere, for the reason that it annihilates the bulwark of the old society, the 
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466 Marx 1976, 638. 
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peasant, and substitutes for him the wage-labourer…. A conscious, technological 
application of science replaces the previous highly irrational and slothfully 
traditional way of working.”468 
As things have come to pass it appears that Marx was not entirely correct about 
capitalism’s ability to establish “real connections” through the proliferation of markets and other 
networks of social intercourse worldwide. Of course, he could not have imagined the 
development of the internet and social media, but as things stand there is evidence which 
suggests that these technological advances do not necessarily provide people with “real 
connections.” Rather than hurling us into a new age of Enlightenment, the expansion of the 
internet has served to demonstrate how even with the opportunity to learn about any topic and 
connect to different people and cultures almost anywhere in the world, a significant amount of 
people tend to search for confirmation of their beliefs and narrowly focus their learning on 
strengthening those existing beliefs while restricting their social intercourse to others like 
themselves. Indeed, it has never been easier for ignorant individuals to find confirmation of their 
attitudes and beliefs by connecting with more people that are like themselves. The resulting 
creation of digital, mass echo-chambers which operate parallel to each other is also observable. 
Nevertheless, it is true that “real connections” have developed in the sense that we have created 
the technological means to connect to each other with far reaching, immediate, mass 
communication and transportation. The innovations in the internet and social media (and all 
related technologies) in the last decades of the 20th century have greatly expanded our horizon 
and it has already been demonstrated that these technologies have the potential to profoundly 
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influence social movements—but it must be emphasized that their efficacy depends on the way 
we use them, i.e., on our ability to command not only the technology but ourselves as well. 
Marx’s emphasis on “real connections” should therefore be re-evaluated because while it is 
evident that capitalism establishes networks of communication,—e.g., by laying the material 
foundation for mass communication and developing social media (advancing and proliferating 
technologies and infrastructure for it, spreading it around the globe, etc.)—Marx’s idea of what 
qualifies these connections as “real” presupposes the development of a subject that is sufficiently 
able to derive “intellectual wealth” from them.469 In Kant’s elaboration of his idea of the “sensus 
communis” he articulated a kind of mental capacity which is comparable to the one presupposed 
by Marx’s idea of “real connections.”470 Kant associated it with three maxims: “(1) to think for 
oneself; (2) to think from the standpoint of everyone else; (3) always to think consistently. The 
first is the maxim of unprejudiced thought, the second that of broadened thought, the third that 
of consistent thought.”471 Kant claimed that the “reason” of subjects such as those that Marx 
understood as deeply superstitious is “passive,” and that to “be given to such passivity, 
consequently to heteronomy of reason, is called prejudice;” and for him, the greatest of all 
prejudices is that of fancying nature not to be subject to rules which the understanding by virtue 
of its own essential law lays at its basis, i.e., superstition.” Kant’s claims about this matter are 
                                                          
469 Consider, for instance, the article “How WhatsApp Destroyed A Village” (Dixit and Mac 2018) which covers a 
spate of murders in India that are linked to the prevalence of WhatsApp, smartphones, and the spread of ‘fake 
news’ among village residents in rural India. 
470 “[By] the name sensus communis is to be understood the idea of a public sense, i.e. a faculty of judging which in 
its reflective act takes account (a priori) of the mode of representation of everyone else, in order, as it were, to 
weigh is judgement with the collective reason of mankind, and thereby avoid the illusion arising from subjective 
and personal conditions which could readily be taken for objective, an illusion that would exert a prejudicial 
influence upon its judgement. This is accomplished by weighing the judgement, not so much with actual, as rather 
with the merely possible, judgements of others, and by putting ourselves in the position of everyone else, as the 
result of a mere abstraction from the limitations which contingently affect our own judging” (Kant 2007, 123). 
471 Ibid., 124. 
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also consistent with Marx’s view of the subjectivity of individuals who provide a foundation in 
the population for—and who live under the yoke of—the despotic regimes which arise in 
conditions lacking “real connections.” According to Kant “the condition of blindness into which 
superstition places us, and which it even demands from us as an obligation, makes the need of 
being led by others, and consequently the passive state of the reason, all too evident.”472 
Marx ultimately thought that only a “communist” revolution “will liberate separate 
individuals from the various national and local barriers, bring them into practical connection with 
the production (including intellectual production) of the whole world and make it possible for 
them to acquire the capacity to enjoy this all-sided production of the whole earth (the creations of 
man).”473 With the continued growth of the world market he believed this revolution was steadily 
approaching. He thought that with the growth of the world market “all contradictions come into 
play” and that these “contradictions” lead to crises which he described as “the urge which drives 
toward the adoption of a new historic form.”474 However, Marx also emphasized the 
development of the subjectivity required to carry out a revolution when the crises of the world 
market surface. The intensification of the “contradiction” between the forces and relations of 
production, for example, will only lead to a revolution if the subjectivity required for it has 
already matured or matures simultaneously. To put it another way, global economic crises have a 
marked tendency to spark mass movements, but Marx’s work suggests that they alone are not 
enough to bring about the kind of revolution that he imagined. 
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5. Marx’s ‘Teleological’ Theory of Humanity’s Historical Development 
Marx’s writing indicates that he thought of human development teleologically, i.e., in his 
view our telos is the development of our implicit potential for “universality” and, ultimately, 
freedom.475 The idea that Marx’s writing contains a teleological theory is controversial. In the 
literature on this it is often the case that ‘teleology’ is associated with ideas that do not reflect the 
kind of teleology found in Marx’s thought and the absence of those ideas in Marx’s writings are 
taken to mean an absence of teleology. Assuming that a teleological development entails an 
inevitable result476 is a common example of something that is correctly not attributed to Marx but 
incorrectly considered a necessary element of any teleological theory.477 To begin with, while 
there is indeed ample evidence to support the interpretive thesis that Marx’s ‘Historical 
Materialism’ contains a philosophy of “universal” or “world” history, he was not ‘stagist’ in the 
simple mechanical way that is frequently attributed to him, i.e., the perspective of history as a 
                                                          
475 Marx’s concept of telos is consistent with his Aristotelian idea of “nature.” According to Meikle it is the “form, 
state or condition toward which an entity develops by its nature,” i.e., “the final form attained in an entity’s 
process of development” (Meikle 1985, 179). 
476 We see this with Kant, for example. He claimed that “All of a creatures natural predispositions are destined 
eventually to develop fully and in accordance with their purpose” (Kant 2006, 4). Marx did not think of humanity’s 
freedom as our ‘destiny’ in the sense of an inevitable occurrence (and Kant wound up maintaining contradictory 
propositions on this matter). Nevertheless it is arguable that Marx would agree with the essence of Kant’s claim 
that “if we abandon” the “teleological theory of nature” we “can no longer understand nature as governed by 
laws, but rather only as playing aimlessly; and the dismal reign of chance thus replaces the guiding principle of 
reason” (Ibid., 5). 
477 For example, Mehmet Tabak claims that “Marx does not assume an inevitable historical development on the 
basis of an eternal, extraneous, pre-given plan,” and the idea that Marx had a “teleological view of history assumes 
that all societies would undergo the same transition toward the same predetermined goal” (Tabak 2012, 39, 49). 
Cf. Bensaïd’s claim that “Present and future history is not the goal of past history.... Marx had no mania for 
posteriority. He did not march to the beat of ultimate promises and last judgements” (Bensaïd 2002, 15). Ollman 
also makes this mistake and claims that Marx’s propensity for ‘reading history backward’ “does not mean that 
Marx accepts a cause at the end of history, a ‘motor force’ operating in reverse, a teleology”; and yet Ollman 
indirectly supports the notion of teleology because he believes that “the unfolding of a potential has a privileged 
status in Marx’s studies,” because this is an essential component of the idea of teleological development in Marx’s 
thought (Ollman 2003, 118, 121-2). As Meikle claimed, “the form of teleology that [Marx] uses, in common with 
Aristotle, is not an occultism in which the future acts causally upon the present.... It is a theoretical correlate of 
recognising the fact that whole entities of their nature have potentials and lines of development, and in their 
development, in fully coming-to-be, those entities are simply realising the potentials constituted in their natures” 
(Meikle 1985, 11). 
124 
 
simply inevitable linear succession of modes of ‘material’ production; but he did not maintain 
that the course of history is simply contingent on random human activity. The teleological theory 
inherent in Marx’s writing on human life and history contains these two theoretical positions 
sublated within it. While his pronouncements may seem paradoxical because of this, he was able 
to maintain a coherent view of the historical process of human development nonetheless. 
In the literature on Marx’s work there is a persistent tendency to associate the idea of “a 
mechanical sequence of modes of production” and “some transhistorical drive which inevitably 
leads one social form to be succeeded by a more productive one” with teleology, as Ellen Wood 
did in a discussion of the “essence of historical materialism and its general theory of history.”478 
While it is indeed arguable that Marx’s work does not contain an idea of a simple linear process 
of inevitably successive developments, she mistakenly assumed that this therefore means there is 
no conception of teleology in his work.479 She argues that Marx  
“has replaced teleology with history—not history as mere contingency, nor history as 
a mechanical succession of predetermined stages or a sequence of static structures, 
but history as a process with its own causalities, constituted by human agency in a 
                                                          
478 Wood 2008, 88. Paresh Chattopadhyay claimed that “As for the accusation that Marx viewed social 
development in a teleological way that is as serving a (predetermined) purpose or design, then Marx’s conception 
of history is certainly not teleological” (Chattopadhyay 2006, 70). He argues that there was an “anti-teleological 
rein” in the manner “that communism is presented by Marx and Engels in their very first works on the materialist 
conception of history as a ‘movement’, not a ‘doctrine’” (Ibid, 71). In a similar vein Sayers claims that the idea of 
“progress” in Marx’s thought “cannot be understood in teleological terms” because it “is not a matter of 
approaching ever closer to some predetermined end point or ideal,” and he goes so far as to say that “the very 
notion of a final human end must be rejected” (Sayers 1998, 163). 
479 She also associated teleology with a “universal technological determinism” (Wood 2008, 91). 
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context of social relations and social practices which impose their own demands on 
those engaged in them.”480 
A grasp of Marx’s ontological and anthropological premises is required to adequately understand 
the relationship between his idea of our agency and of the socio-historical determinations of 
individual life because the specific determinations of each historical period circumscribe human 
agency and, in a sense, determine it, even though Marx did not dissolve human agency into an 
all-subsuming, mechanically fatalistic movement of ‘History’. 
From Marx’s perspective there is not simply one human history even though there is 
essentially one humanity. There is history anywhere humans live; it depends on the relatedness 
of individuals as essentially “rational” and “social” beings and it is conditioned by the 
determinate circumstances in each instance, including the intersection of natural and socio-
cultural factors. Civilizations can rise and fall completely unknown to each other and distinct 
histories of different peoples can entwine and fuse because of our “universal” nature, whereby 
we become part of other histories and they become partly our own. Thus while Marx had an idea 
of “universal”/”world” history, he thought that “World history has not always existed” and that 
“history as world history” is itself “a result” of a specific set of historical trajectories.481 This 
kind of “universal” history, which is bound by necessity rooted in our “universal” development, 
underlies Marx’s infamous claim that in “broad outline, the Asiatic, ancient, feudal and modern 
bourgeois modes of production may be designated as epochs marking progress in the economic 
development of society.”482 We must emphasize “broad outline” because in Marx’s view history 
                                                          
480 Wood 2008, 90. She claims further that by “insisting on the specificity of capitalism, by refusing to read its 
principles of motion back into history, and by explaining how every mode of production is governed by its own 
specific rules for reproduction, Marx is offering precisely the antithesis of teleology” (Ibid., 90). 
481 Marx 1973, 109. 
482 Marx 1977, 21. 
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does not proceed in a straight line of inevitably successive stages, but there are nevertheless 
necessary ‘stages’ in our development into free beings. These ‘stages’ therefore correspond to 
our development which will necessarily involve various particular co-determining 
characteristics, and this process can be disrupted.483 
To borrow a phrase from Bensaïd, there is no “mechanical fatality” in Marx’s theory of 
history, but there is necessity involved in the determination of its pattern nonetheless.484 Our 
activity is determined by the degree of our “universal” development as individuals and as a 
species and our history is bound by necessity rooted in this development. Marx thought that it 
proceeds in part like a ‘natural process’ that is determined by ‘universal laws’. To begin with, at 
any given moment in our species’ existence, those of us that exist have come from those that 
preceded us; we are in part determined by these conditions which correspond to our species’ 
development—a development which has ‘natural’ phases of growth. From Marx’s perspective 
“communist society” cannot emerge from merely any social form. The necessity in this instance 
is conditional necessity. Consider, for example, Marx’s claim that  
“In general, the development of the industrial proletariat is conditioned by the 
development of the industrial bourgeoisie. Only under the rule of the bourgeoisie 
does it begin to exist on a broad national basis, which elevates its revolution to a 
                                                          
483 This of course has direct implications for the ‘multi-linearity’ debate among Marxists. This debate concerns the 
question about whether or not all nations and peoples who have not experienced capitalism necessarily need to 
move through it in order to create “communism.” Kevin Anderson poses the question thus: “Was the pathway 
through which modern capitalism had emerged in Western Europe and North America to be followed by all other 
societies, with the rest of the world simply left behind by these technologically more advanced societies?” 
(Anderson 2010, 172). Marx’s work suggests that the answer to this question of multi-linear paths to 
“communism” is both yes and no. A pre-capitalist nation can embark on a path to create “communism” in which 
they do not first pass through capitalism, but only insofar as those who must appropriate the “universality” of the 
productive forces and other technological and scientific advances created by capitalism are in conditions that have 
allowed them to develop the capacity to do so. This also includes the level of cultural development required for 
the relations appropriate to “communist society.” 
484 Bensaïd 2002, 56. 
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national one; only under the rule of the bourgeoisie which serves to tear up the 
material roots of feudal society and level the ground, thus creating the only possible 
conditions for a proletarian revolution.”485 
From his perspective the development of our “universality” as a species, i.e., the basis of our 
agency, has taken place through the activity of individuals who are not determined by themselves 
entirely. Indeed, we were initially a result of “natural history” (i.e., we emerged from nature as 
creatures of the natural world) and for Marx “History itself is a real part of natural history—of 
nature developing into [humanity].”486 Evidence suggests that we have originated in the womb of 
the cosmos, out of lower forms of animals, plants, simple cellular organisms and even seemingly 
‘dead, inorganic matter’. Thus we must admit that a process has taken place, and is perhaps still 
taking place, from which our potential for agency—i.e., our “universal” capacities—emerged in 
the course of “natural history.”  
Marx attempted to account for what he conceived as a discernable tendency upward not 
only in the evolutionary process of the natural world but human history as well—a trend which 
in the broad scheme of human activity has taken place unintentionally. The record of history 
shows groups and individuals motivated by particular interests and yet at certain moments our 
activity has had unintended results that changed the course of human history in ways which have, 
according Marx, proved necessary for the realization of freedom. In his view of history the 
course of our species’ “universal” development has proceeded for the most part unknown to us 
and in so far as this development results from activities of ours that are oriented toward some 
other end it can be described as a process that we participate in unconsciously. For example, 
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Marx thought the British bourgeoisie were the “unconscious tool of history.”487 Our activity as 
individuals taken collectively makes history, but as individuals we are also made by history, i.e., 
by the activity of those who came before us, including those who still exist contemporaneously 
with us. Marx claimed, for instance, that in “the social production of their existence, men 
inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of 
production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of 
production.”488 
In short, on Marx’s premises our agency is dependent on our “universal” development 
through the life-movement of our species which is governed by “universal” laws. Ultimately, our 
life-process has ‘transhistorical’ characteristics, i.e., characteristics involved in all specific 
historical periods and modes of production, which reassert themselves in a different way in each 
particular form of society in sync with our “universal” development and the circumstances which 
correspond to it. Thus each characteristic of ours which is common to all periods has the 
potential to transform during, and in accordance with, our species’ ‘natural life-process’ of 
growth. The labour process, for example, is a fundamental feature of human life-activity which 
pulsates throughout all distinct modes of production and forms of society.489 In any given period 
                                                          
487 Marx 2010b, 307. 
488 Marx 1977, 20. The emphasis that Marx places on our corporeality, which is a key element of the ‘materialism’ 
of his ‘Historical Materialism’, has profound implications for our conception of our agency. Consider, for example, 
Whitehead’s claim that individuals “are driven by their thoughts as well as by the molecules in their bodies, by 
intelligence and by senseless forces.... Our consciousness does not initiate our modes of functioning. We awake to 
find ourselves engaged in process, immersed in satisfactions and dissatisfactions, and actively modifying, either by 
intensification, or by attenuation, or by the introduction of novel purposes” (Whitehead 1967, 46). 
489 On this matter it is worth quoting Marx at length: “In so far as the labour process is a simple process between 
man and nature, its simple elements remain common to all social forms of its development. But each particular 
historical form of this process further develops the material foundations and social forms. Once a certain level of 
maturity is attained, the particular historical form is shed and makes way for a higher form. The sign that the 
moment of such a crisis has arrived is that the contradiction and antithesis between, on the one hand, the 
relations of distribution, hence also the specific historical form of relations of production corresponding to them, 
and, on the other hand, the productive forces, productivity, and the development of its agents, gains in breadth 
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we have developed our “universal” capacities to some degree through activity which is partly 
self-determined and partly the result of broader interrelated processes inherent in the natural and 
socio-historical elements of our mode of life. Thus in his view “when a society has begun to 
track down the natural laws of its movement” we “can neither leap over the natural phases of its 
development nor remove them by decree,” although we can “shorten and lessen the birth-pangs” 
by understanding it.490 
This way of thinking was prefigured in Hegel’s philosophy. Engels claimed that the “great 
merit” of “the Hegelian system” was that with it, for the “first time,” the  
“whole natural, historical and spiritual world was presented as a process, that is, as in 
constant motion, change, transformation and development; and the attempt was made 
to show the internal interconnections in this motion and development.... It now 
became the task of thought to follow the gradual stages of this process through all its 
devious ways, and to trace out the inner regularities running through all its 
apparently fortuitous phenomena.”491  
Marx also possessed an idea of a telos which spans the natural world and human history, and he 
thought that human beings are the pinnacle of natural development. This is evident in his view of 
the origin and dissolution of “the system of bourgeois economy” which he treated as a kind of 
natural life-process, the “ultimate result” of which is “its negation.”492 This “system” of human 
life is a conditional necessity for another form of life: “Just as…the pre-bourgeois phases [of 
                                                          
and depth. A conflict then sets in between the material development of production and its social form” (Marx 
1981, 1023-24). 
490 Marx 1976, 92. 
491 Engels 1934, 30. 
492 Marx 1973, 712. He claimed to have recognized ways in which “Capital...works towards its own dissolution as 
the form dominating production” (Ibid., 700). 
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life] appear as merely historical, i.e. suspended presuppositions, so do the contemporary 
conditions of production likewise appear as engaged in suspending themselves and hence in 
positing the historic presuppositions for a new state of society.”493 After all, Marx claimed that 
capitalism’s “historical mission” is to “ruthlessly expand the productivity of human labour, to 
drive it onwards to geometrical progression.”494 However, its tendency to provide the foundation 
for the flowering of a “higher” form of social life implies that while the life-process of capitalism 
is akin to any other natural process, it is not simply a ‘natural’ process because it involves the 
activity of human subjects which, moreover, the natural sciences in their conventional form are 
not equipped to comprehend because of insufficient ontological and anthropological premises. 
Nevertheless, according to Marx “the material transformation of the economic conditions” of all 
social forms “can be determined with the precision of natural science” and he thought that such 
transformations “must be explained from the contradictions of material life, from the conflict 
existing between the social forces of production and the relations of production.”495  
It has been well established (to a fault in some literature) that Marx thought “the 
development of the contradictions of a given historical form of production is the only historical 
way in which it can be dissolved and then reconstructed on a new basis.”496 He thought that such 
“contradictions” within the capitalist mode of production “lead to explosions, cataclysms,” and 
“crises” which are “regularly recurring catastrophes” that “lead to their repetition on a higher 
                                                          
493 Ibid., 461. As Whitehead maintained, “we have some knowledge of that counter-tendency which converts the 
decay of one order into the birth of its successor” (Whitehead 1929, 90). 
494 Marx 1981, 371. Capitalism is therefore “untrue to its mission as soon as it starts to inhibit the development of 
productivity” (Ibid.). 
495 Marx 1977, 21. 
496 Marx 1976, 619. As for the capitalist system, Marx was intent on demonstrating that there exists a 
“contradiction between the general social power into which capital has developed and the private power of the 
individual capitalists over these social conditions of production” because this is a “development” that “also 
contains the solution to this situation” by “simultaneously [raising] the conditions of production into general, 
communal, social conditions” (Marx 1981, 373). 
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scale, and finally to” its “violent overthrow.”497 The ‘economic laws’ of distinct modes of 
production differ, however. Marx made it clear that “a general historico-philosophical theory, the 
supreme virtue of which consists in being super-historical,” is not sufficient for comprehending 
how “events strikingly analogous but taking place in different historic surroundings” will lead 
“to totally different results.”498 But as McCarney pointed out, with a “historical dialectic” of the 
sort involved in ‘Historical Materialism’, 
“it is not enough that there should be contradictions continually coming into view 
and going under. There must be an immanent, progressive logic to the sequence of 
changes. What is required is, not simply an indefinite sequence of randomly 
revolving contradictions but, an essentially directed movement. In the language of 
the dialectical tradition, the question is how one can speak of reason in history.”499  
Presented in this way, however, the relationship between Marx’s ontology and his teleological 
view of history is set up for misinterpretation because even though there is evidence which 
indicates that Marx thought there is ‘reason in history’ and that “the social antagonisms that 
spring from the natural laws of capitalist production” are “tendencies winning their way through 
and working themselves out with iron necessity,” it must be emphasized that he did not use this 
ontology, directly or indirectly, as a kind of philosophical guarantee for the emergence of 
freedom.500 To do so would distort the substance of his concept of human freedom as the 
                                                          
497 Marx 1973, 750. 
498 Marx 1975c, 294. 
499 McCarney 1987, 175. 
500 Marx 1976, 91. The view that proletarian revolution is inevitable is characteristic of the old school of ‘historical 
dialectics’ which developed in the Soviet Union. Moseley and Smith claim that “the old Marxian dialectics (or 
Diamat)” was “concerned primarily with the influence of Hegel on Marx’s theory of history, and the eventual 
triumph of socialism” (Moseley and Smith 2014, 1). And according to McCarney it was the Marxism of the Second 
International which thought that the “major achievement” of “Marxist social theory” is “the discovery of scientific 
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‘independent’ development of “self-conscious reason” (which, ultimately, is achieved by 
“universally developed individuals”). And after all, Marx claimed that “History does nothing” 
and “is not, as it were, a person apart, using man as a means to achieve its own aims”; i.e., for 
him history is “nothing but the activity of [humanity] pursuing [its] aims.”501 Thus it is ultimately 
imprecise to say that Marx thought there is a telos of history because history moves and changes 
in accordance with our activity and our development. The “historical dialectic” that he sublated 
from Hegel is not simply an external process of change in the cosmos which mechanically 
determines our behaviour in order to bring about freedom; on the contrary, it involves the 
development of “the human mind”—“self-conscious reason”—through “estrangement,” even 
though it is a process that brings about this development for the most part without conscious 
intention.502 Thus the form which the ontological idea that “Reason directs the world” takes in 
Marx’s ‘Historical Materialism’ does not entail being resigned to some kind of blind fate. 
Marx had no need for prophetic assertions about the “impending revolution” because, of 
course, it is (allegedly) impending. He did not proclaim that a successful revolution would 
inevitably happen apart from moments of revolutionary fervor such as in the Manifesto (during 
the revolutionary period of 1848)503 or in Capital (which was intended to be a “scientific” 
                                                          
laws of history and, specifically, of the mechanism that ensures the downfall of capitalism and its replacement by 
socialism” (McCarney 1990, 1). 
501 Marx 1975b, 93. 
502 Consider, for example, Hegel’s idea that “the grand interest of Spirit in History, is to attain an unlimited 
immanence of subjectivity—by an absolute antithesis to attain complete harmony” (Hegel 1956, 174). 
503 In his book History, Labour and Freedom, Gerald Cohen incorrectly claims that “Marx and Engels considered it 
inevitable that a socialist revolution would overturn capitalism” (he cites the statement in the Manifesto that the 
“fall [of the bourgeoisie] and the victory of the proletariat are equally inevitable” as evidence of this) (Cohen 1988, 
51). Karl Löwith also claims that the Manifesto is “eschatological in its framework, and prophetic in its attitude,” 
and he went so far as to say that it “is only in Marx’s ‘ideological’ consciousness that all history is a history of class 
struggles, while the real driving force behind this conception is a transparent messianism which has its unconscious 
root in Marx’s own being, even in his race. He was a Jew of Old Testament stature.... It is the old Jewish 
messianism and prophetism...and Jewish insistence on absolute righteousness which explain the idealistic basis of 
Marx’s materialism” (Löwith 1949, 38, 44). 
133 
 
exposition of the immanent manifestation of proletarian revolution from within capitalist 
society).504 Ultimately, Marx only maintained that there are discernable tendencies toward a 
revolutionary transformation of society because from his perspective both the material conditions 
and the subjectivity that was going to bring it about were already in the process of formation—a 
subject, of course, to whom he thought he was speaking. Thus from his perspective it is allegedly 
self-evident that if freedom is going to be achieved, we have to bring it about with consciousness 
and will. To suggest that freedom is inevitable on Marx’s premises is to suggest, in effect, that it 
has already become realized, but unlike Hegel who thought that the “infinite purpose” has 
already been accomplished,505 Marx’s work puts forth the idea that the “dialectic” which is 
evident in the record of history and modern capitalism in particular only entails that the 
experience of freedom is truly possible. 
This discussion overlaps with a relatively common objection to the teleological notion that 
‘Reason is at work’ in history; namely, that it is theological and that history thereby becomes a 
kind of theodicy. This, of course, would be an expression of alienation, a projection of our own 
purposeful activity onto some external, ‘divine’ Subject which resides ‘above’ and ‘beyond’ 
nature and humanity. Löwith, for instance, claimed that  
“Historical materialism is essentially, though secretly, a history of fulfilment and 
salvation in terms of social economy. What seems to be a scientific discovery...is, on 
                                                          
504 He mentioned, for example, “the inevitable conquest of political power by the working class” (Marx 1976, 619). 
505 “The accomplishing of the infinite purpose,” Hegel claimed, “consists…only in sublating the illusion that it has 
not yet been accomplished. The good, the absolute good, fulfills itself eternally in the world, and the result is that 
it is already fulfilled in and for itself, and does not need to wait upon us for this to happen. This is the illusion in 
which we live, and at the same time it is this illusion alone that is the activating element upon which our interest in 
the world rests. It is within its own process that the Idea produces that illusion for itself; it posits an other 
confronting itself, and its action consists in sublating that illusion. Only from this error does the truth come forth, 
and herein lies our reconciliation with error and with finitude. Otherness or error, as sublated, is itself a necessary 
moment of the truth, which can only be in that it makes itself into its own result” (Hegel 1991b, 286). 
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the contrary, from the first to the last sentence inspired by an eschatological faith.... It 
would have been quite impossible to elaborate the vision of the proletariat’s 
messianic vocation on a purely scientific basis and to inspire millions of followers by 
a bare statement of facts.”506 
Teleology in general is often associated with theological notions of a Providential ‘Designer’ 
God guiding the process as a conscious agent separate from us. These ideas can be attributed to 
the medieval Scholastic tradition which used Aristotelian teleology to bolster the Christian view, 
resulting in a “divine teleological cosmology.”507 It is generally accepted that this idea of 
teleology is absent from Marx’s work. In fact, this is likely the sort of “teleology” that Marx 
spoke about in an 1861 letter to Ferdinand Lassalle, claiming that its presence in the natural 
sciences was “dealt a mortal blow” by Darwin.508 The “rational meaning” of teleology that Marx 
alludes to in this letter is the form of “teleology” in his own thinking. Nothing like Hegel’s 
theological overtones and invocation of “the superior design of providence,” as Kosík put it, will 
be found in Marx’s writings on history.509 But Marx did not view the history of human 
development as a Darwinian process of natural evolution, i.e., as a series of random mutations 
and adaptations governed ultimately by a blind process of natural selection. Even though it is 
                                                          
506 Löwith 1949, 45. He claims that “the term ‘philosophy of history’ is used to mean a systematic interpretation of 
universal history in accordance with a principle by which historical events and successions are unified and directed 
toward an ultimate meaning. Taken in this sense, philosophy of history is, however, entirely dependent on 
theology of history, in particular on the theological concept of history as a history of fulfilment and salvation but 
then philosophy of history cannot be a ‘science’; for how could one verify the belief in salvation on scientific 
grounds?” (Ibid., 1). 
507 Meikle 1985, 167. 
508 Marx 1985, 247. As Wood claimed, “Marx and Engels respect for Darwin...rests on the fact that he exhibited a 
progressive historical movement in the natural world, and provided a purely naturalistic account of biological 
organization, undercutting explanations of natural teleology in theological or supernaturalist terms” (Wood 2004, 
109). 
509 Kosík 1969, 65. 
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evident that Darwin was influential for Marx’s view of human life and development,510 Marx did 
not base his ‘Historical Materialism’ on the kind of ‘materialist’ ontology found in Darwin’s 
theory of natural evolution. The Darwinian view of natural life is based on what Marx described 
as “the abstract materialism”—i.e., what Whitehead called ‘scientific materialism’—“of natural 
science” which “excludes the historical process,” and on this basis we cannot adequately account 
for our development into a “universal,” “free being.”511 
It is thus not accurate to claim that Marx understood history as a series of ultimately 
‘meaningless’ transitions between cultural form and social modes of life. For him, history was 
not merely a “banal ‘succession of generations’” with “no more meaning than the dreary 
genealogy of whales,” as Daniel Bensaïd argued.512 Bensaïd was referring to the idea that  
“History is nothing but the succession of separate generations, each of which uses the 
materials…the productive forces handed down to it by all preceding generations, and 
thus, on the one hand, continues the traditional activity in completely changed 
circumstances and, on the other, modifies the old circumstances with a completely 
changed activity.”513  
                                                          
510 For example, Marx claimed that “Darwin has directed attention to the history of natural technology, i.e., the 
formation of the organs of plants and animals, which serve as the instruments of production for sustaining their 
life. Does not the history of the productive organs of man in society, of organs that are the material basis of every 
particular organization of society, deserve equal attention?” (Marx 1976, 493). 
511 Cf. Merleau-Ponty’s claim that “Marxism, as we know, recognizes that nothing in history is absolutely 
contingent, that historical facts do not arise from a sum of mutually foreign circumstances but form an intelligible 
system and present a rational development. But the characteristic thing about Marxism—unlike theological 
philosophies or even Hegelian idealism—is its admission that humanity’s return to order, the final synthesis, is not 
necessitated but depends upon a revolutionary act whose certainty is not guaranteed by any divine decree or by 
any metaphysical structure of the world” (Merleau-Ponty 1964, 120).  
512 Bensaïd 2002, 15. 
513 Marx and Engels 1998, 58. 
136 
 
Misreading this is unavoidable if it is taken in abstraction from Marx’s ontology and 
philosophical anthropology because the change of circumstances and activity correspond to our 
“universal” development which is bound by laws that govern our species-life, including the 
transitions in our development.514 In so far as the realization of “human nature” (freedom) is our 
‘end’, there are necessary stages in our development; i.e., if there is progress in the process of our 
development, certain necessary stages must be reached and surpassed, and Marx thought that 
there was evidence of such progress. How are we to make sense of Marx’s claim, for instance, 
that the “forming of the five senses is a labour of the entire history of the world” if we assume 
that he thought all of our activity throughout history is simply ‘meaningless’?515 Substantial 
evidence indicates that, for Marx, our existence has an ‘end’ or ‘purpose’, and yet interpretive 
positions akin to Bensaïd’s are quite common. István Mészáros, for example, claimed that for 
Marx “history had to remain radically open to qualify as history in order to make any sense at all 
of ‘self-activity’ and ‘freedom’ in terms of the objective potentialities of human self-
realization.”516 This notion of an open-ended movement is inadequate because Marx thought that 
freedom is humanity’s ‘end’ or ‘purpose’ and it does not take account of the fact that certain 
kinds of society achieve freer relations and activities. An example of the inherent absurdity of 
such positions can be found explicitly in Bensaïd’s claim that in Marx’s work we do not find “a 
speculative philosophy of history” but rather “a deconstruction of universal History” which  
“opens the way to a history that promises no salvation, offers no guarantee to redress 
injustice—not even the faintest possibility. A profane history emerges whose 
                                                          
514 Cf. Marx’s claim that at “a certain stage of development” the mode of production founded on the small-scale 
industry of peasants and artisans “brings into the world the material means of its own destruction. From that 
moment, new forces and new passions spring up in the bosom of society, forces and passions which feel 
themselves to be fettered by that society. It has to be annihilated; it is annihilated” (Marx 1976, 928). 
515 Marx 1964, 141. 
516 Mészáros 2011, 36. 
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trajectory is unsettled, in that it is determined conjointly by struggle and necessity. 
Hence there is no question of founding a new philosophy of some unidirectional 
history.”517 
If Marx thought that there was “not even the faintest possibility” of freedom, how are we to 
explain his life’s work? If the possibility of progress exists there must be an ‘end’ toward which 
we can progress.518 
While “Reason” does not function as Providence in Marx’s writing it is evident that 
attitudes toward revolutionary politics akin to religious faith exist nonetheless and that the 
ontological idea that “Reason directs the world” could indeed be mistakenly treated like some 
kind of omnipotent and inexorable Providential Will. It seems that even McCarney had a quasi-
religious striving for salvation brought on by misgivings about the revolutionary potential of the 
proletariat and the development of “communism.” He did not think capitalism is doing what 
Marx said it would and was lamenting the absence of the revolutionary subject required to carry 
out a revolution. He went so far as to maintain that “some version of the cunning of reason” is 
“needed” to supplement Marx’s revolutionary social theory by being “placed explicitly at the 
center of the conceptual field,” “generalized in its application,” and “extended to the revolution 
of socialism.”519 He did not recognize the extent to which Marx had critically reworked this idea 
into his writings—aside from “isolated and opportunist, or at least not fully theorized, uses”—
                                                          
517 Bensaïd 2002, 2-3. 
518 Cf. McCarney’s claim that “At the most general level of all it is uncontroversially clear that” Marx “shares” with 
Hegel “the vision of history as the history of human emancipation. It is for him a record of progress leading to ‘that 
development of human energy which is an end in itself, the true realm of freedom’” (McCarney 1991, 22). 
519 He claims that it is “a device with which Marx was perfectly familiar” and he insightfully pointed out that this 
“device has nothing mysterious or arbitrary about it in Hegel’s scheme. On the contrary, it is directly grounded in, 
and required by, his basic ontological principles.... In the form that it is historically significant, reason is present in 
human beings as a ‘unconscious universal instinct’” (McCarney 2000, 73, 72). 
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although, to his credit, he claims that if it were transferred into Marx’s thought, it “seems likely 
that a concept of Spirit as incorporating, and driven by, an impulse of reason, is 
indispensable.”520 While this is true, Starosta’s claim that an “extrinsic application of a general 
dialectic” of “Spirit” is not sufficient for Marx’s critique of political economy is also valid.521 
But is the “dialectical” development of “Spirit” or “mind” in history only capable of being 
extrinsically applied? McCarney was on the right path to answering this question. He claimed 
that if “Spirit is read immanently and anthropologically,” it “will not present a theoretical 
difficulty, but at most a shock522 to conventional ways of thinking.”523 Indeed, “Spirit” must be 
read this way—Marx identified humanity with “mind.”524  
Marx’s work does not suggest that the revolution will be brought about by some kind of 
estranged cosmic-νοῦς. We cannot rely on the ontological idea that “Reason directs the world” as 
if it were a blind faith in an omniscient force tending the light at the end of the tunnel of human 
history; but it is evident that Marx thought he could see that light nonetheless. After all, he 
claimed that as “the immanent laws of capitalist production” proceed to unfold in the world—
intelligible laws which are “reason” implicit in the phenomena of capitalism—“the mass of 
misery, oppression, slavery, degradation and exploitation grows; but with this there also grows 
the revolt of the working class, a class constantly increasing in numbers, and trained, united and 
                                                          
520 Ibid., 73-4. 
521 Starosta 2015, 6. 
522 In the words of Nietzsche’s Zarathustra: “Where is the lightning to lick you with its tongue?” (Nietzsche 1996, 
14). 
523 McCarney 2000, 74. “The real problem,” he continues, “is whether…Spirit can after all be detached from the 
Idea so as to form the basis of a viable, self-contained theory” (Ibid.). 
524 Cf. Hegel’s claim regarding the “question of perfectibility and of the education of the human race”: “Those who 
have proclaimed this perfectibility have had some inkling of the nature of spirit, which is to have know thyself as 
the law of its being, and as it comprehends what it is, to assume a higher shape than that which its being originally 
consisted. But for those who reject this thought, spirit has remained an empty word, and history has remained a 
superficial play of contingent and allegedly ‘merely human’ aspirations and passions” (Hegel 1991, 372-373). 
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organized by the very mechanism of the capitalist process of production.”525 Of course he may 
be wrong about this, but if it is determined that he is right then we will have to admit that there is 
indeed someone tending the light: you and I and everyone else who have ‘become like one of 
us’, as it were—i.e., “universally developed individuals” living a “free” life. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
525 Marx 1976, 929. 
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Chapter Five – Revolutionary Subjectivity 
“Have courage, for life is striding 
To endless life along; 
Stretched by inner fire, 
Our sense becomes transfigured. 
One day the stars above 
Shall flow in golden wine, 
We will enjoy it all, 
And as stars we will shine. 
The love is given freely, 
And Separation is no more. 
The whole life heaves and surges 
Like a sea without a shore....” 
- Novalis526 
1. The Subjective Dimension of Revolutionary Transformation 
According to Marx “the communist proletarians who revolutionise society” put “the 
relations of production and the forms of intercourse on a new basis—i.e., on themselves as new 
people, on their new mode of life.”527 The subjectivity of the working class in capitalist 
society—like the subjectivity of all individuals in all societies—is internally related to the 
definite character of social relations and conditions of life-activity that they live within. It is thus 
also a historical product like the revolution itself, which Marx depicts as the result of a broader 
                                                          
526 Novalis 2015. 
527 Marx and Engels 1998, 230. 
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historical process whereby we transform the socio-natural world of life-activity and our own 
“inner world” simultaneously. In his view the specific form of “estrangement” that we 
experience as wage-labourers develops capacities that are required to engage in the 
“revolutionary practice” through which revolutionary subjectivity develops further. Of course, 
revolutionary subjectivity is not the character of individuality that will populate an “advanced 
phase of communist society.” The “present generation,” Marx claimed, “must perish in order to 
make room for the [individuals] who are equal to a new world.”528 Revolutionary subjects are the 
individuals that will initiate the revolution by overthrowing the capitalist order and utilizing the 
productive forces of social labour in the context of new, freer relations that take the place of the 
oppressive capitalist relations of dominance and servitude. They establish conditions through 
which, over time, we will remove any remaining barriers to the full and free development of 
everyone. 
Marx’s idea of revolutionary subjectivity centers on the developmental transformation of 
two particular aspects of human individuality: the productive capacities required to appropriate 
the knowledge objectified in the productive forces, which includes the technical skill required to 
use them and which also develops further in the act of appropriation; and ethical capacities, i.e., 
the development of a state of character required for the social relations which are necessary to 
initiate the revolution, including for the specific way that the working class must unite in order to 
carry out the revolutionary appropriation of the productive forces and reorientation of social life. 
He also thought that general intellectual development accompanies the growth of these 
capacities, but in the literature on Marx’s theory of revolution there tends to be an overemphasis 
on revolutionary consciousness. For him, the development of “consciousness” about our 
                                                          
528 Marx 2010b, 112. 
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essentially collective struggle and the necessary character of the collective solution involves a 
transformation of what Hegel termed the “sensuous will” along with an expansion of thought.  
Marx’s writing puts forth the idea that the development of revolutionary subjectivity 
involves a mental-psychological process. This is expressed, for instance, in his depiction of 
“greed” as an essential factor in the formation of the productive capacity that he called “general 
industriousness.” In short, this is an “indifference” to the “content” of labour insofar as we are 
receiving wages, which is a kind of “versatility” that is required for the revolutionary process. 
The ethical character of revolutionary subjects required for the revolutionary appropriation of the 
productive forces beyond the character of capitalist relations of production also involves a 
mental-psychological transformation of this sort. In accordance with his philosophical 
anthropology, it entails the development of the “so-called spiritual and moral senses” such as 
“will” and “love.” This alteration of subjectivity underlies Marx’s emphasis on the dissolution of 
the identity of revolutionary subjects themselves as a result of the revolution,529 but the kind of 
psychological transformation that Marx envisioned does not only begin after the ‘socio-political’ 
revolution has reached a ‘culminating point’. Instead, he thought that the “proletariat goes 
through various stages of development” both during and leading up to revolutionary activity.530 
Marx does not elaborate in detail about this but we are able to determine that in his view the 
development of revolutionary subjectivity is brought about through the process of “estranged” 
wage-labour. It is this definite form of social life-activity in capitalism which allegedly leads to 
                                                          
529 Cf. Lukács claim that the “proletariat only perfects itself by annihilating and transcending itself, by creating the 
classless society through the successful conclusion of its own class struggle. The struggle for this society, in which 
the dictatorship of the proletariat is merely a phase, is not just a battle waged against an external enemy, the 
bourgeoisie. It is equally the struggle of the proletariat against itself: against the devastating and degrading effects 
of the capitalist system upon its class consciousness. The proletariat will only have won the real victory when it has 
overcome these effects within itself” (Lukács 1971, 80). 
530 Marx 2010, 75. 
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the development of a degree of “reason” required to initiate “revolutionary practice” which is 
then further developmental. 
2. The Influence of Hegel and Aristotle on Marx’s Idea of Humanity’s Development 
Through “Estrangement” 
Marx’s idea of revolutionary subjectivity was strongly shaped by his critical engagement 
with Hegel’s Phenomenology. However, the interpretative literature on this influence tends to 
overlook or underemphasize the extent to which Marx appropriated Hegel’s representation of the 
life and death struggle between oppressed labourers and their oppressive exploiters as a 
fundamentally mental-psychological process. Hegel claimed, for instance, that within this 
oppressive socio-productive relationship the labourer “rids himself of attachment to natural 
existence” and their “natural will.”531 He thought the oppressed labourers were driven to enter 
into a state of deferred desire by a fear that completely consumes them—the fear of death.532 In 
his view a consequence of this is that “the slave,” in “the service of the master, works off his 
individualist self-will, overcomes the inner immediacy of appetite, and in this divestment of self 
and in ‘the fear of his lord’ makes ‘the beginning of wisdom’—the passage to universal self-
consciousness.”533  
                                                          
531 Hegel 1977, 117. 
532 Hegel claimed that “this consciousness has been fearful, not of this or that particular thing or just at odd 
moments, but its whole being has been seized with dread; for it has experienced the fear of death, the absolute 
Lord” (Ibid.). Cf. Aristotle’s claim that “death is the most fearful of all things; for it is the end” (Aristotle 1998, 64). 
According to Hegel, in the labourer’s experience “everything solid and stable has been shaken to its foundations,” 
and through their “service” the labourer “actually brings this about” (Ibid.). Cf. Marx’s claim that “all repose, all 
fixity and all security as far as the worker’s life-situation is concerned” is undermined in capitalist society (Marx 
1976, 617-18). 
533 Hegel 1971, 175. In the process of elaborating this Hegel also touched on its significance for the development of 
the human species overall: “Since the slave works for the master and therefore not in the exclusive interest of his 
own individuality, his desire is expanded into being not only the desire of this particular individual but also the 
desire of another. Accordingly, the slave rises above the selfish individuality of his natural will.... This subjugation 
of the slave’s egotism forms the beginning of true human freedom. This quaking of the single, isolated will, the 
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An analysis of Marx’s critical appropriation of Hegel’s idea of the intersubjective nature of 
class struggle makes the mental-psychological aspect of it in Marx’s work more apparent. 
Consider, for instance, his idea of the “life-and-death struggle” between bourgeoisie and 
proletariat.534 He claimed that it is the “poverty of the proletarian” which “assumes an acute, 
sharp form” and “drives him into a life-and-death struggle, makes him a revolutionary.”535 Marx 
did not think of “poverty” only in the “material” sense; he also described a “spiritual” form of 
“poverty” which suggests that he thought of it from a mental-psychological standpoint.536 Thus 
the life-and-death nature of the class struggle can be conceived from this perspective as well. In 
other words, the class struggle involves an ‘internal’ struggle which is internally related to our 
struggles in the life-world of ‘socio-natural’ practice. 
Class-consciousness, of course, is unthinkable without at least implicitly presupposing the 
existence of subjective-mental life. After all, Marx thought that the revolutionary working class 
is becoming conscious of their power as a class and the real potential for independence from 
economic bondage under the rule of the capitalists. This perspective is unlikely to arouse 
controversy among scholars of Marx’s work, although there is no consensus regarding how the 
development of revolutionary subjectivity and its relation to practice should be theorized within 
the bounds of Marx’s ‘Historical Materialism’. Marx did not provide a substantial amount of 
elaborate detail about his view of the relationship between subjectivity and practice, nor the 
                                                          
feeling of the worthlessness of egotism, the habit of obedience, is a necessary moment in the education of all 
men” (Ibid.). 
534 Marx referred to “the fear felt by the bourgeoisie of the inevitable life-and-death struggle between itself and 
the proletariat” and also articulated class struggle in general as such a struggle (Marx 2010c, 371). He claimed, for 
instance, that there can be “no peace” between “feudal and aristocratic society” and “modern bourgeois society” 
because their “material interests and needs require a life-and-death struggle in which one society must win, the 
other go under”; and that the French bourgeoisie had attempted to “indict the proletariat retrospectively for 
failing to rise in a bloody life and death struggle on its behalf!” (Marx 2010, 259-60; Marx 2010b, 225). 
535 Marx and Engels 1998, 236. 
536 Marx 1964, 141. 
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developmental process of revolutionary subjectivity in particular, but his writings contain some 
definite ideas about this nonetheless. Elements from the philosophies of Aristotle and Hegel that 
inspired Marx can be drawn on to enrich our understanding of his thinking on this matter as well. 
According to Hegel, a key moment in this process occurs as “consciousness, qua worker, comes 
to see in the independent being [of the object] its own independence” from its exploitative 
oppressor.537 Even though Marx maintained that there are significant—but not insurmountable—
barriers hindering the wage-worker’s self-awareness and experience of their objectified power in 
the product that they produce in capitalist relations of production, the influence of Hegel’s 
representation of the maturation of revolutionary independence is evident in Marx’s writing: 
“The recognition of the products as its own, and the judgment that its separation from 
the conditions of its realization is improper—forcibly imposed—is an enormous 
[advance in] awareness, itself the product of the mode of production resting on 
capital, and as much the knell to its doom as, with the slave's awareness that he 
cannot be the property of another, with his consciousness of himself as a person, the 
existence of slavery becomes a merely artificial, vegetative existence, and ceases to 
be able to prevail as the basis of production.”538  
However, there is a depth to Marx’s idea of the wage-workers’ revolutionary independence that 
is not normally taken into consideration because it involves a mental-psychological dimension of 
                                                          
537 Phenomenology, 118. The worker “posits himself as a negative in the permanent order of things, and thereby 
becomes for himself, someone existing on his own account…. [In] fashioning the thing, he becomes aware...that he 
himself exists essentially and actually in his own right. The shape does not become something other than himself 
through being made external to him.... Through this rediscovery of himself by himself, the bondsman realizes that 
it is precisely in his work wherein he seemed to have only an alienated existence that he acquires a mind of his 
own. For this reflection, the two moments of fear and service as such, as also that of formative activity, are 
necessary, both being at the same time in a universal mode” (Hegel 1977, 118-19). 
538 Marx 1973, 462-63. 
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human life-activity that he left undertheorized. He thought that money plays a role in the 
development of this independence because since it is “the worker himself who converts the 
money into whatever use-values he desires”—i.e., since “it is he who buys commodities as he 
wishes”—the wage worker “acts as a free agent; he must pay his own way; he is responsible to 
himself for the way he spends his wages” and thus “learns to control himself, in contrast to the 
slave, who needs a master.”539 
The influence of Aristotle is perceptible in this idea of self-transformative life-activity 
because the development of independence through the use of money, i.e., through habitual 
practice, is analogous to Aristotle’s idea of “moral virtue” which “comes about as a result of 
habit.”540 As Aristotle claimed, “the things we have to learn before we can do them, we learn by 
doing them.”541 This also applies to the development of what Marx described as “that 
revolutionary boldness which flings at its adversary the defiant words, I am nothing and I should 
be everything.”542 Marx’s higher fusion of Aristotelian and Hegelian philosophy suggests that 
this revolutionary character requires the development of “courage,” which is a “moral virtue.”543 
Aside from the ethical character of revolutionary subjects, Marx’s writing indicates that he also 
                                                          
539 Marx 1976, 1033. Marx also claimed that “piece-wages” in particular give a “wider scope” to “individuality” 
which “tends to develop both that individuality, and with it the worker’s sense of liberty, independence and self-
control, and also the competition of workers with each other” (Ibid., 697). 
540 Aristotle 1998, 28. Aristotle claimed, for example, that “by doing the acts that we do in our transactions with 
other men we become just or unjust” (Ibid., 29). 
541 Ibid., 28-29. 
542 Marx 1994, 37. 
543 According to Aristotle we become brave “by doing brave acts” and he defined it as “a mean with regard to 
feelings of fear and confidence” (Aristotle 1998, 29, 63). A “brave” person “faces” and “fears the right things and 
from the right motive, in the right way and at the right time,” and feels “confidence under the corresponding 
conditions”; “for the brave man feels and acts according to the merits of the case and in whatever way the rule 
[logos] directs,” i.e., “as courage directs” (Ibid., 65-66). Marx’s notes indicate that he thought of this as a virtue (cf. 
Marx 1964, 169).  
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took the mental-psychological dimension of the development of revolutionary productive 
capacities into consideration. 
3. Revolutionary Productive Capacities 
Marx thought that the revolutionary appropriation of the productive forces of social labour 
by the working class involves the development of the abilities required to collectively control 
them in a manner consistent with the initiation of a “communist organization of society.” In his 
view the process of appropriating the knowledge objectified in these forces, and attempting to 
exercise the technical capacities associated with their use, further develops the ability required 
for it. In particular, he claimed that  
“private property can be abolished only on condition of an all-round development of 
individuals, precisely because the existing form of intercourse and the existing 
productive forces are all-embracing and only individuals that are developing in an 
all-round fashion can appropriate them, i.e., can turn them into free manifestations of 
their lives.”544 
As a feature of revolutionary subjectivity this “all-round fashion” of individual development is 
more accurately described as the workers’ “indifference to the particularity of labour.”545 The 
                                                          
544 Marx and Engels 1998, 464. “This appropriation is first determined by the object to be appropriated, the 
productive forces, which have been developed to a totality and which only exist within a universal intercourse. 
Even from this aspect alone, therefore, this appropriation must have a universal character corresponding to the 
productive forces and the intercourse. The appropriation of these forces is itself nothing more than the 
development of the individual capacities corresponding to the material instruments of production. The 
appropriation of a totality of instruments of production is, for this very reason, the development of a totality of 
capacities in the individuals themselves” (Ibid., 96). 
545 In Capital, Marx included a statement on this matter by a French labourer who went to California for work: “I 
could never have believed that I was capable of working at all the trades I practiced in California…. As a result of 
this discovery that I am fit for any sort of work, I feel less of a mollusc and more of a man” (Marx 1976, 618). Cf. 
Marx 1973, 104; Marx 1981, 289; Marx 1976, 1013-14. 
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development of this “indifference” is facilitated by the tendency to ‘deskill’ the production 
process which increases the relative ease of transition from one occupation to another. In The 
Poverty of Philosophy he claimed that the “division of labour...engenders specialized functions, 
specialists” which is a kind of one-sided development—he called it “craft-idiocy”—but within 
the “automatic workshop” of capitalist production “labour has...lost its specialized character,” 
and “the moment every special development stops, the need for universality, the tendency 
towards an integral development of the individual begins to be felt.”546 He thought this was a 
positive consequence of the “estrangement” experienced by wage-labourers because the 
“automatic workshop wipes out specialists and craft idiocy.”547 Immature forms of the “rational” 
indifference to the particularity of labour that Marx thought would be achieved in the 
“communist organization of society”—i.e., “the totally developed individual”—germinate 
through “estrangement” in capitalism.548 
In tandem with this process, the “general mania for money” encourages the movement 
which develops our “versatility,” i.e., the “perfect indifference towards the particular content of 
work and the free transition from one branch of industry to the next.”549 This aspect of the 
“estrangement” experienced by wage-labourers which develops “self-conscious reason” is thus 
fundamentally mental-psychological and socio-practical. The key significance that Marx 
ascribed to the mental-psychological dimension for the development of revolutionary productive 
capacities makes it worthwhile to quote him at length: 
                                                          
546 Marx and Engels 1976, 190. 
547 Ibid. 
548 Marx 1976, 618. 
549 Ibid., 1034. 
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“Greed, as the urge of all, in so far as everyone wants to make money, is only created 
by general wealth. Only in this way can the general mania for money become the 
wellspring of general, self-reproducing wealth. When labour is wage-labour, and its 
direct aim is money, then general wealth is posited as its aim and object.... Money as 
aim here becomes the means of general industriousness.... In this way the real 
sources of wealth are opened up. When the aim of labour is not a particular product 
standing in a particular relation to the particular needs of the individual, but money, 
wealth in its general form, then, firstly the individual’s industriousness knows no 
bounds; it is indifferent to its particularity, and takes on every form which serves the 
purpose.... It is clear, therefore, that when wage-labour is the foundation, 
money...acts productively.... General industriousness is possible only where every act 
of labour produces general wealth, not a particular form of it; where therefore the 
individual’s reward, too, is money.”550 
Marx claimed that “the sole purpose of work in the eyes of the wage-labourer” is money, and 
since money is “a specific quantity of exchange-value” from which “every particular mark of 
use-value has been expunged,” workers are “wholly indifferent towards the content” of their 
labour.551 This is a key ingredient in the developmental context of the proletariat as opposed to 
the slave. Marx claimed that wage-labour is playing a vital role in the historical emergence of 
“general industriousness as the general property of the new species” and that slavery can “never 
create general industriousness” because it fosters the perspective that freedom is “loafing.”552 
                                                          
550 Marx 1973, 224. 
551 Marx 1976, 1033. Cf. Marx 1973, 163. 
552 Marx 1973, 325-326. Cf. Marx 1976, 1014. 
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In contemporary literature, Guido Starosta places a strong emphasis on Marx’s idea of 
productive subjectivity, although the mental-psychological dimension of the development of the 
productive capacities of revolutionary subjects is generally overlooked.553 Starosta recognizes 
and attempts to explore the relationship between subjective powers and the ‘socio-material’ 
productive basis of society554 but he fails to notice the depth of Marx’s idea of subjectivity and 
mental-psychological life. To begin with, Starosta misinterprets Marx’s idea that truly 
“universal” productive subjects can only exist in an “advanced phase of communist society” and 
not as revolutionary subjects.555 He does not place adequate emphasis on the “universality” of 
humanity in the sense of our “rational” and therefore “free” nature, i.e., that which makes our 
productive activity unique among animals that “also produce.” In effect, Starosta condenses 
Marx’s idea of human “universality” into the colloquial sense of the term (i.e., as all-rounded) 
and places excessive emphasis on productive capacities; e.g., he writes about “a universal 
worker, that is, a productive subject capable of taking part in any form of the human labour-
process.”556 Marx’s idea of “general industriousness” incorporates the notion of “all-sided 
development” in this sense. However, as demonstrated in previous chapters, his idea of our 
“universality” involves all other aspects of human subjectivity.  
                                                          
553 He maintains that for Marx “productive subjectivity” is a uniquely human trait, and that in Marx’s writing from 
1844 “the content of the history of the human species consists in the development of the specific material powers 
of the human being as a working subject, that is, of human productive subjectivity” (Starosta 2013, 233). Thus for 
Starosta the “essence” of the “capitalist transformation of the production-process of human life lies in the 
mutation of the productive attributes of the collective labourer according to a determinate tendency: the 
individual organs of the latter eventually becoming universal productive subjects” (Ibid., 236). 
554 He claimed, for example, that “it is on the fully-expanded universal character of human productive subjectivity 
that the material basis for the new society rests” (Ibid., 244). 
555 Consider, for example, his claim that a “passage from the Grundrisse mentions that the universality of 
‘revolutionary’ productive subjectivity must be the expression of a scientific consciousness, capable of organising 
work as ‘an activity regulating all the forces of nature’” (Ibid., 247).  
556 Ibid., 239. He also claimed that “Large-scale industry’s tendency to produce an increasingly universal worker” is 
equal to “the disappearance of the technical necessity for a particularistic development of the worker’s productive 
subjectivity” (Ibid., 240). 
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Marx thought the capitalist transformation of human subjectivity is more extensive than 
just the development of productive capacities. In particular, the development of our ethical 
character is an essential aspect of revolutionary subjectivity. Thus while the development of 
productive capacities is an integral subjective transformation for the revolutionary appropriation 
of the productive forces of social labour, the revolutionary character of this appropriation also 
requires a corresponding development of a more “rational” individual ethical character557 among 
members of the working class. 
4. The Ethical Character of Revolutionary Subjectivity 
The revolutionary appropriation of the productive forces requires the development of the 
ethical character of revolutionary subjects so as to advance beyond the relations of current 
society558 and reorganize economic life in a way that all of us can eventually be provided with 
what we require to develop “universally.” Marx’s writing indicates that he thought of it along the 
lines of a mental-psychological transformation related to our “sensuous will” and the 
development of “ratiocinative desire.” As is the case with revolutionary productive capacities, 
Marx thought that the ethical character of revolutionary subjects is developing through their life-
practice in capitalism, including “revolutionary practice.”559  
                                                          
557 Again, in keeping with Marx’s primary philosophical influences, this can be articulated as a greater degree of 
“moral virtuosity” à la Aristotle. 
558 Consider, for example, the “workers’ desire to create the conditions for cooperative production” (Marx 2010c, 
354). 
559 He claimed, for instance, that the “advance of industry, whose involuntary promoter is the bourgeoisie, 
replaces the isolation of the labourers, due to competition, by their revolutionary combination, due to 
association,” and that it “is one of the civilizing aspects of capital that it extorts...surplus labour in a manner and in 
conditions that are more advantageous to social relations and to the creation of elements for a new and higher 
formation” because “it creates the material means and the nucleus for relations that permit this surplus labour to 
be combined, in a higher form of society, with the greater reduction of the overall time devoted to material 
labour” (Marx 2010, 79; Marx 1981, 958). 
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In the “Provisional Rules” of the First International Marx described the emergent ethical 
character of revolutionary working class movements. He claimed that the “International 
Association and all individuals adhering to it…acknowledge truth, justice, and morality as the 
basis of their conduct towards each other, and towards all men, without regard to colour, to 
creed, or nationality.”560 He thought it was increasingly self-evident to working class individuals 
that “the cause of the producer is everywhere the same and its enemy everywhere the same, 
whatever its nationality (in whatever national garb),” and that their “efforts, far from being 
narrow and selfish, aim at the emancipation of the downtrodden millions.”561 It would not be 
accurate to describe his view of revolutionary working people as though he thought they were 
acting ‘altruistically’ but they are not ‘selfish’ in the colloquial sense either insofar as he thought 
that workers were increasingly coming to experience each other’s need for emancipation as their 
own self-interest.562 Ultimately, on Marx’s premises the reciprocal practice of the virtue of 
“justice” is the expression of a rational view of self-interest which is vital for a truly good 
existence. 
Marx depicts this budding ethical character as partly expressed in the working class’ “need 
for society.” He thought it develops through our “revolutionary activity” which is instrumental in 
the development of the desire for such relations as ends-in-themselves. Marx claimed that 
                                                          
560 Marx 2010c, 83. 
561 Ibid., 264, 92. 
562 Like many interpreters, Mihailo Marković would misinterpret this as “abstract moralizing humanism” which he 
claimed is not “Marx’s standpoint” because he mistakenly thought that Marx “does not expect emancipation to be 
the consequence of a higher moral consciousness” but rather “the result of a social development which is 
unconscious and involuntary. The proletarians are not the agents of emancipation because they are morally 
superior and have noble and unselfish social aims” (Marković 1974, 173). Cf. Skillen’s more accurate claim that the 
“proletariat is the ‘revolutionary class’ because of its capacity to seize power and its disposition to organise society 
on a different, non-oppressive basis. It is the ‘universal class,’ not because its members obediently perform a 
cluster of Kantian duties, but because its actual, historically formed ‘inclinations’ correspond to the conditions for 
the realization of the human species’ potential. It needs no moralistic form because its particular needs are, and 
are increasingly felt to be humanity’s needs” (Skillen 1981, 156-57). 
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“Company, association, and conversation, which again has society as its end, are enough for 
them,” and their association, which was initially approached as a means for resisting capitalism, 
“becomes an end.”563 Marx thought that he had recognized the embryo of “communist” social 
relations developing within the already existing “revolutionary activity” of the proletariat.564 
While he did not elaborate at length about this character we can still determine that, in his view, 
even though “the first phase of communist society” will be “stamped with the birthmarks of the 
old society from whose womb it emerges,” in order to bring about the appropriation of the 
productive forces in a way that facilitates a life of abundant “universal” freedom—through which 
we will develop so that we are all ultimately recognized as free in our actual life-activity—the 
“first phase” of revolutionary transition must be brought about by a collectivity of revolutionary 
subjects that identify with all human beings and recognize that each individual is inherently free 
and an end-in-themselves. These revolutionary individuals are driven to act with the aim of 
remedying any situation in which human beings are subject to oppression and exploitation. As 
Marx claimed, “the emancipation of the class of producers is that of all human beings, without 
distinctions of sex or race.”565 This indicates that the subjectivity at the basis of the “bourgeois 
                                                          
563 Marx 1964, 155. Cf. Shlomo Avineri’s elaboration of this: “Organization and association, even considered apart 
from their immediate aims, constitute a crucial phase in the liberation of the workers. They change the worker, his 
way of life, his consciousness of himself and his society. They force him into contact with his fellow-workers, 
suggest to him that his fate is not a subjective, particular and contingent affair but part of a universal scheme of 
reality. They make him see in his fellow-proletarians not competitors for work and bread but brothers in suffering 
and ultimately victory, not means but co-equal ends” (Avineri 1968, 143). 
564 Avineri claimed that “these proletarian associations are in potentia what future society will be in practice” and 
that they “offer a glimpse into future society” because they “create other-directedness and mutuality” (Ibid., 141-
42). Cf. Skillen’s claim that “Marx tended to write as if it was solely in the struggle against the dominant class that 
the masses would gain the dispositions and capacities fitting them for self-emancipation. But...[if] the new society 
is to develop in the womb of the old, its embryo must do more than kick against the walls of the old; it will have to 
be the case that it has exercised virtues and acquired habits (traditions) that will be required in the new age” 
(Skillen 1981, 170). This “new age” has to be qualified as the initial phase of the revolutionary reorganization of 
society because further development is required for the dawn of the age of “true” freedom. 
565 First International and After, 376. He thought that “the emancipation of the workers contains universal human 
emancipation” because “the whole of human servitude is involved in the relation of the worker to production, and 
all relations of servitude are but modifications and consequences of this relation”; and that “the economical 
subjection of the man of labour to the monopoliser of the means of labour, that is, the sources of life, lies at the 
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right” which characterizes the social relations of the “first phase” of revolutionary transition has 
the aim of universal human emancipation driving it to reorganize society.566 Marx did not 
venture to comprehensively explain this aspect of the revolutionary process but his work 
suggests that the development of the “need for society” must be realised and transcended in order 
for the realisation of what he called the “human need” for “the other person as a person” to 
become widespread after a succession of post-revolutionary generations. The full development of 
the need for “the other” as a “person” as well as its satisfaction can only be achieved in the life-
activity of an “advanced phase of communist society” in which “the human end-in-itself” is 
intersubjectively recognized and affirmed by all “universally developed individuals.”567 
The picture of revolutionary individuals conveyed in Marx’s writing indicates that they 
could not be perfectly “just” because they are unable to practice “complete virtue” in relations 
with others and thus that they would have to rectify the lack of development which still remains 
in order to ‘complete’ the revolutionary transition; but it also indicates that a key factor of the 
motivation of these individuals is the recognition of all human beings as inherently free. He 
depicted the revolutionary reorganization of society (production, distribution, etc.) as leading to 
the further development of individuals, tending ultimately toward the “universal development” of 
everyone. On his premises the collective subjectivity animating the revolutionary process is 
consciously oriented toward revolutionary aims which would include feeling the need to make 
each other’s life better in accordance with the knowledge—which is developed through 
                                                          
bottom of servitude in all its forms, of all social misery, mental degradation, and political dependence” (Marx 1964, 
118; Marx 2010c, 82). Cf. Fromm’s claim that the “revolutionary character is humanist in the sense that he 
experiences in himself all of humanity, and that nothing human is alien to him” (Fromm 1963, 165). Cf. Ibid., 158. 
566 Marx 2010c, 346.  
567 Marx 1973, 488. 
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socializing with other workers—of what this essentially requires (the details of which will be 
determined democratically along the way in the process of creating these conditions).568  
Marx did not elaborate the mental-psychological dimension of the process whereby we 
recognize everyone as potentially “universally developed,” i.e., as inherently “universal” and 
“free.” Hegel’s philosophy is relevant for explanatory purposes in this instance as well. He 
claimed that the “servile obedience” arising in response to the worker’s fear of the “Lord” is the 
beginning of wisdom—but only the beginning, 
“because that to which the natural individuality of self-consciousness subjects itself 
is not the truly universal, rational will which is in and for itself, but the single, 
contingent will of another person. Here, then, only one moment of freedom is 
manifested, that of the negativity of the egoistic individuality; whereas the positive 
side of freedom attains actuality only when, on the one hand, the servile self-
consciousness, freeing itself both from the individuality of the master and from its 
own individuality, grasps the absolutely rational in its universality which is 
independent of the particularity of the subjects.”569 
Marx did not think that revolutionary subjects would be able to grasp “the absolutely rational in 
its universality” but his work suggests that the aufhebung of the workers’ “egoistic individuality” 
through “estrangement” facilitates the process of “revolutionary practice” in which he glimpsed 
“the brotherhood of man.” He claimed, for instance, that the experience of “poverty” in 
capitalism “causes the human being to experience the need of the greatest wealth—
                                                          
568 Consider, for example, Marx’s claim that “the emancipation of the working classes requires their fraternal 
concurrence” (Marx 2010c, 81). 
569 Hegel 1971, 175-6. 
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the other human being.”570 While he did not elaborate this point, his distinction between 
“material and spiritual wealth and poverty” is informative in this instance.571 The “spiritual” 
form of “poverty” is connected to the experience of the need for “the other human being” 
because it involves a “passive bond,” i.e., a kind of relation with other individuals, which on the 
premises of Marx’s philosophical anthropology is something we are able experience due to our 
unique mental-psychological life.572 He thought material poverty is also connected to the mental-
psychological dimension of human life, although unlike its “spiritual” form he does not suggest 
that it leads to the further development of a “human” need. Consider, for example, his claim that 
the “material privation” of the working classes “dwarfs their moral as well as their physical 
stature.”573 Ultimately, his idea of the working class as the ‘universal class’574 contains an idea of 
the development of ethical character. Comprehending the process of this development on his 
premises requires a theorization of the mental-psychological dimension of it, but this element of 
his social philosophy remained undertheorized. As the final section of this chapter will 
demonstrate, the result of this is that a gap exists in his work which ultimately undermines the 
coherence of his revolutionary theory. 
 
                                                          
570 Cf. Aristotle’s claim that “in poverty and other misfortunes men think friends are the only refuge” (Aristotle 
1998, 192). 
571 Marx 1964, 144, 141. 
572 Ibid., 144. “Where a relationship exists, it exists for me. The animal has no ‘relations’ with anything, no relations 
at all. Its relation to others does not exist as a relation” (Marx 1967, 433). 
573 Marx 2010c, 396. 
574 Marx claimed that the working class claims “no particular right because no particular wrong but unqualified 
wrong is perpetrated on it,” invokes “no traditional title but only a human title,” “cannot emancipate itself without 
emancipating itself from all the other spheres of society, thereby emancipating them,” and that it is “the complete 
loss of humanity” which “can only redeem itself through the total redemption of humanity” (Marx 1994, 38). 
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5. “Revolutionary Practice” and Vanguardism: the Limitations of the Idea that 
Revolutionary Theory is a “Guide To Action” 
On Marx’s premises, revolutionary subjectivity implies “revolutionary practice” which he 
defined as the “coincidence of the changing of circumstances” and “self-change.”575 This 
“revolutionary activity” has developmental consequences for our subjectivity in ways that are 
necessary for carrying out a revolution. Marx claimed that for 
“the production on a mass scale of...communist consciousness, and for the success of 
the cause itself, the alteration of men on a mass scale is necessary, an alteration 
which can only take place in a practical movement, a revolution; the revolution is 
necessary, therefore...because the class overthrowing it can only in a revolution 
succeed in ridding itself of all the muck of ages and become fitted to found society 
anew.”576 
However, Marx’s writing indicates that he thought there is “revolutionary practice” before what 
is often conceived of as “the revolution,” i.e., as a kind of culminating moment when the class 
struggle comes to a head and the rule of private property and the bourgeois state is overthrown. It 
is in this broader sense of “revolutionary practice” that we should interpret his claim that 
“through a revolution...there develops the universal character and the energy of the proletariat, 
which are required to accomplish the appropriation, and the proletariat moreover rids itself of 
everything that still clings to it from its previous position in society.”577 An issue arises, 
however, in so far as Marx’s idea of the “coincidence of the changing of circumstances” and 
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to Marx’s view of revolution” (McNally 2006, 375). 
576 Marx and Engels 1998, 60. 
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“self-change” poses an incomprehensible paradox for the kind of abstract thinking that Hegel 
called “the Understanding.” Such thinking is unable to comprehend the “dialectical” 
transformative process of revolutionaries who are “engaged in the revolutionary transformation 
of themselves and their material surroundings, in the creation of something which does not yet 
exist.”578 Marx’s claim that “revolutionary practice” can be “rationally understood” indicates that 
it is only comprehensible for “speculative” thinking. 
We encounter an abstract rendering of the paradoxical “coincidence” at the basis of Marx’s 
idea of “revolutionary practice” in Michael Löwy’s The Theory of Revolution in the Young Marx. 
Löwy posited the notion of a culminating “moment of the revolution, during which the broad 
masses ‘change’ and become conscious of their role by changing circumstances through their 
action”—but this is just the process of revolutionary activity itself.579 While Marx indeed had an 
idea of a “decisive hour” in the process of the class struggle, Löwy’s formulation is spurious 
because it implies that the “moment of the revolution” is necessary for the process of 
“revolutionary practice.”580 On this basis we would have to posit it ad infinitum, in which case it 
would never begin—unless, of course, a Marxist vanguard would come along and guide the 
masses to this “moment.” 
Lenin’s work serves as a classical example of vanguardist thought. In his pamphlet What Is 
To Be Done? he stressed the “need for a strong revolutionary organization,” i.e., a Marxist 
“vanguard” composed of “professional revolutionaries” whose “attention must be devoted 
principally to the task of raising the workers to the level of revolutionaries.”581 In his view the 
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“vanguard” is required “to bring political knowledge to the workers” and for “training the masses 
in revolutionary activity.”582 Vanguardism has since become presupposed as a legitimate 
tendency among countless groups and independent scholars that consider themselves to be within 
the tradition of Marx’s thought,583 even though his idea of “revolutionary practice” is 
inconsistent with it. His third thesis on Feuerbach suggests that anyone who maintains a 
vanguardist position “forgets” that “the educator must...be educated.”584 This problem arises 
explicitly in Kant’s writing on the development of humanity. Kant put it thus:  
“The human being must...be educated to be good. The one who educates [us] is, 
however, also a human being, one who also therefore is subject to the same brutish 
nature and is supposed to bring about that of which [they are] in need. This is the 
source of the constant deviation from [our] vocation, while [we] repeatedly [turn] 
back towards it.”585  
Compare this to the following statement by Marx about a “speaker from the knightly estate” who 
was opposed to freedom of the press:  
                                                          
582 Ibid., 112, 109. He claimed that “our very first and most imperative duty is to help train working class 
revolutionaries who will be on the same level in regard to Party activity as intellectual revolutionaries (we 
emphasize the words ‘in regard to Party activity,’ because although it is necessary, it is not so easy and not so 
imperative to bring the workers up to the level of intellectuals in other respects)” (Ibid., 153). 
583 Even though different perspectives tend to stress the significance of the role of the vanguard more or less and 
define the scope of its activity differently, the principle is essentially the same.  
584 Marx 1967, 401. Cf. Lenin’s claim that “We can and must educate workers (and university and high-school 
students) so as to enable them to understand us when we speak to them” (Lenin 1943, 154). 
585 Kant 2006, 168. Kant also articulated this problem another way; he claimed that “the human being is an animal 
which, when he lives among others of his own species, needs a master.... But where does he find such a master? In 
no place other than in the human species. But such a master is just as much an animal in need of a master.... This 
task is thus the most difficult of all. Indeed, its perfect solution is impossible: nothing entirely straight can be 
fashioned from the crooked wood of which humankind is made” (Kant 2006, 9). Cf. Schiller’s reflection on an 
analogous paradox of human development: “Theoretical culture should engender practical culture, while practical 
culture is still the condition of theoretical culture? All improvement in the domain of politics should derive from 
the refinement of character—but how can character be refined under the influence of a barbaric state order?” 
(Schiller 2016, 29). 
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“In his view, true education consists in keeping a person wrapped up in a cradle 
throughout his life, for as soon as he learns to walk, he learns also to fall, and only by 
falling does he learn to walk. But if we all remain in swaddling-clothes, who is to 
wrap us in them? If we all remain in the cradle, who is to rock us? If we are all 
prisoners, who is the prison warder?”586 
Thus while textual evidence suggests that Marx would agree, in a qualified way, with Kant’s 
claim that the “human being is capable of and requires education in the form of both instruction 
and discipline,” Marx’s idea of the “estrangement” that shapes our development from nature into 
human beings (e.g., “the severe discipline of capital, acting on succeeding generations”) avoids 
the problem of needing an ‘educator’ in the Kantian sense.587 
Löwy’s Theory of Revolution contains awkward and inconsistent formulations about the 
self-emancipation of the proletariat and the role of a vanguard for consolidating this self-activity 
into a successful revolutionary “moment.” One of the many examples of this is his claim that the 
“communist’s” goal consists in “helping the proletariat to find, through its own historical 
practice, the path of communist revolution,” but the Party “cannot set itself above the masses and 
‘make the revolution’ in their place.”588 This inconsistency is even present in a single sentence in 
which Löwy claims that Marx’s activity during the 1846-48 period “had a definite aim: to form a 
communist vanguard freed from utopian socialism and the ‘true’, conspiratorial, or ‘sentimental’ 
varieties, and to create, on the international scale, but first of all in Germany, a revolutionary and 
‘scientific’ Communist Party which must be theoretically coherent, yet not become a sect cut off 
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from the proletarian masses.”589 No iteration of vanguardist politics, including any idea of a 
vanguard that is somehow connected to the working class, can escape inconsistency with Marx’s 
“Scientific socialism.”590  
The concept of a vanguard is not part of Marx’s idea of self-transformative “revolutionary 
practice.” As Engels claimed,  
“Marx…entirely trusted to the intellectual development of the working class, which 
was sure to result from combined action and mutual discussion. The very events and 
vicissitudes of the struggle against capital, the defeats even more than the victories, 
could not help bringing home to men’s minds the insufficiency of their various 
favourite nostrums, and preparing the way for a more complete insight into the true 
conditions of working-class emancipation. And Marx was right.”591 
Whether he was right or wrong, Marx was clear about his belief that members of the working 
class 
“know that in order to work out their own emancipation, and along with it that higher 
form to which present society is irresistibly tending by its own economical agencies, 
they will have to pass through long struggles, through a series of historic processes, 
transforming circumstances and men. They have no ideals to realize, but to set free 
the elements of the new society with which old collapsing bourgeois society itself is 
                                                          
589 Ibid., 120. 
590 According to Marx the term “Scientific socialism” was “only used in opposition to utopian socialism, which 
wants to attach the people to new delusions, instead of limiting its science to the knowledge of the social 
movement made by the people itself” (Marx 2010c, 337). This also applies to vanguard groups because as an 
’advanced layer’ they bring in “knowledge” about the “social movement” that is not “made by the people itself.”  
591 Marx 2010, 63. Cf. Marx’s claim that “the material and mental elements” for the “collective form” of control of 
the means of production “are created by the very development of capitalist society” (Marx 2010c, 376). 
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pregnant. In the full consciousness of their historic mission, and with the heroic 
resolve to act up to it.”592 
It makes no difference if we point out, as Löwy indicates, that Marx may have had some 
vanguardist tendencies in a relatively early period, because his theory of “Scientific socialism”—
including the budding form that it was in when he was young—is anti-vanguardist in principle. 
Indeed, there also appears to be evidence which suggests that Marx had some vanguardist 
tendencies later on as well,593 but what he chose to emphasize about his experience of 
revolutionary social movements is of greater importance for our understanding of his idea of the 
role of revolutionary theorists like himself and the possible role of some kind of vanguard group. 
Consider, for example, his account of the role of the International in the affairs of the Paris 
Commune:  
“The insurrection in Paris was made by the workmen of Paris. The ablest of the 
workmen must necessarily have been its leaders and administrators; but the ablest of 
the workmen happen also to be members of the International Association. Yet the 
Association as such may be in no way responsible for their action.”594 
“The Association does not dictate the form of political movements,” he claimed, “it only requires 
a pledge as to their end.”595 Even though Löwy claimed that Marx’s idea of the “self-liberation 
of the working class through communist revolution” and “self-education of the proletariat 
                                                          
592 Ibid., 213. As Hal Draper put it, “against all varieties of socialism and reform which looked on the working 
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of the working class” (Draper 1977, 216). Cf. Draper 1978, 42. 
593 In 1870 he claimed that the “English have all that is needed materially for social revolution. What they lack is 
the sense of generalization and revolutionary passion. These are things that only the General Council can supply, 
and it can thus speed up the genuinely revolutionary movement in this country, and consequently everywhere 
else” (Marx 2010c, 116). 
594 Ibid., 394. 
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through its own revolutionary practice”—i.e., that “in the course of its struggle against the 
existing state of affairs, the proletariat transforms itself, develops its consciousness, and becomes 
capable of building a new society”—he overemphasized the significance of Marx’s vanguardist 
tendencies and presented him as a vanguardist of the Leninist variety.596 
If there is a single statement that best sums up Marx’s idea of the role of who he called “the 
theoreticians of the proletarian class,” it is his claim that as “history moves forward” and “the 
struggle of the proletariat assumes clearer outlines,” these theoreticians “have only to take note 
of what is happening before their eyes and to become its mouthpiece.”597 Thus in his view the 
theoretician’s voice has been “called forth” by the situation “from which emanates the 
consciousness of the necessity of a fundamental revolution, the communist consciousness.”598 It 
is evident that Marx was writing it as he experienced it. In his 1843 “Introduction” to his critique 
of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right he claimed that “Theory is actualized in a people only insofar as 
it actualizes their needs”; and in personal correspondence from the same period he wrote: “I am 
convinced that a real demand will be met by our plan, and it must be possible really to fulfill the 
real demand.”599 Marx was not opposed to the organization of a revolutionary political party600 
but in his view such activity presupposes that “a class in which the revolutionary interests of 
society are concentrated” has developed and “finds the substance and material of its 
revolutionary activity in its own immediate situation: enemies to be struck down; measures to be 
taken, dictated by the needs of the struggle,” and he thought that “the consequences of its own 
                                                          
596 Lowy 2005, 106. 
597 Marx and Engels 1976, 177. Cf. McCarney’s claim that for “Hegel and Marx…what is required of the dialectical 
thinker is not to moralise the immanent movement of reason and of reality but to surrender to it and seek to 
articulate it, to ‘become its mouthpiece’” (McCarney 2000, 68). Cf. McCarney 1990, 81-3.  
598 Marx and Engels 1998, 60. 
599 Marx 1994 35; Marx 1967, 212.  
600 He claimed that “even under the most favourable political conditions all serious success of the proletariat 
depends upon an organization that unites and concentrates its forces” (Marx 2010c, 99). 
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actions drive it on.”601 After all, he believed that “the working class” was “constantly increasing 
in numbers, and trained, united and organized by the very mechanism of the capitalist process of 
production.”602  
Nevertheless, Marx maintained that the presence of vanguard sects is unavoidable in the 
early, immature phases of revolutionary struggle.603 For the sake of clarity it is worth quoting 
Marx at length: 
“All the socialist founders of sects belong to a period in which the working classes 
themselves were neither sufficiently trained and organized by the march of capitalist 
society itself to enter as historical agents upon the world’s stage, nor were the 
material conditions of their emancipation sufficiently matured in the old world 
itself.... The utopian founders of sects…found neither in society itself the material 
conditions of its transformation, nor in the working class the organized power and 
the conscience of the movement. They tried to compensate for the historical 
conditions of the movement by fantastic pictures and plans of a new society in whose 
propaganda they saw the true means of salvation.604 From the moment the working 
                                                          
601 Marx 2010b, 45. He claimed that “Our party can only become the government when conditions allow its views 
to be put into practice” (Marx 2010, 343). This is consistent with Avineri’s claim that “Even during 1857-8, when he 
envisaged a possible radicalization that might lead to revolution, Marx did not try to prepare for it by forming or 
joining a revolutionary group. Quite the contrary: when he saw the gathering storm, he immersed himself with 
additional intensity in his economic studies, so that his Political Economy would be ready once the revolution 
broke out” (Avineri 1968, 257). 
602 Marx 1976, 929. 
603 He claimed that the “first phase in the struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie is marked by 
sectarianism. This is because the proletariat has not yet reached the stage of being sufficiently developed to act as 
a class. Individual thinkers provide a critique of social antagonisms, and put forward fantastic solutions which the 
mass of workers can only accept, pass on, and put into practice” (Marx 2010c, 298). 
604 Engels claimed that the “means through which the abuses [of the capitalist system] that have been revealed can 
be got rid of must likewise be present, in more or less developed form, in the altered conditions of production. 
These means are not to be invented by the mind, but discovered by means of the mind in the existing material 
facts of production” (Engels 1934, 294). This idea was already essentially present in the Manifesto: “When people 
speak of ideas that revolutionize society, they do but express the fact that within the old society, the elements of a 
new one have been created” (Marx 2010, 85). 
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men’s class movement became real, the fantastic utopias evanesced, not because the 
working class had given up the end aimed at by these utopians, but because they had 
found the real means to realize them, and in their place came a real insight into the 
historic conditions of the movement and a more and more gathering force of the 
militant organization of the working class.”605 
As he claimed in a letter to Friedrich Bolte in 1871, the “development of socialist sectarianism 
and that of the real working-class movement always stand in inverse proportion to each other. 
Sects are (historically) justified so long as the working class is not yet ripe for an independent 
historical movement.”606 
This outlook is yet another indication of the significance of Hegel’s influence on Marx’s 
revolutionary theory and orientation. In the midst of a discussion on “the subject of issuing 
instructions on how the world ought to be,” Hegel notoriously claimed that “philosophy, at any 
rate, always comes too late to perform this function. As the thought of the world, it appears only 
at a time when actuality has gone through its formative process and attained its completed 
state.”607 Marx not only carried out this approach in his theoretical work, he also affirmed it in 
his socio-political practice. For example, while he was involved with the First International 
Workingmen’s Association he put forward “a program limited to outlining the major features of 
the proletarian movement” and left “the details of theory to be worked out as inspired by the 
demands of the practical struggle.”608 Thus while the record of Marx’s life-activity indicates that 
he was indeed a revolutionary intellectual who sought to engage with the working class 
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movement, his life-activity is also a prime example of the limits to interventions in social 
movements by revolutionary theorists. After all, his interventions in the First International 
Workingmen’s Association (which he was invited to participate in) could not keep it from 
disintegrating. 
Ultimately it is inconsistent to maintain that “the masses” of working people will liberate 
themselves but that they also need direction—on how to think and act, and therefore how to feel, 
will, etc.—from the superior intellects of a vanguard in order to do so. Löwy, for example, 
claimed that Marx thought that “the proletariat tends towards the totality through its practice of 
the class struggle, thanks to the role of mediation, which is played by its communist vanguard,” 
whereby the vanguard “is the instrument of the masses for coming to consciousness and taking 
revolutionary action. Its role is not to act in place or ‘above’ the working class but to guide the 
latter towards the path of its self-liberation, towards the communist ‘mass’ revolution.”609 A 
similar inconsistency is found in Guido Starosta’s book Marx’s Capital, Method and 
Revolutionary Subjectivity. As with Löwy’s book, it indicates that Starosta’s interpretation has 
missed the mark.  
Starosta claims that without “a detailed positive account of the laws of motion of alienated 
labour and the determinations of the political action of the workers as personifications of the 
former, no significant guide to action can be drawn from revolutionary theory” because the 
“scientific critique of capital” would be “bound to remain external and thus impotent to fully 
unite with practice.”610 This diverges considerably from Marx’s position. First of all, Marx’s 
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practical criticism does not need to be applied to or guide an externally conceived practice” (Ibid., 54). Cf. his 
ambiguous claim that “the only meaningful way in which to materialistically understand the so-called ‘unity of 
theory and practice’” is to recognize that “science as practical criticism” has “the aim of uncovering and ideally 
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work indicates that he was not concerned with uniting “theory” and “practice” but instead 
presupposed that they were already in unity; indeed, his work suggests that a theory of “the 
political action of the workers” entails that they are already engaged in the process of 
transcending capitalism and thus corresponds to the development of revolutionary subjectivity to 
the extent required for participating in the intersubjective experience that the theory reflects. 
Starosta even argues that “dialectical cognition must provide the necessity of the transformative 
action of the workers in the totality of its determinations,” i.e., “all the determinations involved 
in the different forms of political action of the workers necessary for its production as fully 
conscious revolutionary action.”611 Any such “necessity” is what Marx sought to comprehend in 
a clear and comprehensive way within the phenomena of the workers’ already existing 
“revolutionary practice.” In the Manifesto, Marx and Engels attempted to make it clear that the 
“theoretical conclusions of the Communists are in no way based on ideas or principles that have 
been invented, or discovered, by this or that would-be universal reformer. They merely express, 
in general terms, actual relations springing from an existing class struggle, from a historical 
movement going on under our very eyes.”612 Starosta, on the contrary, claimed that “what was at 
stake in [Marx’s] investigation was the conscious organization, i.e., the discovery of the social 
necessity, of the political action of the working class,” and that Marx attempted to provide 
“scientific grounds for his political position concerning the content and form of proletarian 
action antagonistic to capital.”613 With the Manifesto Marx intended to articulately vocalize the 
                                                          
appropriating human practice’s immanent material and social determinations…in order consciously to regulate 
their real actualization through ‘revolutionary’, ‘practical-critical’ activity” (Ibid.). 
611 Starosta 2016, 106-7. Cf. Starosta 2016, 100-109. He wrote about “the need to grasp the specific qualitative 
determination immanent in each of the forms of the class struggle in order to discover their necessity” (Starosta 
2016, 114). 
612 Marx 2010, 80. 
613 Starosta 2016, 100-1. Cf. Lenin: “We must take upon ourselves the task of organizing a universal political 
struggle under the leadership of our Party in such a manner as to obtain all the support possible...for the struggle 
and for our Party” (Lenin 1943, 117). 
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“necessity”—of the “real” needs—of the revolutionary working class movement, i.e., of the 
workers that were “already conscious” of their “historic task” and were “constantly working to 
develop that consciousness into complete clarity.”614 Marx was contributing to the “clarity” of 
the worker’s consciousness of their “historic task” on the premises that the working class had 
been “sufficiently trained and organized by the march of capitalist society itself to enter as 
historical agents upon the world’s stage.” On these premises it makes sense to give a speech 
about what he considered “real insight into the historic conditions of the movement” because the 
working class is “the organized power and the conscience of the movement.” 
From the perspective presented in Starosta’s work it is as if Marx was writing Capital so 
that those of us who cannot engage in “dialectical research” can come “to know what concrete 
form our action should take in order to achieve the willed transformation of the world.”615 
Evidence suggests, however, that in Marx’s view it is only in the wake of the development of 
requisite “subjective and objective conditions” engendered through our “estranged” activity and 
“revolutionary practice” that we discover for ourselves the necessity of our revolutionary 
action.616 As Marx claimed in the 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, we “must first create the 
revolutionary starting-point, i.e., the situation, relations and conditions necessary for the modern 
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revolution to become serious.”617 In this work it is clear that he is invoking Hegel’s idea of 
“reason as the rose in the cross.”618 
To his credit, Starosta recognized the compulsion to “associate” in capitalism as well as the 
fact that Marx saw “associations as a necessary ‘training ground’ for the revolutionary struggle,” 
but he did not take into account that it leads to the development of “needs” (e.g. the “need for 
society”) and a state of character that cannot be imparted by another’s guidance, as well as the 
fact that “the necessity of a fundamental revolution” is connected to this “inner necessity.”619 
The ‘education’ required for this mental-psychological transformation cannot be developed 
through formal instruction but must instead be attained through “revolutionary practice.” In 
accordance with Marx’s Aristotelianism, the transformation of the “mental” and “practical 
senses” can be conceived of as coinciding with the development of a degree of both “moral 
virtue” and “practical wisdom.” Aristotle defined the latter as “the quality of mind concerned 
with things just and [beautiful] and good for man” and claimed that “we are none the more able 
to act for knowing them if the virtues are states of character” because “states of character arise 
out of like activities.”620 Thus even if Marx asked us to “Imagine that the capitalist form of 
society has been abolished and that society has been organized as a conscious association 
working according to a plan,” his prompt alone is not enough to get us to see it with our mind’s 
eye and desire its existence.621 
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It comes as no surprise when, at the end of Starosta’s book, we are told that it is the task of 
“communist intellectual labourers” to provide the “form of political action that could mediate the 
immediate needs of the workers with the ‘historical interests of the proletariat as a whole.’”622 In 
Starosta’s view, revolutionary subjects are in need of a perspective beyond theirs “in order to 
account for the necessity of the practical abolition of alienated life”—instead of being able to 
think, feel, will and act in a way that is necessary for self-emancipation.623 Evidence suggests 
that this is an act that Marx had come across. He claimed, for instance, that the  
“only task of a thoughtful and truth-loving mind in regard to the first outbreak of the 
Silesian labour revolt was not to play the role of schoolmaster to the event but rather 
to study its peculiar character. For the latter some scientific insight and love of 
humanity is necessary, while for the other operation a glib phraseology, soaked in 
hollow egoism, is quite sufficient.”624 
Rather than attempting to “hurl revolutionary thunderbolts,” Marx was occupied with “soberly 
analyzing the state of affairs” for those who are able to recognize them as such.625 In this way he 
acted as a mouthpiece for a clarified and unified voice of the revolutionary working class. Thus 
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workers” (Lenin 1943, 105-6). 
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rather than simply offering dictates for action, the way he practiced revolutionary theory 
contributes to our “combined action and mutual discussion” through which we attain a kind of 
‘reconciliation with the world’. As he adamantly maintained, 
“we do not face the world in a doctrinaire fashion with a new principle, declaring, 
‘Here is truth, kneel here!’ We develop new principles for the world out of the 
principles of the world. We do not tell the world, ‘Cease your struggles, they are 
stupid; we want to give you the true watchword of the struggle.’ We merely show the 
world why it actually struggles; and the awareness of this is something the world 
must acquire even if it does not want to.”626  
This passage is an indication of Marx’s confidence that the subjectivity of the working class was 
undergoing a process of revolutionary maturation through the experience of their fundamental 
life-activity (whereby we come to the revolutionary “awareness” of why we “actually” struggle). 
Rather than suggesting that revolutionary theorists are responsible for reforming the 
consciousnesses of others, Marx claimed that “awareness...is something the world must acquire 
even if it does not want to” because it is required to be free, and the context in which it was 
uttered implies that he thought there is a tendency to resist what he considered a “reform of 
consciousness.” 
6. A Crisis for ‘Marxism’  
The unfolding complexity of the situation of global capitalism in the course of history 
since Marx was active, including our encounters with considerable counter-revolutionary 
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tendencies during this time,627 compels us to entertain “the question of what could justify a 
rational confidence in the proletariat as the historical subject which brings to an end the era of 
capitalism” (to borrow McCarney’s words from relatively early in the neoliberal era).628 
McCarney responded to this question by claiming that “no greater theoretical contribution to the 
dialectic of human freedom could be conceived” than a “systematic study of ‘the world market 
and crisis’ which [Marx] projected.”629 Hope for a crisis of capitalism that will compel the 
working class to participate in revolutionary struggle is common among ‘Marxists’. However, 
even though Marx thought the crises of capitalism could act as potential galvanising moments 
(he also proposed the theory of the ‘falling rate of profit’ and predicted ever expanding and 
volatile capitalist crises), in his view the most decisive factor was the development of a group of 
revolutionary subjects who act as agents of this process. Consider, for instance, the emphasis he 
placed on this in a discussion about the civil war in France in which he claimed that the “Paris 
proletariat was still incapable, except in its imagination, in its fantasy, of moving beyond the 
bourgeois republic; when it came to action it invariably acted in the service of the republic.”630 
The issue—apart from the consideration of whether revolutionary subjectivity is actually 
developing—is that Marx’s idea of the development of revolutionary subjectivity within the 
ranks of the working class is inconsistent (even if it is just incomplete and undertheorized). 
While it might be true that elements of the “estranged” labour process in capitalism 
facilitate the revolutionary development of individuals engaged in it, he also indicated 
detrimental consequences that undermine his idea of this developmental process. In his view the 
                                                          
627 As with Fascism in the 20th century and the contemporary rise of the extreme Right worldwide in the decade 
scarred by the fallout of the global economic crisis—the ‘Great Recession’—of 2008, for instance. 
628 McCarney 1990, 143. 
629 McCarney 2000, 75. 
630 Marx 2010b, 57. 
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“estrangement” experienced by working people stunts our development as “human” beings 
because capital “usurps the time for growth, development and healthy maintenance of the body,” 
and “squanders human beings, living labour, more readily than does any other mode of 
production, squandering not only flesh and blood, but nerves and brain as well.”631 It thus ruins 
our mind, resulting in “ignorance,” “mental degradation,” ”stupidity,” and “cretinism.”632 This is 
a profound problem inherent in Marx’s idea of revolutionary subjectivity. Consider, for example, 
his claim that the “advance of capitalist production develops a working class which by education, 
tradition and habit looks upon the requirements of that mode of production as self-evident natural 
laws. The organization of the capitalist process of production, once it is fully developed, breaks 
down all resistance.”633 Historical evidence can be compiled to suggest that capitalism has 
performed quite well in this respect, even in the face of deep social and political crises, when 
“estrangement” has peaked. 
A conspicuous impediment to “revolutionary practice” is the fact that capitalism 
profoundly exhausts the physical and mental energies of the working class.634 Marx described 
this as the “physical and mental degradation” brought on by “the torture of overwork.”635 This is 
a key reason why he supported “the limitation of the working day” which he considered a 
“preliminary condition, without which all further attempts at improvement and emancipation 
                                                          
631 Marx 1976, 367; Marx 1981, 182; Marx 1976, 481. Capitalist manufacturing in particular “converts the worker 
into a crippled monstrosity” and “mutilates the worker, turning him into a fragment of himself” (Marx 1976, 482). 
Cf. Ibid., 799. 
632 As Avineri points out, “Marx’s sceptical view of the proletariat’s ability to conceive its own goals and realize 
them without outside intellectual help has often been documented” (Avineri 1968, 63). He quotes Marx’s claim 
that “Asses more stupid than these German workers do not exist” (Ibid.). 
633 Marx 1976, 899. 
634 Marx 1964, 110-11; Marx 1976, 376, 381, 481-2, 799. 
635 Marx 1976, 381. In capitalism “the highest development of productive power together with the greatest 
expansion of existing wealth will coincide” with “degradation of the labourer, and a most straitened exhaustion of 
his vital powers” (Marx 1973, 750). 
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must prove abortive,” because it “is needed to restore the health and physical energies of the 
working class...as well as to secure them the possibility of intellectual development, sociable 
intercourse, social and political action.”636  
In Marx’s view, continued struggle can lead to gradual development over a span of 
generations as the brutality of capitalism is resisted and conditions improve so that individuals 
are able to experience development even within “estrangement,” but his work also points out that 
the inherently hostile relations at the heart of our social life-activity in capitalism stunts the 
development of our ethical character and impairs the initiation of the revolutionary 
reorganization of society on a radically democratic basis within which we will have the 
opportunity for “universal” development.637 Indeed, Marxists today have a history of social and 
economic crises to reflect on which bear this out. The experiences of the four decades following 
the First World War can be taken as evidence that “estrangement” is profoundly detrimental for 
revolutionary progress even though it gives rise to revolutionary tendencies. Various kinds of 
revolutionary forces arise in periods of social and economic crisis, but so do reactionary ones 
which are at times so extreme that they reflect the symptoms of a mass psychosis.  
Ultimately, Marx failed to elaborate a consistent and realistic vision of how revolutionary 
ethical character is developing within the “estranged” social relations of capitalist society.638 In 
                                                          
636 Marx 2010c, 87. Marx claimed that “After a thirty years’ struggle, fought with most admirable perseverance, the 
English working classes, improving a momentaneous split between the landlords and money-lords, succeeded in 
carrying in the Ten Hours Bill” which led to “immense physical, moral, and intellectual benefits” for the “factory 
operatives” (Marx 2010c, 78). In Capital he sarcastically remarked: “Time for education, for intellectual 
development, for the fulfilment of social functions, for social intercourse, for the free play of the vital forces of 
[our] body and [our] mind…what foolishness!” (Marx 1976, 375). 
637 “In too many cases,” Marx claimed, a working person “is even too ignorant to understand the true interest of 
[their] child, or the normal conditions of human development. However, the more enlightened part of the working 
class fully understands that the future of its class, and, therefore, of mankind, altogether depends upon the 
formation of the rising working generation” (Marx 2010c, 89). 
638 Skillen insightfully articulated the development of revolutionary character but underemphasized the 
significance of the “internal enemies” of revolutionary activity: “it is the case that direct and habitual experience, 
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his view we are habituated into an individualistic and possessive hostility as individuals who are 
united through the cash-nexus and exchange relation (on the foundation of private property)—a 
relation which is fundamental for life-activity in capitalism and increasingly permeates all facets 
of human life. Marx described this ἔθος of our “estrangement” as “mutual pillaging”: 
“Its background is the intent to pillage, to defraud. Since our exchange is selfish on 
your side as well as mine and since every self-interest attempts to surpass that of 
another person, we necessarily attempt to defraud each other.... I regard you as a 
means and instrument for the production of this object, that is, my goal.... 
Our mutual value is the value of our mutual objects for us.... [Humanity itself], 
therefore, is mutually valueless for us.”639 
On Marx’s premises this “estrangement” is also instrumental for the development of 
revolutionary subjectivity. 
The inconsistency inherent in Marx’s theory of revolutionary subjectivity happens to be 
consistent with the persistence of “estrangement” among the working class. While it might be 
premature to simply maintain that it cannot be overcome, there are relentless counter-
revolutionary tendencies that need to be taken into account nonetheless. Indeed, the working 
class continues to fight itself and historical evidence indicates that it is not immune to waves of 
extreme reaction. In times of struggle it is not uncommon to see the acceleration of the zero-sum-
                                                          
not only of reciprocities, of taken-for-granted ‘mutual aid,’ but also of common suffering and common joy where 
community enters into the nature of the passions, fosters a capacity directly to appreciate and respond to 
situations ‘disinterestedly,’ as ‘one of many.’ In this sense, ‘the universal class’ received its epithet from Marx in 
part because he thought that ‘the brotherhood of man’ could be ‘a fact of life’ to its members; because the 
proletariat, the producers, protected by separation from ownership from bourgeois values, is the bearer in a 
qualitative, though not unqualified way, of universal human values. These values had their internal enemies—
opposed by situationally generated tendencies to possess, to submit, to escape, to ‘scab’” (Skillen 1981, 166). 
639 Marx 1994, 51-2. 
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gain ethos and envious competition instead of “the brotherhood of man.” We fight to ‘get ahead’ 
as individuals pitted against each other in the war of all against all—instead of becoming aware 
of our common struggle and collective power, recognizing that the freedom of others is a 
condition of our own, and working together to liberate ourselves from hardship and oppression. 
It could be that Marx overestimated the pace at which working class solidarity was growing (or 
the extent to which it can grow at all) and, in particular, the tendency for all forms of divisive 
prejudice to progressively diminish. Whatever the case may be, his writing indicates that he had 
considerable experience with the reactionary tendencies of working people. Consider, for 
instance, this statement of his on the situation in England in 1870: 
“All English industrial and commercial centers now possess a working class split 
into two hostile camps: English proletarians and Irish proletarians. The ordinary 
English worker hates the Irish worker because he sees in him a competitor who 
lowers his standard of life. Compared with the Irish worker he feels himself a 
member of the ruling nation and for this very reason he makes himself into a tool of 
the aristocrats and capitalists against Ireland and thus strengthens their domination 
over himself. He cherishes religious, social and national prejudices against the Irish 
worker. His attitude is much the same as that of the ‘poor whites’ towards the 
‘niggers’ in the former slave states of the American Union. The Irishman pays him 
back with interest in his own money. He sees in the English worker both the 
accomplice and the stupid tool of English rule in Ireland. 
“This antagonism is artificially sustained and intensified by the press, the pulpit, the 
comic papers, in short, by all the means at the disposal of the ruling classes. This 
antagonism is the secret of the impotence of the English working class, despite its 
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organization. It is the secret which enables the capitalist class to maintain its power, 
as this class is perfectly aware.”640 
Aside from consideration of the actual development of revolutionary subjectivity in the world, 
the problem with Marx’s view of this process is an existential crisis for ‘Marxism’. On Marx’s 
premises, any attempt to reformulate ‘Marxism’ to save it from this crisis is mistaken. For those 
who seek to involve themselves in the struggle for human emancipation through the practice of 
social and political theory on similar premises, a foray into the mental-psychological dimension 
of human life-activity—a frontier not beyond the bounds of Marx’s ‘Historical Materialism’ but 
one which he did not sufficiently explore in his writing—is integral for comprehending the root 
of our social and political struggles. 
 
“And meanwhile we spawn senses and sensations, drown in delusions 
And the river, sated with blood and mud and bile 
We suck it up bursting in air, we suck it like blood from a puncture by a rust-eaten needle 
We walk crippled, our feet leaden, bound by ropes of greed, the cable of defective  
 pleasure and desire to succeed....”641 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
640 Marx 2010c, 169. 
641 Efthymiades 2016, 27. 
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Conclusion 
“Death and Love are myths of the negative dialectic because the dialectic is the simple inner 
light, the penetrating eye of Love, the inner soul which is not crushed through the material 
dissolution of life. It is the inner place of the spirit. Thus Love is the myth of the dialectic. But the 
dialectic is also the torrent which shatters multiplicity and its limits, which overthrows 
autonomous forms to plunge everything into the one sea of eternity. Hence the myth of the 
dialectic is Death. 
The dialectic is thus Death but at the same time the vehicle of what is living, the flowering in the 
garden of spirit. It is the effervescing in the bubbling tumbler of innumerable suns from which 
the flower of a spiritual fire blooms.” 
- Marx642 
1. The Paradox of “Estrangement” and the Human “Soul” through the Prism of Marx’s 
‘Historical Materialism’, Freud’s Psychoanalytic Psychology, and Husserl’s 
Phenomenology 
There is substantial textual evidence which indicates that Marx thought “estrangement” has 
a fundamental mental component and that it is also related to the struggles arising from the social 
satisfaction of bio-physical/natural-animal needs determined via a process of natural evolution 
and further modified historically. He depicted the “soul” as an integral factor in the 
determination of our life-activity, including in the context of the idea that at certain stages of 
development our “species powers” become independent of us. This psychological dimension is 
evident, for instance, in his claim that “the workers find themselves confronted by” the “capital 
                                                          
642 Marx 1967, 60. 
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that lives in the capitalist,” and it fits with his claim that the alien power which dominates us in 
conditions of “estrangement” is ultimately ourselves, both as individuals and collectively as a 
species.643  
Ultimately, Marx portrayed “estrangement” as an expression of the human “mind” in the 
process of its development, as well as a feature of socio-material practice and relations. His 
writing displays the paradox that throughout the process of “estrangement” our consciousness 
can be characterized in part as illusory (or “mystical”) even though it arises from the ‘real world’ 
of life-activity. Consider, for instance, his claim that the “transposition of the social productivity 
of labour into the material attributes of capital is so firmly entrenched in people’s minds that the 
advantages of machinery, the use of science, invention, etc. are necessarily conceived in this 
alienated form, so that all these things are deemed to be the attributes of capital.”644 Indeed, he 
thought that a fundamental aspect of the “basis for this” is “the form in which objects appear in 
the framework of capitalist production and hence in the minds of those caught up in that mode of 
production.”645 He emphasized that consciousness is “practical”646 but he also focused on 
“estranged” consciousness as an experience because it is within consciousness that the world 
appears to us, whether ‘real’ or ‘illusory’. If consciousness “can never be anything else except 
conscious existence, and the existence of men is their actual life-process,” the experience of 
                                                          
643 Marx 1976, 1054. 
644 Ibid., 1058. 
645 Ibid. 
646 “The phantoms formed in the human brain...are necessary sublimations of man’s material life-process which is 
empirically verifiable and connected with material premises.... Consciousness does not determine life, but life 
determines consciousness” (Marx 1967, 415). 
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“estrangement” is an irrational experience of our “actual life-process” (which itself is carried out 
in a more or less “rational” way).647 
Starting out “from any form of theoretical and practical consciousness”—i.e., taking “the 
forms peculiar to existing reality” as his “point of departure”—Marx treated the experience of 
the “mystical consciousness” of “estrangement” phenomenologically in a manner akin to 
Husserl’s phenomenology. In the process he concerned himself with an embryonic form of what 
Husserl elaborated as “intentionality.”648 This indicates that the incipient psychology in Marx’s 
‘Historical Materialism’ has an affinity to Husserl’s “phenomenological psychology.”649 For 
Husserl, however, this psychology “simply knows nothing other than the subjective,”650 whereas 
Marx’s concentration on social life-activity is what foremost shaped the various nebulous 
expressions of his incipient psychological theory. The fact that human beings are part of a 
natural “life process” is a cornerstone of ‘Historical Materialism’.651 “Life” is an onto-
cosmological principle for Marx and as such it is ultimately affirmed in everything that exists, 
                                                          
647 Ibid., 414. Consider, for instance, his claim that the “irrational forms in which certain economic relationships 
appear and are grasped in practice do not bother the practical bearers of these relationships in their everyday 
dealings; since they are accustomed to operating within these forms, it does not strike them as anything worth 
thinking about. A complete contradiction holds nothing at all mysterious for them. In forms of appearance that are 
estranged from their inner connection and, taken in isolation, are absurd, they feel as much at home as a fish in 
water” (Marx 1976, 914). 
648 Cf. Husserl’s claim that “when we are fully engaged in conscious activity, we focus exclusively on the specific 
thing, thoughts, values, goals, or means involved but not on the psychical experience as such, in which these things 
are known as such. Only reflection reveals this to us. Through reflection, instead of grasping simply the matter 
straight out—the values, goals, and instrumentalities—we grasp the corresponding subjective experiences in which 
we become ‘conscious’ of them, in which (in the broadest sense) they ‘appear’. For this reason, they are called 
‘phenomena’, and their most general essential character is to exist as the ‘consciousness-of’ or ‘appearance-of’ the 
specific things, thoughts (judged states of affairs, grounds, conclusions), plans, decisions, hopes, and so forth” 
(Husserl 1999, 323). 
649 Husserl claimed that if the “realm of what we call ‘phenomena’ proves to be the possible field for a pure 
psychological discipline related exclusively to phenomena, we can understand the designation of it as 
phenomenological psychology” (Ibid.). 
650 Cf. his idea of a “scientifically rigorous form of a psychology purely of inner experience” in his article 
“Phenomenological Psychology and Transcendental Phenomenology” (Husserl 1999, 328). 
651 After all, he thought that “the process” of “material production” is “the life process in the realm of the social” 
(Marx 1976, 990). 
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even that which we would normally consider ‘dead’.652 This entails that even so-called 
‘inorganic matter’ is an active moment in the pulsing process of effervescent “life,” the creative 
force animating the interconnected totality of all being. “Reason” may ‘govern the world’ but the 
force of Eros,653 as it were, also has a hand in the cosmos. This kind of thinking is reflected in 
Marx’s outline of the premises of ‘Historical Materialism’ in which he attempts to theorize our 
emergence from the “life process” in the ‘natural world’. 
Insofar as ‘Historical Materialism’ presupposes our “initial animal condition,” 
revolutionary subjectivity is the penultimate result of a struggle not only with external nature but 
with our own bestial nature originating in the instinctual life of natural-animal existence.654 
“Immediately,” Marx claimed, humanity “is a natural being. As a living natural being [we are], 
in one aspect, endowed with the natural capacities and vital powers of an active natural being. 
These capacities exist in [us] as tendencies and capabilities, as drives.”655 Thus even though we 
have developed subjective-mental life above our initial animal nature and have lived in 
‘civilizations’ for millennia, the ‘state of nature’ is not simply a thing of the past because we are 
still partly animals with bodies that are driven in part by bio-physical forces (which transform 
throughout the socio-historical movement of our existence).656 Marx’s depiction of this aspect of 
the complex “inner world” of the human being indicates that he understood it as an element of 
                                                          
652 He claimed, for instance, that “in history, as in nature, putrefaction is the laboratory of life” (Marx 1965, 995). 
653 “We have to ask,” Whitehead mused, “whether nature does not contain within itself a tendency to be in tune, 
an Eros urging towards perfection” (Whitehead 1967, 251). 
654 Marx 1976, 647. 
655 Marx 1967, 325. 
656 Cf. Fromm’s claim that the “realm of human drives is a natural force which, like other natural forces…is an 
immediate part of the substructure of the social process. Knowledge of this force, then, is necessary for a complete 
understanding of the social process” (Fromm 1970, 157). 
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the “soul,” which together with our higher mental faculties is the subjective basis of the 
“perceptibly existing psychology” in our life-activity. 
Freud’s psychoanalytic theory complements Marx’s perspective on the historical 
transformation of our “natural” needs and desires through life-activity which involves the 
unavoidably social satisfaction of “natural necessity.” Freud thought that “civilization is to a 
large extent being constantly created anew” because “each individual who makes a fresh entry 
into human society repeats” the “sacrifice of instinctual satisfaction for the benefit of the whole 
community.”657 He described this process as “frustration by reality” under “the pressure of vital 
needs—Necessity,”658 and the role it plays in his theory of the human psyche is a major point of 
intersection with the foundational premises of Marx’s ‘Historical Materialism’. It is worth 
quoting Marx’s most concise articulation of these premises at length: 
“[The] first premise of all human existence and, therefore, of all history...[is that] life 
involves before everything else eating and drinking, a habitation, clothing and many 
other things. The first historical act is thus the production of the means to satisfy 
                                                          
657 Freud 1966b, 27. According to Hegel, “constraint put upon impulse, desire” and the “mere brute emotions and 
rude instincts,” as well as the “limitation” of “premeditated self-will of caprice and passion,” is “the indispensable 
proviso of emancipation” because the “state of Nature” is “predominantly that of injustice and violence, of 
untamed natural impulses, of inhuman deeds and feelings” (Hegel 1956, 41). Cf. Freud’s claim that for “in-
calculable ages mankind has been passing through a process of evolution of culture. (Some people, I know, prefer 
to use the term ‘civilization’.) We owe to that process the best of what we have become, as well as a good part of 
what we suffer from.... The process is perhaps comparable to the domestication of certain species of animals and it 
is undoubtedly accompanied by physical alterations; but we are still unfamiliar with the notion that the evolution 
of civilization is an organic process of this kind. The psychical modifications that go along with the process of 
civilization are striking and unambiguous. They consist in a progressive displacement of instinctual aims and a 
restriction of instinctual impulses. Sensations which were pleasurable to our ancestors have become indifferent or 
even intolerable to ourselves; there are organic grounds for the changes in our ethical and aesthetic ideals. Of the 
psychological characteristics of civilization two appear to be the most important: a strengthening of the intellect, 
which is beginning to govern instinctual life, and an internalization of the aggressive impulses, with all its 
consequent advantages and perils” (Freud n.d.). On Hegel’s premises, of course, this is not the ultimate result of 
the ‘strengthening of the intellect’. 
658 Freud 1966b, 441 (cf. 386, 442-444, 463). According to Freud “it is a characteristic feature of the libido that it 
struggles against submitting to the reality of the universe—to Ananke” (Ibid., 534). 
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these needs, the production of material life itself. And indeed this is an historical act, 
a fundamental condition of all history, which today, as thousands of years ago, must 
daily and hourly be fulfilled merely in order to sustain human life…. 
The second point is that the satisfaction of the first need (the action of satisfying, and 
the instrument of satisfaction which has been acquired) leads to new needs; and this 
production of new needs is the first historical act…. 
The third circumstance which, from the very outset, enters into historical 
development, is that men, who daily remake their own life, begin to make other men, 
to propagate their kind: the relation between man and woman, parents and children, 
the family.... 
These three aspects of social activity are...to be taken as...three aspects...which have 
existed simultaneously since the dawn of history and the first men, and which still 
assert themselves in history today. 
The production of life, both of one’s own in labour and of fresh life in procreation, 
now appears as a double relationship: on the one hand as a natural, on the other as a 
social relationship.”659 
In an analogous way, Freud thought that the “motive of human society is in the last resort an 
economic one,” and “since [society] does not possess enough provisions to keep its members 
alive unless they work, it must restrict the number of its members and divert their energies from 
sexual activity to work. It is faced, in short, by the eternal, primaeval exigencies of life, which 
are with us to this day.”660 In Marx’s work the social process of production and reproduction of 
                                                          
659 Marx and Engels 1998, 47-49. 
660 Freud 1966b, 386. 
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life is a primary nexus of “estrangement” because the struggle to procure the requirements of life 
gives rise to “the need, the necessity,” of “associating with the individuals around” us.661 He does 
not get into elaborate detail about this feature of “estrangement” but the intersubjective nature of 
our struggles to satisfy “natural necessity” is depicted in his writing as having a stimulating 
effect on the development of our conscious “mind.” Even though he focused primarily on the 
class struggle and the labour process in the sphere of ‘civil society’, he thought a primary form of 
human production and reproduction takes place in the “family” in relations between “parents and 
children.” This suggests that it is also primary for “estrangement” which thus begins in the 
infancy of the human species and as individuals, along with the rest of our development.662  
From the perspective of psychoanalytic theory, the socio-historical alteration of our natural 
“drives”—as an “active natural being”—entails that our instincts have become sublimated or 
repressed but still operative in our unconscious and redirected.663 To put Freud’s view briefly, if 
the struggle to satisfy the portion of “natural necessity” in us—which is connected to the bestial-
instinctual part of our psyche—becomes overwhelming, it leads to their repression and 
establishment in our “unconscious” with the consequence that our behaviour is later influenced 
by these reoriented drives (the source of which is obscured by the fundamental structure and 
functioning of the psyche itself). Freud maintained that what psychoanalysis “aims at and 
                                                          
661 Marx and Engels 1998, 50, 49. 
662 Recall Marx’s statement—quoted in the previous chapter—that “the future” of humanity “altogether depends 
upon the formation of the rising working generation.” Cf. Aristotle’s claim that “states of character arise out of like 
activities.... It makes no small difference, then, whether we form habits of one kind or of another from our very 
youth; it makes a very great difference, or rather all the difference” (Aristotle 1998, 29). 
663  “We believe,” Freud wrote, that “civilization has been created under pressure of the exigencies of life at the 
cost of satisfaction of the instincts,” e.g., “the sexual impulses” which “are diverted from their sexual aims and 
directed to others that are socially higher and no longer sexual” (Freud 1966b, 26-27). Compare Hegel’s claim that 
as “the passions of men are gratified” they “develop themselves and their aims in accordance with their natural 
tendencies, and build up the edifice of human society; thus fortifying a position for Right and Order against 
themselves” (Hegel 1956, 27). For Freud, however, this ultimately leads to “discontent” which is inconsistent with 
the actualization of what Hegel understood as freedom. 
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achieves is nothing other than the uncovering of what is unconscious in mental life,” and thus 
freedom requires that we become conscious of the mysterious, alien power of our 
“unconscious.”664 The role of the “unconscious” in Freud’s conception of psychical life is 
comparable with Marx’s idea of “estrangement,” specifically in relation to the notion that our 
own activity is “alienated” and driven from an unintelligible source which is, at least in part, in 
us; and which, in some circumstances, is an unavoidable and necessary phase in our species’ 
development.665 To reiterate a previous point: Marx’s work indicates that he thought it is not just 
our social activity per se which obfuscates and distorts the experience of our activity; he also 
understood it as a product of human subjectivity itself. Of course, Marx did not conceive of an 
idea like Freud’s “unconscious,” but the record of his thought about our “drives” as a “living,” 
“active natural being”—which are a kind of internal “natural necessity”666—are amenable to 
linking with Freud’s psychoanalytic theory (bearing in mind the difference in philosophical 
premises).667 This comparison is possible whether Freud’s idea of the psyche and its structure, 
including his idea of the “unconscious,” is entirely correct or not. 
                                                          
664 Freud 1966b, 482-3. In Freud’s view it “is only the analysis of one of the affections which we call narcissistic 
psychoneuroses that promises to furnish us with conceptions through which the enigmatic Ucs. [unconscious] will 
be...made tangible” (Freud 1991, 201). Consider, for instance, an interpretation of Marx’s idea of the capitalist 
“passions” from the perspective of Freudian psychoanalysis. Even though it is one possible interpretation of this 
phenomenon articulated by Marx, the congruency with Freud’s thought is noteworthy. A psychoanalytic 
perspective would treat them as forms of “neurotic” desire that act as compensation for the inhibition of direct 
instinctual satisfaction. According to Freud, the “psycho-analytic investigation of the psychoneuroses has taught us 
that their symptoms are to be traced back to directly sexual impulsions which are repressed but still remain active” 
(Freud 1959, 95). From this perspective the capitalist “passions” are aspects of the ‘anal character’, i.e., the 
particular psychosocial canalization of “anal-sadistic” impulses (he lists three primary personality traits of the ‘anal’ 
character: excessive orderliness, obstinacy, and parsimoniousness). From this perspective, Marx’s idea of the 
“mystical consciousness” of “estranged” life-activity can be framed as an unavoidable symptom of our process of 
development. 
665 This comparison illustrates a connection between instinctual activity and the exercise and development of 
human powers which was left unexplored by Marx.  
666 Cf. Plato’s classic treatment of “inner natural necessity” in his Republic (Plato 1997, 137). 
667 Marx 1967, 325. 
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From the perspective of ‘Historical Materialism’, “self-conscious reason” develops through 
the process of “estrangement” whereby the natural world (including ourselves as a “natural 
being”) is altered by our activity. Freud’s perspective of the socio-economic frustration of 
instinctual desire entails a psychological process whereby the “ego-instincts” work “towards 
obtaining pleasure” and “under the influence of the instructress Necessity” the “ego discovers 
that it is inevitable for it to renounce immediate satisfaction”; and he claimed that through this 
experience the ego is “educated” and “has become ‘reasonable.’”668 However, Freud’s idea of 
“reason” is inconsistent with Marx’s because, for Freud, the operation of the inexorable 
“pleasure principle” within our psyche will perpetually come into conflict with the demands of 
reality, including other people that inhabit the world with us, insofar as our “id” perpetually 
strives for immediate instinctual gratification.669 Thus he maintained that human beings “have 
always found it hard to renounce pleasure” and “have contrived to alternate between remaining 
an animal of pleasure and being once more a creature of reason.”670 
In this respect Freud’s work parallels the writings of Kant, for whom a truly just society 
remains ultimately unattainable. In Kant’s view, freedom cannot be achieved because the crudity 
of our instinctual-bestial nature clings so strongly that we need a master to discipline us and 
educate us for the demands of a peaceful and free social order, but this master can only come 
from among humanity itself.671 As we have seen, the problem of needing an educator to educate 
                                                          
668 Freud 1966b, 444. This idea of “pleasure postponed” is comparable with Hegel’s depiction of the psychological 
process of deferred desire in the section on the “Independence and dependence of self-consciousness” in the 
Phenomenology (Ibid.). 
669 As Brown claimed, for Freud the “pleasure-principle is in conflict with the reality principle, and this conflict is 
the cause of repression. Under the conditions of repression the essence of our being lies in the unconscious, and 
only in the unconscious does the pleasure-principle reign supreme” (Brown 1959, 8). 
670 Freud 1966b, 463. 
671 This kind of problem is reflected by the case of the judge from Oklahoma who was found to be masturbating 
with a penis-pump under the bench in court while presiding over trials. He was sentenced to four years in prison in 
2006 (Associated Press 2006). 
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the educator is an insoluble one. It is evident that the same kind of problem arises in 
psychoanalytic theory if it is maintained that we need an analyst to overcome the discontent of 
civilized life. Psychoanalysis is thus bound by a contradiction like the vanguardist fallacy which 
is common to ‘Marxism’. This is particularly evident in the thought of the psychoanalytic-
Marxist Wilhelm Reich whose work is bound by both of these fallacies. If psychoanalysis is the 
solution to the neurotic discontent rooted in the crudity of our instinctual nature which acts as a 
barrier to “integral development” and expresses itself as a constant check on the progress of 
human civilization, it follows that the analyst must also be analyzed, but we would still have to 
account for how the first analyst was capable of ‘spontaneous’ self-analysis. After all, Sigmund 
Freud analyzed Sigmund Freud, and yet given the barriers to such insight that he himself pointed 
out it seems that self-analysis is inadequate in principle. Ultimately, from this perspective our 
history is, and can only be, a record of perpetual striving for unattainable freedom, characterized 
predominantly by suffering and unhappiness. Marcuse’s work serves as a classic example of an 
attempt to resolve this problem on its own foundations. In Eros and Civilization he railed against 
the “the tyranny of reason” and tried to “extrapolate the hypothesis of a non-repressive 
civilization from Freud’s theory of the instincts” which—on the premises of Freud’s 
psychoanalytic theory—is ultimately impossible.672 As a result of his search for “mental forces” 
which “remain essentially free from the reality principle,” he ended up positing the imaginative 
power of “phantasy” as the path to liberation because he thought that it “has a truth value of its 
own,” and only with it lies the possible “surmounting of the antagonistic human reality” and “the 
liberation of sensuousness from the repressive domain of reason.”673 In his Essay on Liberation 
he attempted to describe a “new sensibility” in which the “sensuous power of the imagination” 
                                                          
672 Marcuse 1962, 164, 122. 
673 Ibid., 130, 126, 164. 
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would “fashion [our] reason,” and he thought that “the freedom of the imagination is restrained 
not only by the sensibility, but also, at the other pole of the organic structure, by the rational 
faculty of man, his reason.”674 He left it up to the “imagination” to mediate “between the rational 
faculties and the sensuous needs.”675 
Freud’s theory ultimately stands in contrast to the idea, found in Marx’s writing, that it is 
possible for us to develop the ability to desire in accordance with “universal” ethical values, i.e., 
in a conscious, “ratiocinative” way. This limitation of Freudian psychology can be illustrated 
with Fromm’s uncritical appropriation of what he considers the key conception of 
psychoanalysis: the adaptation of the instinctual structure to “social reality” and “real needs in 
life.”676 Any such ‘social psychology’ could not adequately incorporate the manifestation of 
“mind” as “self-conscious reason” on the premises of Freudian anthropology. From Marx’s 
perspective, the character of social relations in “communist society” is not merely derived from 
the sublimation of the desire “to bring one’s own genitals into contact with those of someone” 
else.677 Its full actualization is found in “universally developed individuals” who are able to 
experience and actualize aesthetic, intellectual and ethical values as “universal existences” 
through “rational” thought and feeling. 
Alongside these divergences from Marx’s philosophical premises is the deeper 
inconsistency of ontological principles associated with the ‘materialism’ of the natural sciences 
on which Freud’s work is based (as discussed in the Introduction). In contrast, the vision of the 
“soul” that Husserl put forth is aligned with Marx’s premises and he spoke directly to the issues 
                                                          
674 Marcuse 1969, 30, 21, 29. 
675 Ibid., 30. 
676 Fromm 1970, 150, 139. Fromm maintained that the “phenomena studied in social (or mass) psychology...should 
be understood as the result of the adaptation of the instinctual apparatus to the social reality” (Ibid., 147). 
677 Freud 1969, 22. 
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arising from a psychological theory which shares the same ontological materialism as the natural 
sciences, as with psychoanalysis. According to Husserl, for “the realm of souls there is in 
principle no...ontology, no science corresponding to the physicalistic mathematical ideal” 
characteristic of the natural sciences.678 He claimed that the 
“task set for modern psychology, and taken over by it, was to be a science of 
psychophysical realities, of men and animals679 as unitary beings, though divided 
into two real strata. Here all theoretical thinking moves on the ground of the taken-
for-granted, pregiven world of experience, the world of natural life; and theoretical 
interest is simply directed as a special case to one of the real aspects of it, the souls, 
while the other aspect is supposed to be already known, or is yet to be known, by the 
exact natural sciences according to its objective, true being-in-itself.”680 
The essentially physicalistic idea of the “soul” in Freud’s psychoanalytic psychology cannot 
account for our participation in what Marx described as the “suprasensible” realm of experience, 
                                                          
678 Husserl 1970, 265. Husserl claimed that “psychology began with a concept of soul which was not at all 
formulated in an original way but which stemmed from Cartesian dualism, a concept furnished by a prior 
constructive idea of a corporeal nature and of a mathematical natural science. Thus psychology was burdened in 
advance with the task of being a science parallel [to physics] and with the conception that the soul—its subject 
matter—was something real in a sense similar to corporeal nature, the subject matter of natural science” (Ibid., 
212). The “psychology of Locke,” which developed with “the natural science of a Newton before it as a model,” is a 
classic example (Ibid., 177). Cf. Rousseau’s claim that “Nature commands all animals, and the beast obeys. Man 
receives the same impulsion, but he recognizes himself as being free to acquiesce or resist; and it is above all in 
this consciousness of his freedom that the spirituality of his soul reveals itself, for physics explains in a certain way 
the mechanism of the senses and the formation of ideas, but in the power to will, or rather to choose, and in the 
feeling of that power, we see pure spiritual activity, of which the laws of mechanics can explain nothing” 
(Rousseau 1984, 88). 
679 Cf. his claim that “Animal realities are first of all, at a basic level, physical realities. As such, they belong in the 
closed nexus of relationships in physical nature, in Nature meant in the primary and most pregnant sense as the 
universal theme of a pure natural science; that is to say, an objective science of nature which in deliberate one-
sidedness excludes all extra-physical predictions of reality” (Husserl 1999, 323). 
680 Husserl 1970, 204. 
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nor the idea that the human “soul” is undergoing a teleological development whereby “self-
conscious reason” manifests.681  
Husserl’s “phenomenological pure psychology” involves a conceptual framework which is 
more consistent with the incipient psychology in Marx’s ‘Historical Materialism’ than Freudian 
psychoanalysis is.682 Husserl maintained that 
“the psychic, considered purely in terms of its own essence, has no [physical] nature, 
has no conceivable in-itself in the natural sense, no spatiotemporally causal, no 
idealizable and mathematizable in-itself, no laws after the fashion of natural laws.”683 
He claimed that psychology is like “natural science” insofar as it “can only draw its ‘rigor’ 
(‘exactness’) from the rationality of the essence.”684 In this case it is “the mind’s [Geist] own 
essence” which “refers not to a mystical ‘metaphysical’ essence but to one’s own being-in-
oneself and for-oneself which...is accessible to the inquiring, reflecting ego through so-called 
‘inner’ or ‘self-perception.’”685 This is related to the distinction that Husserl made between “the 
psychological ego (the human ego, that is, made worldly in the spatiotemporal world) and the 
                                                          
681 Cf. Hegel’s idea of the “instinctive movement—the inherent impulse in the life of the soul—to break through 
the rind of mere nature, sensuousness, and that which is alien to it, and to attain to the light of consciousness, i.e. 
to itself” (Hegel 1956, 57). 
682 Husserl 1999, 326. 
683 Husserl 1970, 222. In his view, the “soul ‘is’, of course, ‘in’ the world. But does this mean that it is in the world in 
the way that the physical body is and that, when men with living bodies and souls are experienced in the world as 
real, their reality, as well as that of their living bodies and souls, could have the same or even a similar sense to 
that of the mere physical bodies? Even though the human living body is counted among the physical bodies, it is 
still ‘living’—‘my physical body’, which I ‘move’, in and through which I ‘hold sway’, which I ‘animate’. If one fails to 
consider these matters—which soon become quite extensive—thoroughly, and actually without prejudice, one has 
not grasped at all what is of a soul’s own essence as such” (Ibid., 212). 
684 Husserl 1999, 326. According to Husserl, a “phenomenological pure psychology is absolutely necessary as the 
foundation for the building up of an ‘exact’ empirical psychology, which since its modern beginnings has been 
sought according to the model of the exact pure sciences of physical nature. The fundamental meaning of 
‘exactness’ in this natural science lies in its being founded on an a priori form-system—each part unfolded in a 
special theory (pure geometry, a theory of pure time, theory of motion, etc.)—for a Nature conceivable in these 
terms” (Ibid., 326). 
685 Husserl 1970, 213. 
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transcendental ego.”686 There are strong parallels between Husserl’s idea of “transcendental 
subjectivity”687 and the thinking expressed in Marx’s fragmentary writings on human 
subjectivity. Consider, for example, the following passage: 
“My general consciousness is only the theoretical shape of that of which 
the living shape is the real community, the social fabric.... The activity of my general 
consciousness, as an activity, is therefore also my theoretical existence as a social 
being. Above all we must avoid postulating ‘society’ again as an abstraction vis-à-vis 
the individual. The individual is the social being.... In his consciousness of 
species man confirms his real social life and simply repeats his real existence in 
thought, just as conversely the being of the species confirms itself in species 
consciousness and exists for itself in its generality as a thinking being. Man, much as 
he may therefore be a particular individual... is just as much the totality—the ideal 
totality—the subjective existence of imagined and experienced society for itself; just 
as he exists also in the real world both as awareness and real enjoyment of social 
existence, and as a totality of human manifestations of life. Thinking and being are 
thus certainly distinct, but at the same time they are in unity with each other.”688 
                                                          
686 Ibid., 205. Husserl described this “duality” as our being “psychological, as human objectivities in the world, the 
subjects of psychic life, and at the same time transcendental, as the subjects of a transcendental, world-
constituting life-process,” and he thought that we have “direct access” to “this transcendental subjectivity” 
through “a transcendental experience” (Husserl 1999, 330-31). 
687 “Transcendental subjectivity...is none other than again ‘I myself’ and ‘we ourselves’; not, however, as found in 
the natural attitude of everyday or of positive science; i.e., apperceived as components of the objectively present 
world before us, but rather as subjects of conscious life, in which this world and all that is present—for ‘us’—
‘makes’ itself through certain apperceptions. As [human beings], mentally as well as bodily present in the world, 
we are for ‘ourselves’; we are appearances standing within an extremely variegated intentional life-process, ‘our’ 
life, in which this being on hand constitutes itself ‘for us’ apperceptively, with its entire sense-content. The 
(apperceived) I and we on hand presuppose an (apperceiving) I and we, for which they are on hand, which, 
however, is not itself present again in the same sense” (Ibid., 329-330). 
688 Marx 1964, 137-8. 
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According to Husserl, “each soul” stands “in community with others which are intentionally 
interrelated, that is, in a purely intentional, internally and essentially closed nexus, that of 
intersubjectivity.”689 On his premises this entails “a transcendental intersubjectivity constituting 
the world as ‘world for all.’”690 In this way his phenomenology is more thoroughly consistent 
with Marx’s claim that “the sense and minds of other [individuals can] become my own 
appropriation.”691 
Thus, unlike psychoanalytic psychology, Husserl’s approach aligns with the fundamental 
premises underlying Marx’s idea of “universal” experience. As he claimed, 
“phenomenology recognizes…the absolute norms which are to be picked out 
intuitively from [the life of humanity], and also its...directedness towards disclosure 
of these norms and their conscious practical operation…. Or, in different words, it is 
a striving in the direction of the idea (lying in infinity) of a humanness which in 
action and throughout would live and move [be, exist] in truth and genuineness.”692 
From the perspective of Marx’s ‘Historical Materialism,’ this kind of ‘practical activity’ involves 
the development of capacities required to experience “universal” ethical principles. In contrast, 
Freud’s view of experience is inconsistent with the idea of being able to know “universal” ethical 
values and actualize them in “free” relations. Even though Freud was concerned with the 
development of an individual whose desires are “reasonable” because they seek “to attain 
                                                          
689 Husserl 1970, 238. In other words, “there is a sole universal nature as a self-enclosed framework of all souls, 
which are united not externally but internally, namely, through the intentional interpenetration which is the 
communalization of their lives” (i.e., in “a pure, intentional, mutual internality”) (Ibid., 255-56). 
690 Ibid., 184. Cf. what Hegel described as “the experience of what Spirit is,” i.e., the “absolute substance which is 
the unity of the different independent self-consciousnesses which, in their opposition, enjoy perfect freedom and 
independence: ‘I’ that is ‘We’ and ‘We’ that is ‘I’” (Hegel 1977, 110). 
691 Marx 1964, 139-40. 
692 Husserl 1999, 334-335.  
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pleasure” which “is assured through taking account of reality,” the only basis for determining 
ethical behaviour from his perspective is the character of our “superego” morality, i.e., the sense 
of conscience inherited from one’s elders and broader socio-cultural environment.693 Evaluative 
claims about the way we behave in our relations with others are inconsistent with this relativism. 
Ultimately the “superego” is not a substantial basis for self-determined ethical behaviour because 
it is a predominantly unconscious internal authority that influences behaviour through fear 
roused by a sense of guilt. This is consistent with the fact that Freud’s psychoanalytic 
psychology precludes the possibility for self-determination—and has no space for “universal” 
ethical values—at the ontological level. 
2. Kleinian Psychoanalysis and the Development of “Human Need” 
Melanie Klein’s revision of Freud’s psychoanalytic theory694 brought it closer to the 
philosophical premises of Marx’s social philosophy. In particular, her work is more compatible 
with the philosophical premises underlying Marx’s idea of ethical life and experience. Her 
elaboration of the human psyche and its development also overlaps with significant elements of 
Marx’s depiction of human subjectivity. Klein attempted to take account of an “ethical pattern” 
which she claimed is “universal.”695 A key idea of hers in this connection is the “integration” of 
                                                          
693 Freud 1966b, 444. 
694 One of Klein’s major revisions to Freud’s theory is her reconceptualization of the subject’s “inner world” and her 
contribution to “object relations” theory. She maintained that “the processes of introjection and projection from 
the beginning of life lead to the institution inside ourselves of loved and hated objects, who are felt to be ‘good’ 
and ‘bad’, and who are interrelated with each other and with the self: that is to say, they constitute an inner world. 
This assembly of internalized objects becomes organized, together with the organization of the ego, and in the 
higher strata of the mind it becomes discernible as the super-ego. Thus, the phenomenon which was recognized by 
Freud...as the voices and the influence of the actual parents established in the ego is, according to my findings, a 
complex object-world, which is felt by the individual, in deep layers of the unconscious, to be concretely inside 
himself, and for which I and some of my colleagues therefore use the term ‘internalized objects’ and an ‘inner 
world’” (Klein 1998, 362). 
695 In her view, “When the imperatives: ‘Thou shalt not kill’ (primarily the loved object), and ‘Thou shalt save from 
destruction’ (again the loved objects, and in the first place from the infant’s own aggression) have taken root in the 
mind, an ethical pattern is set up which is universal and the rudiment of all ethical systems” (Ibid., 322). Coming 
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the “ego.”696 The process of “integration” is essentially the coming-together of initially 
discordant parts of the ego and “internalized objects.”697 
According to Klein, as the process of “integration” proceeds, “the adaptation to external 
reality” improves and there is “a fuller synthesis of unconscious processes,” i.e., “within the 
unconscious parts of the ego and super-ego,” whereby “the demarcation between conscious and 
unconscious is more distinct.”698 The “growing sense of reality”699 associated with “integration 
and synthesis” is a step away from Freud’s ethical relativism toward the kind of “rational” self-
determination presented in Marx’s work in so far as “integration” entails the gradual 
“assimilation” of the “super-ego” by the ego.700 Thus from the perspective of Klein’s 
psychoanalytic psychology it is possible to conceive of a subject capable of engaging in relations 
of “justice” that are good from a “universal” standpoint.701 Marx’s idea of “universally 
developed individuals” suggests that when we are fully developed there would be no need for 
                                                          
from a “socialist” perspective, Michael Rustin claimed that Klein’s psychological theory is consistent with the idea 
of “a universal ethic” of “essential human equality” at the basis of “a social order providing a fulfilling life for all” 
(Rustin 1982, 95). 
696 For Klein, “elements of an integrated personality” are “emotional maturity, strength of character, [the] capacity 
to deal with conflicting emotions, a balance between internal life and adaptation to reality, and a successful 
welding into a whole of the different parts of the personality” (Klein 1997, 268). It “expresses itself in the capacity 
for love” and more specifically corresponds to “Understanding of other people, compassion, sympathy and 
tolerance” (Ibid., 191, 269). Klein maintained that in “the depths of the mind, the urge to make people happy is 
linked up with a strong feeling of responsibility and concern for them, which manifests itself in genuine sympathy 
with other people and in the ability to understand them, as they are and as they feel” (Klein 1998, 311). 
697 The “integration of the ego is accomplished by the different parts of the ego…being able to come together in 
spite of their conflicting tendencies” (Klein 1997, 289; cf. 50). 
698 Klein 1997, 86. 
699 Klein claimed that “steps in integration and synthesis...result in a greater capacity of the ego to acknowledge 
the increasingly poignant psychic reality” (Ibid., 73). 
700 Ibid., 304, 73. 
701 In relation to Marx’s social philosophy it is noteworthy that her definition of successful individual development 
is articulated as a kind of mean akin to Aristotelian virtue ethics; e.g., with the development of “tolerance” (see 
Klein 1997, 260). 
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something like a “super-ego” to govern ethical behaviour because we would be self-determined 
in a way that is “universal,” i.e. “rational.” 
From a Kleinian perspective, the experience of the ethical relationship that Marx conceived 
as “human”— namely, relations in which we would experience each other “as a reintegration of 
[our] own nature and a necessary part of [ourselves]” and would be “affirmed in [our] thought as 
well as [our] love”— involves, in part, developmental processes in infancy that “make possible 
the feeling of unity with another person,” whereby “such unity means being fully understood.”702 
Her understanding of the psychology of “love” also overlaps with Marx’s idea of the 
“human need” for “the other person as a person.” From a Kleinian perspective this is prefigured 
in the development of the infant’s ability to experience their mother as independent and a 
“person.”703 Another key concept related to this is her idea of “reparation”—i.e., the desire to 
repair loved objects (including people) that a child (in a delusional way) believes they have 
harmed with their destructive impulses—which she associates with the capacity to love and feel 
concern for others. In particular, she thought that the “drive to make reparation” is “a 
consequence of greater insight into psychic reality and of growing synthesis, for it shows a more 
realistic response to the feelings of grief, guilt and fear of loss resulting from the aggression 
against the loved object.”704  
                                                          
702 Marx 1994, 53; Klein 1997, 188. She claimed that this experience is “essential for every happy love relation or 
friendship” and, in the context of infant development, that “such an understanding needs no words to express it” 
(Ibid.). She thought that to “be genuinely considerate implies that we can put ourselves in the place of other 
people: we ‘identify’ ourselves with them” (Klein 1998, 311). 
703 Marx 1964, 134. Klein claimed that the “infant’s relation to parts of his mother’s body, focusing on her breast, 
gradually changes into a relation to her as a person,” i.e., the mother is first experienced as an object (more or less 
fragmented) but with the infant’s further development she becomes recognized as an independent subject (Klein 
1997, 71). As Marx claimed, “love” is what “first really teaches man to believe in the objective world outside 
himself, which not only makes man into an object, but even the object into a man” (Marx 1975b, 21-22). 
704 Klein 1997, 14. 
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C. Fred Alford claimed that “reparative reason” is a “Kleinian alternative” to “what the 
Frankfurt School calls instrumental reason” and that “Klein’s psychoanalytic studies reveal a 
potential for morality that flies higher than Freud’s.”705 According to Alford, with Klein’s 
version of psychoanalysis we encounter the idea of “a morality based not merely upon the desire 
to make sacrifices, in order to make reparation for phantasied acts of aggression; it is also based 
upon an ability to deeply identify with others, to feel connected with their fates. Their pain 
becomes our pain.”706 However, Alford’s focus on “the way in which reparative reason is 
sensitive to the complexities and nuances of objects, rather than forcing them into rigid, 
prefabricated categories” is misleading because it does not adequately account for the underlying 
reason why the individual “seeks to repair and make amends.”707 From Klein’s perspective this 
“reparative” tendency requires an element of depressive guilt tied to “phantasy.” A degree of 
delusion thus remains at the basis of Kleinian ethics. This is a major shortcoming of her 
psychological theory from the standpoint of Marx’s social philosophy because she essentially 
precludes the possibility of the development of individuality akin to “universally developed 
individuals.”708 Indeed, Marx’s work suggests that such individuals would require what Klein 
termed “Complete and permanent integration” which she maintained is “never possible” (even 
though she thought that a tendency toward “integration” is inherent in the ego).709 
This issue in Klein’s thought is consonant with some of the aforementioned issues arising 
from Freud’s original version of psychoanalytic psychology. Nevertheless, her view of the 
                                                          
705 Alford 1989, 22, 38-39. 
706 Ibid., 41. 
707 Ibid., 138. Alford’s focus on the Frankfurt School led to his emphasis on this attribute of “reparative reason” 
because, according to him, it “makes reparative reason relevant to the critique of instrumental reason” (Ibid.). 
708 She thought that “the young child’s perception of external reality and external objects is perpetually influenced 
and coloured by his phantasies, and...this in some measure continues throughout life” (Klein 1997, 40). 
709 Ibid., 233. 
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mental-psychological processes underlying human development complements Marx’s 
perspective on “estranged” socio-historical practices through which humanity transforms into 
“the new species.”710 Marx claimed that through certain social practices our collective powers 
and relations become transferred onto objects (e.g., capital) that then dominate us as alien and 
hostile entities. This process resembles Klein’s concept of “projective identification” which 
denotes the unconscious process whereby parts of the self, e.g., an infant’s own impulses like 
greed and aggressiveness, are projected onto other objects (and people) and experienced as 
though they actually belong to them.711 For Klein, some unconscious ‘projection’ is an 
unavoidable necessity in the development of a healthy, “integrated” mind. Marx had an 
analogous view of the role that “estrangement” in capitalist society plays in the process of human 
development. In his view, with “estranged” labour in capitalism “we find the same situation that 
we find in religion,” i.e., “the inversion of subject into object and vice versa,” in “the realm of 
the social,” and he claimed that it “cannot be avoided, any more than it is possible for [humanity] 
to avoid the stage in which [our] spiritual energies are given a religious definition as powers 
independent of [ourselves].”712 
                                                          
710 Marx 1973, 325. After all, Marx thought that a “communist” revolution concludes humanity’s “prehistory” 
(Marx 1977, 21). Cf. Engels’ claim that “the common management of production by the whole of society and the 
resulting new development of production require and also produce quite different people. The common 
management of production cannot be effected by people as they are today, each one being assigned to a single 
branch of production, shackled to it, exploited by it, each having developed only one of his abilities at the cost of 
all the others and knowing only one branch, or only a branch of a branch of the total production. Even present-day 
industry finds less and less use for such people. Industry carried on in common and according to plan by the whole 
of society presupposes moreover people of all-round development, capable of surveying the entire system of 
production” (Marx and Engels 1976, 353). 
711 Klein 1997, 12. See R.D. Hinshelwood’s “Projective Identification and Marx’s Concept of Man” in which he 
argues that “Marx described an unmistakable and very concrete form of projective identification” (Hinshelwood 
1983, 221). 
712 Marx 1976, 990. 
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3. Humanity’s “Dream” and a Starting Point for Reconceptualising the Mental-
Psychological Dimension of Socio-Political Struggle in the “Bourgeois Epoch” 
At a formative period in Marx’s life he expressed the desire to contribute to the “self-
understanding” of “the age concerning its struggles and wishes.”713 He described the “reform of 
consciousness” as the awakening of the world “out of its own dream” which is “a matter 
of realising the thoughts of the past” and “consciously” performing the “old work” of 
humanity.714 This goal corresponds to the essential aim of psychoanalytic theory which, in its 
own way, is concerned with what Marx called an “analysis of the mystical consciousness that is 
unclear about itself.”715 As Norman Brown put it, in “the case of the neurotic individual, the goal 
of psychoanalytical therapy is to free him from the burden of his past.... And the method of 
psychoanalytical therapy is to deepen the historical consciousness of the individual...till he 
awakens from his own history as from a nightmare.”716 From the psychoanalytic perspective, the 
“the past” bears on the present mentally through wishes, instinctual impulses, emotional ties, 
etc., that were repressed in the process of psychological development and have returned to 
influence us from their source in our “unconscious,” as with religious life.717 This idea was 
reanimated in the Kleinian school’s idea of “unconscious phantasy.” As the Kleinian Roger 
Money-Kyrle put it, when “phantasy” is at work there is “an undercurrent of patterns belonging 
to other situations than the present one. Something is being repeated from the past.... The 
perceptual world...is being distorted—perhaps only to a slight and barely perceptible degree—by 
                                                          
713 Marx 1967, 214-5. 
714Ibid., 213-4. From his perspective “there is not a big blank between the past and the future” (Ibid.). 
715 Ibid., 213. 
716 Brown 1959, 19. 
717 Freud claimed that “the story of religious ideas includes not only wish-fulfillments but important historical 
recollections. The concurrent influence of past and present must give religion a truly incomparable wealth of 
power” (Freud 1961, 69). 
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unconscious phantasy, and it is the distorted picture to which” we “emotionally” react.718 He 
claimed that when “the phantasy world” is gradually recognized as unreal,  
“the belief systems expressed by it are to this extent corrected. The process is 
analogous to the awakening from a dream. No one is entirely awake even when he is 
out of bed, for everyone has moods of irrational depression, anxiety or irritation 
which reflect the unconscious influence of phantasy. The neurotic or psychotic is 
someone who lives more in an unconscious dream world than other people, the 
unrecognized influence of which accounts for the irrationality of his emotional 
behaviour. As he gradually wakes under the influence of analysis, he may have to 
face some sorrows which he previously evaded; but he will also discard some 
nightmare-like anxieties.”719 
While the experience of “phantasy” as represented in Klein’s version of psychoanalysis 
parallels Marx’s idea of “estrangement” because it is unavoidable and at times instrumental for 
development, the idea that psychoanalysis by an external psychoanalyst is necessary for this 
awakening is antithetical to Marx’s view that overcoming “estrangement” is a result of the 
process of “estrangement” itself. He insisted that revolutionary theorists are limited to presenting 
what is “actually” happening, e.g., by “bringing the religious and political problems into the self-
conscious human form.”720 From his perspective, we are living in conditions which require 
“illusions” and we can dispel them only through activity which transforms both our conditions of 
life and ourselves simultaneously. He did not treat the “mystical consciousness” of 
                                                          
718 Money-Kyrle 1951, 85. 
719 Ibid., 85-86. 
720 Marx 1967, 214. 
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“estrangement” as if it were simply a hallucinatory experience721 and in his work he presents the 
same process of “estrangement” that mires us in “illusions” as also bringing about a historical 
development of the human “mind.” 
Despite its limitations, Klein’s version of psychoanalysis presents a possible starting point 
for reconceptualising the mental-psychological determinations of the social and political 
struggles of humanity which parallel the concerns of a ‘Historical Materialist’ analysis of class 
struggle in the “bourgeois epoch.” Her writings offer a complementary approach to a theory of 
the “soul” of individuals who have revolutionary or reactionary attitudes and participate in their 
respective social movements. Consider, for instance, her claim that the “universal ethical 
pattern” is “capable of manifold variations and distortions, and even of complete reversal,” and 
that she mentioned “the Nazi attitude” as an example of a “reversal” of this “primary pattern.”722 
In her explanation for this she referred to “the early unconscious relation towards the first 
persons attacked or injured in phantasy.”723 At the basis of this is her “conceptual distinction 
between depressive anxiety, guilt and reparation on the one hand and persecutory anxiety and the 
defenses against it on the other.”724 She cited Money-Kyrle’s application of this “to attitudes 
towards ethics in general725 and towards political beliefs in particular.”726 
                                                          
721 In capitalist society, for instance, “the worker actually treats the social character of his work, its combination 
with the work of others for a common goal, as a power that is alien to him” and “really does submit to the 
commands of capital,” which thus “really” is “an alien power” (Marx 1981, 178-9 ; Marx 1976, 989, 716). 
722 Klein 1997, 322. 
723 Ibid. “Here the aggressor and aggression have become loved and admired objects, and the attacked objects 
have turned into evil and must therefore be exterminated.... The object then turns into a potential persecutor, 
because retaliation by the same means by which it had been harmed is feared. The injured person is, however, 
also identical with the loved person, who should be protected and restored. Excessive early fears tend to increase 
the conception of the injured object as an enemy, and if this is the outcome, hatred will prevail in the struggle 
against love” (Ibid.). 
724 Klein 1997, 37. 
725 Such as forms of “morality based on irrational anxiety” (Money-Kyrle 1952, 230). 
726 Klein 1997, 38. 
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Money-Kyrle approached “the conflict of different social ideologies within one nation,” 
i.e., “the old conflict between socialism and individualism, radicalism and conservatism,” from a 
Kleinian perspective.727 He maintained that “our political beliefs” about “political affairs” are 
“often very greatly influenced by unconscious phantasies surviving from early childhood which 
distort our conscious inferences and deductions.”728 This is because our “political egos” are 
connected to the “super-ego” which is “a being in the world of unconscious phantasy.”729 Aside 
from the theoretical differences discussed above, the concept of the “super-ego” happens to 
correspond with Marx’s assertion to Ruge that in the process of a “reform of consciousness” it 
“is not a question of drawing a great mental dividing line between past and future”; as Freud 
claimed, the “super-ego” “unites in itself the influences of the present and the past.”730 Inspired 
by Freud, Klein maintained that the “super-ego derives” from “the people whom we first loved 
and hated” and she thought that these “phantasy-relationships” form “part of our continuous, 
active life of feeling and of imagination.”731 While her idea of the “super-ego” remains 
essentially Freudian, her revision of Freud’s theory brings it closer to Marx’s thought because 
                                                          
727 Money-Kyrle 1944, 114. 
728 Money-Kyrle 1952, 233. Following Ernest Jones, he claimed that our “political egos” can “remain as it were the 
seat of an encapsulated illness in otherwise sane and normal personalities” (Money-Kyrle 1951, 99). According to 
Money-Kyrle some “ideological attitudes” are “ultimately conditioned by unconscious distortions of reality and 
must therefore be classed as pathological” (Money-Kyrle 1944b, 168). Similar to when a “patient’s emotional 
behaviour is irrational,” pathological ideological attitudes and beliefs are “not justified by the situation” that an 
individual is “really in”; these individuals behave as if they are “in different situations” because they are “in 
unconscious phantasy” and “unconsciously deluded” (Money-Kyrle 1952, 228-9). 
729 Money-Kyrle 1951, 67. 
730 Marx 1975, 144. Freud 1969, 97. “In the establishment of the super-ego,” Freud claimed, “we have before us, as 
it were, an example of the way in which the present is changed into the past” (Ibid.). As Brown put it, Freud’s 
theory maintains that “the problem of guilt in the human species...causes the nightmare of history” (Brown 1959, 
277). 
731 Klein 1997, 322-323; Klein 1998, 340. She claimed that “However far we feel removed from our original 
dependencies, however much satisfaction we derive from the fulfilment of our adult ethical demands, in the 
depths of our minds our first longings to preserve and save our loved parents, and to reconcile ourselves with 
them, persist. There are many ways of gaining ethical satisfaction; but whether this be through social and co-
operative feelings and pursuits, or even through interests which are further removed from the external world—
whenever we have the feeling of moral goodness, in our unconscious minds the primary longing for reconciliation 
with the original objects of our love and hatred is fulfilled” (Klein 1997, 323). 
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the “growing assimilation of the super-ego by the ego” entails a tendency toward growing 
awareness of the “universal” present of “rational” intersubjective life-activity and experience. 
In accordance with Klein’s idea of the series of psychological “positions” that individuals 
pass through in the early phases of psychological development—i.e., the “paranoid-schizoid” and 
“depressive”732—Money-Kyrle gave a Kleinian account of the “super-ego” in his attempt to 
explain the forms of ‘moral character’ that are observable in ideological attitudes. He arranged 
these forms of “conscience” on a spectrum in which the “humanist” type is closest to the 
“integrated”/“rational” individual and at the other extreme is the “authoritarian” which is 
subdivided further into more irrational forms of “disturbed morality,” namely the “hypo-manic” 
and “hypo-paranoid.”733 From this perspective these different forms of ‘moral character’ 
correspond to an unconscious sense of “guilt” that is composed of some combination of 
“persecutory” and “depressive” anxiety, and they are expressed in different political ideologies 
and the activities associated with them. 
From Money-Kyrle’s Kleinian perspective, “the Nazi attitude” is connected to a 
predominance of “unconscious phantasy” associated with the “paranoid-schizoid position.” 
According to Klein “if early schizoid mechanisms and anxieties have not been sufficiently 
overcome, the result may be that instead of a fluid boundary between the conscious and 
unconscious, a rigid barrier between them arises,” indicating that “development is disturbed.”734 
Prominent during this phase of psychological development is a force directly related to the onto-
cosmology of Freudian psychoanalysis, i.e., death. As Klein maintained, when “there is a very 
                                                          
732 Each of these developmental “positions” function in accordance with the particular form of anxiety that 
corresponds to them, i.e., “persecutory” and “depressive” respectively, and each has corresponding defences 
against the anxiety, e.g., “splitting” and mania. 
733 Money-Kyrle 1951, 71-72. 
734 Klein 1997, 87. 
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rigid barrier [between the conscious and unconscious] produced by splitting” (i.e., of the “ego” 
and “internalized objects” as a defense from ‘persecutory anxiety’), the “conclusion would be 
that the death instinct is dominant”; and when “the persecution-anxiety for the ego is in the 
ascendant, a full and stable identification with another object, in the sense of looking at it and 
understanding it as it really is, and a full capacity for love, are not possible.”735 
In the work of both Marx and Klein the development of the capacity to “love” is portrayed 
as a condition of freedom and associated with increasing “universal” awareness of the world,736 
including other individuals and our relationships with them.737 Marx proposed that revolutionary 
subjects strive to organize society on the basis of a common plan which ensures that everyone 
can be properly nurtured. Such individuals stand in contrast to those who create “crude 
communism,” with their “greed,” “envy,” and proclivity for “possession,” as well as individuals 
driven by feelings of vengeance and drawn to violent and authoritarian power structures. From a 
Kleinian perspective the form of individuality expressed in Marx’s idea of the revolutionary 
subject is characteristic of the “depressive” type. There is thus a congruency with Marx’s thought 
which presents one possible but fitting way of articulating a “spiritual” form of “poverty” 
associated with the “need” for “the other person as a person” in a form that precedes its full 
development and freely realized form in relations between “universally developed individuals.” 
Marx’s work does not suggest that the experience of such “poverty” alone is enough for 
individuals to develop the ethical character required for a “communist” revolution; rather, the 
context in which it is written suggests that Marx thought of it as a partial catalyst for the “inner” 
                                                          
735 Ibid., 244; Klein 1998, 271. 
736 Klein shares with Marx the broad sense of “universal” experience as that which is common to all who have 
attained a certain level of individual development, but on different ontological and anthropological premises. 
737 Cf. Hegel’s idea of “spirit” as the knowledge of “oneself in love” (Hegel 2007, 78). 
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transformation required for “revolutionary practice” in the context of the social relations of 
capitalist society, akin to the role that servitude plays in the development of real self-
determination in Marx’s Hegelian theory of class struggle.738 Kleinian theory provides a possible 
way of conceiving of this role because it is thought that with “the depressive type” of individual 
the “division between unconscious and conscious is less pronounced” and they are “much more 
capable of insight.”739 
4. “Is this really a conclusion?” 
This dissertation has demonstrated several theses in relation to key components of Marx’s 
philosophy that conventional interpretations either misrepresent or overlook entirely. Chief 
among them are his sublation of the ontological idea that “reason governs the world”; the 
“speculative”-phenomenological nature of his “dialectical method”; the development of 
“universal human nature” as “free” being, which is our “end” in the Aristotelian sense; his idea 
of freedom as the “rational” activities (the creation and enjoyment of “beauty” and “truth” as 
ends-in-themselves and the social provision of what is required for the full development and 
                                                          
738 Consider the following lines written by Yannis Ritsos during the Greek Civil War in 1948 while he was detained 
at a political prison camp (at these prisons Leftists were tortured in an attempt to crush the spirit of their 
resistance, at times having members of their family beaten and sexually abused in front of them, and forced to sign 
humiliating renunciations of their struggle):  
November 6: 
“Well then—must we really be so sad 
In order to love one another?” 
November 9: 
“Tonight we learned that we have to be happy 
in order to be loved by one another” (Ritsos 2013, 51, 19). 
739 Klein 1997, 67. Klein claimed that the “experience of depressive feelings”—i.e., the specific kind of “suffering” 
associated with them—“has the effect of further integrating the ego, because it makes for an increased 
understanding of psychic reality and better perception of the external world, as well as for a greater synthesis 
between inner and external situations” (Ibid., 14, 44). This association between ‘moral character’ and perception 
resembles the relationship between “moral virtue” and perception in Aristotle’s ethical philosophy. Cf. his claim 
that “each state of character has its own ideas of the [beautiful] and the pleasant, and perhaps the good man 
differs from others most by seeing the truth in each class of things, being as it were the norm and measure of 
them” (Aristotle 1998, 59). 
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flourishing of everyone) and relations (comparable to Aristotle’s ideas of “justice” and true 
“friendship”) of “universally developed individuals” in “an advanced phase of communist 
society”; his sublation of the idea that “reason” is ‘at work’ in human history and that it is 
through a process of “estrangement” that it takes the form of self-conscious subjectivity; his idea 
that capitalism in particular is a necessary stage in this teleological development of “self-
conscious reason” because the “passions” of the capitalists establish a mode of production which 
is instrumental in the development of the science and technology objectified in the productive 
forces of social labour and the “integral development” of wage-labourers; and his idea that the 
creation of the revolutionary subject takes place fundamentally through “estrangement” and 
“revolutionary practice” which, aside from the consciousness of their revolutionary role, 
develops the productive and ethical capacities required for the revolutionary reorganization of 
social life. A firm grasp of these aspects of his philosophy and their interconnection is essential 
for a coherent interpretation of his idea of revolutionary subjectivity. This dissertation has 
challenged mistaken vanguardist interpretations of Marx’s idea of revolutionary subjectivity and 
ultimately his idea itself on the grounds that it is inconsistent and undertheorized. 
Rearticulating elements of Marx’s thought about “estrangement” and human subjectivity 
with Husserl’s phenomenology and Freudian psychoanalysis (and Klein’s revision of it) is a 
fruitful starting point for moving beyond the limitations of Marx’s social philosophy while 
retaining and advancing the insights of it. In his assessments of the class struggle Marx took 
account of forms of “estrangement” and irrationality that are not ‘self-transcending’, even though 
they remained inadequately explored in his work. This can be explained in part by the fact that, 
from the perspective of his social philosophy, “estrangement” plays a necessary role in the 
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development of freedom and humanity is depicted as its own enemy throughout this process.740 
However, without an adequate theory of the subjectivity at the basis of our life-practice, his work 
unavoidably fell short of explaining “to the world its own acts” and putting “political problems 
into the self-conscious human form” for the “mystical consciousness that is unclear about 
itself.”741 
 
“If to be human is to suffer we are not human to suffer only 
this is why I think so often, these days, of the great river 
of this meaning that goes forward between banks of herbs and weeds 
and animals that graze and slake their thirst and people that sow and reap 
and even of great tombs and small dwellings of the dead. 
This flowing that follows its course and is not so different from human blood 
or from human eyes when they gaze fixedly and without fear into their own hearts...”742 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
740 This, of course, is already a component of the progressive Hegelian tradition in which his thought is situated. Cf. 
Hegel’s claim that “Spirit is at war with itself; it has to overcome itself as its most formidable obstacle” (Hegel 
1956, 55). 
741 Ibid., 214. 
742 From “An Old Man On The River Bank” by George Seferis (Seferis 2016, 113).  
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